Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case were the rights of three brothers who were residuary beneficiaries under a testamentary trust. One of the brothers leased the trust property when the trust terminated. The other two brothers sued him and the trustee to determine their respective rights. The one brother appealed the district court's judgment that found the trust was properly terminated and that he was not entitled to compensation for improvements he made to the property. Upon careful consideration of the district court record, the Supreme Court found there were genuine issues concerning reimbursement for the improvements made to the property. The Court reversed the district court on that issue, but affirmed the lower court as to all other issues. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.

Jacklin Land Company (Jacklin) owned real property that it developed into a commercial industrial complex. The development was subject to multiple covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). One of the CC&Rs was that the development was not intended for retail businesses. In April 2008, Blue Dog RV, a retailer, began negotiating with Jacklin about the purchase of land in within the complex. During the course of the negotiations, Blue Dog also discussed renting four undeveloped lots across the street, but still within the complex. KL Properties owned those four lots. Ultimately Blue Dog leased space from KL Properties. Citing the CC&Rs, Jacklin sent notice to Blue Dog to vacate the KL leased space. When further negotiations between the parties proved unfruitful, Jacklin filed suit to enjoin KL Properties and Blue Dog from using the space for RV retail. The trial court ruled in KL and Blue Dog's favor. On reconsideration, the court issued an injunction against Blue Dog for violation of the CC&Rs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's injunction was technically flawed because it did not give "explicit notice of precisely what conduct was outlawed," and that it enjoined unknown persons who were not party to this action. The Court vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Stephen and Marilee Bell hired contractor Defendant Perception Construction Management, Inc. (PCM) to build a log home. The parties' relationship deteriorated, and the Plaintiffs terminated the contract before construction was complete. Plaintiffs refused to pay PCM's final invoices, and PCM filed suit to enforce a lien it placed on the home for the unpaid invoices. Plaintiffs filed multiple counterclaims, including construction defect and breach of contract. PCM prevailed at trial, and the district court found PCM was entitled to damages, prejudgment interest and attorney fees. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district court erred by excluding certain evidence relating to their defense against the lien, and in its determination of the monies allegedly owed under the lien. The Supreme Court found that the district court impermissibly excluded Plaintiffs' evidence, and as such, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner-Appellant Roger Steele and several residents appealed a district court order that dismissed their claim that the City of Shelley (City) illegally annexed land in Bingham County known as "Kelley Acres." The district court found that there was no statutory authorization for the district court's review of the annexation. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellants argued that the annexation was "arbitrary and capricious" and procedurally defective. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that there was indeed, no statutory authority for judicial review of the annexation. Furthermore, the Court found substantial evidence that supported the City's annexation of Kelley Acres. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellant Twin Lakes Canal Company (Twin Lakes) owned a reservoir. Respondents Warren and Sessilee Choules own property subject to a "prescriptive overflow" easement by Twin Lakes. In 2008, Twin Lakes filed suit against the Choules, alleging that the Choules moved earth, rocks, concrete and other debris from elsewhere on their property into areas below the height of the reservoir, which reduced the reservoir's storage space and damaged a lining designed to prevent leaks. The district court determined that state law allows the Choules as owners of the servient property, to use their property in any way they see fit, despite the common law rule that generally prohibits them from using their property in a way that interferes with the "dominant estate." The district court dismissed Twin Lakes' complaint. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Twin Lakes argued that the district court misinterpreted state law in its ruling in favor of the Choules. Upon careful consideration of the plain meaning of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellants David and Kathy Caldwell appealed the district court's refusal to allow the removal of trees within and adjacent to an access road easement that ran over property belonging to their neighbors, Respondents Thomas and Lori Cometto. Until 1997, an access road ran in a straight line directly through the Comettos' property and was subject to a deeded easement that benefited the Caldwells. The Comettos rerouted the road so that it avoided buildings on their property. The new road had four new sharp turns, and was narrower than the previous road. The Caldwells filed suit against the Comettos alleging that the new road injured their rights in the easement. To settle that litigation, the parties signed an agreement that granted Appellants an easement over the newly constructed road. The Caldwells then filed suit in 2007 to quiet title to the new easement, and sought a declaration that the Comettos must upgrade the road to the same standards as the previous road. Furthermore, the Caldwells sought to enjoin the Comettos from placing obstacles in the right-of-way. The trial court quieted title to the easement, and specifically held that the Comettos were to keep the easement free of debris. The Comettos were precluded from removing nineteen mature trees from the easement. Neither side was awarded attorney's fees, because as the court concluded, there was no prevailing party. The Caldwells appealed the denial of attorney's fees and the order regarding the trees. They argued that there was no substantial evidence to support the court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the lower court's record sufficient to support its decision. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision on the trees and the denial of attorney fees.

