Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal was the second time before the Idaho Supreme Court. It involved the existence of a prescriptive easement and the presumption of permissive use. Shelley and Roger Cook owned a parcel of land which was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker Sr. The property stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Cooks filed suit against Jay and Shelli Van Orden alleging they had a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ land (the “Van Orden Property”) via a road the parties call “Tower Road.” Tower Road connected the Cooks’ property to a county road and had been used by the Cooks and their predecessors in interest since the Cook Property was homesteaded in 1908. The district court initially entered judgment in favor of the Van Ordens after it determined the Cooks had failed to prove the necessary element of adverse use for a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, finding it was necessary for the district court to determine the statutory period of adverse use because “there were potentially periods of adverse use” that could satisfy “either the five-year or twenty-year period for establishing a prescriptive easement. On remand, the district court determined that the use of Tower Road by the Harkers was presumptively permissive prior to 1910 and that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the district court identified a statutory period from 1962 to 2006, and granted the Cooks’ prescriptive easement claim by concluding the period of statutory use was sufficiently adverse due to the common belief of the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons—the Van Ordens’ predecessors in interest—that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use Tower Road. The Van Ordens appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the record supported the district court's conclusion that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road never changed into an adverse use, and the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kiki Leslie Tidwell (“Tidwell”) and the Madison Jean Tidwell Trust opposed an affordable housing project on land dedicated to Blaine County, Idaho for public use. Plaintiffs contended the Final Plat contemplated the land be held for open space and recreational use, but Blaine County contracted with ARCH Community Housing Trust (“ARCH”) and Blaine County Housing Authority (“BCHA”) to donate a parcel ("Parcel C") to BCHA to construct community housing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the County, ARCH, and BCHA (collectively “the County”) seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages to Tidwell under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court ultimately dismissed Tidwell’s section 1983 claim, but the district court allowed Plaintiffs to pursue the remaining claims, despite the County’s contention that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the complaint. Following a series of unsuccessful dispositive motions seeking summary and partial summary judgment on both sides, the case proceeded to court trial, where Plaintiffs prevailed on both claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court denied Tidwell’s request for attorney fees. The County appealed, and Tidwell cross-appealed the dismissal of her section 1983 claim and both Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees. On appeal, the County again raised its standing argument, contending Plaintiffs had no particularized interest in the parcel and suffered no particularized injury. If Plaintiffs had standing, the County claimed the district court erred by concluding the Final Plat was ambiguous and by permitting extrinsic evidence, including testimony of what the parties intended to construct on the parcel when the land was transferred. The Plaintiffs cross-appealed, with Tidwell alleging the district court erred in dismissing her procedural and substantive due process claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Both Plaintiffs also contended the district court abused its discretion in denying their claim for attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment because Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims. Costs, but not attorney fees, were awarded on appeal to the County. View "Tidwell, et al. v. Blaine County, et al." on Justia Law

Kyle and Ashley Fickenwirth and Amy Lanning (“Lanning”) owned adjoining properties at the center of this dispute. The Fickenwirths owned a gravel driveway that ran along the backside of Lanning’s property. Lanning had previously maintained a decorative split-rail fence on her property. Until recently, there was a relatively small strip of grassy land between the