Coeur d'Alene Paving, Inc. (CDA Paving) leased several parcels of real property in Kootenai County from Beacon West, LLC. Approximately thirty acres of this leased property was zoned for mining activity. CDA had an interest in two undeveloped parcels that were initially zoned for agricultural use. The two agricultural parcels bordered the mining-parcel, but were not adjacent to it. In January 2008, CDA Paving submitted an application to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department to have its two agricultural lots rezoned for mining. The Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) held public hearings on the application, and eventually approved the application. Several property owners located in the vicinity of the zone changes, including Appellant Linda Ciszek, petitioned the district court for a declaratory judgment, alleging the zone change was invalid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CDA Paving, holding that the BOCC had the authority to amend its zoning map. Appellants raised multiple issues with the district court's decision. Principal among their arguments to the Supreme Court was that the BOCC lacked statutory authority to approve a zoning application as it had for CDA Paving. The Supreme Court found all of Appellants' arguments persuasive, and affirmed the district court's decision.

The Idaho Department of Water Resources (Department) appealed an order of the district court that required it to strike a term from a hydropower water right license issued to the Idaho Power Company. In 1984, an agreement was entered into between Idaho Power, the State, the governor, and the attorney general, in an effort to resolve a controversy associated with the company's water rights at the Swan Falls Dam. As part of the Swan Falls agreement, the parties agreed to support legislation for the commencement of an adjudication of water rights in the Snake River Basin. One key piece of the legislation that was passed pursuant to the Swan Falls Agreement gave the Department specific authority to subordinate hydropower rights in a permit or license to the rights of subsequent upstream depletionary users. The Department was also authorized to limit a permit or license involving hydropower to a term of years. The Department issued a final order that articulated the legal basis for including the "term of years" condition in the license to Idaho Power. The Company sought judicial review of the Department's final order, arguing that the Department did not have statutory authority to include a term condition in its license. The court indeed concluded that the Department did not have the authority to limit the license. The Department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Department had the statutory authority to include a term condition in Idaho Power's license. The Court reversed the district court's decision.

Appellants Samuel Jr. and Laurie Schneider appealed the district court's decree quieting title to real property in favor of Respondents Vernon and Dorothy Kennedy as adverse possessors. In 1924, Mr. Kennedy's great-uncle purchased the property that would eventually be passed to the Kennedys. When the Kennedys decided to place their property up for sale, they became aware that three parcels of the property that they believed had been owned by their family for generations were the subject of deeds in favor of other parties. In 2007, the Kennedys initiated a quiet title action to assert ownership over the three parcels as adverse possessors under a written claim of title. A default judgment in favor of the Kennedys was entered against the titleholders of record for two of the three parcels. The Schneiders answered and defended the Kennedys' claim to the third parcel. The district court issued a memorandum finding that the Kennedys had proved the elements of their claim of adverse possession by clear and satisfactory evidence. The court then entered a decree quieting title to the third parcel. The Schneiders appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was not substantial, competent evidence to support the district court's findings. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decree and its judgment awarding attorney fees. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Knipe Land Company (KLC) and John Knipe appealed a jury verdict in favor of Defendants Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. KLC is a real estate broker that specializes in agricultural and commercial real property. In 2005, the Robertsons signed an employment contract with KLC, where KLC was granted an exclusive listing to sell 1400 acres they owned. KLC would earn a percentage commission of the sales price or nonrefundable portions of any earnest money paid. In 2005, Robert and Sheila Harmon signed a purchase contract to buy the Robertsons' 1400 acres. The Harmons paid $50,000 as earnest money. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, $35,000 of the earnest amount would be non-refundable. The Harmons did not purchase the property, and the nonrefundable portion of the earnest money was transferred from the Harmons' real estate broker to KLC, which in turn distributed it to the Robertsons. In 2007, Robertson Kennels signed an employment contract with KLC to sell 1887 acres of land it owned. MidAmerican Nuclear Energy Company, LLC entered into a purchase agreement to purchase all of the Robertsons' property. The company paid $450,000 as nonrefundable earnest money. MidAmerican did not purchase the Robertsons' property. After the Harmon and MidAmerican purchase contracts ended, KLC demanded the Robertsons' pay its commission from the two cancelled purchase agreements. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Robertsons "clearly breached the unambiguous employment contracts and there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict." The Court vacated the damages and attorney fees that were awarded to the Robertsons at trial, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.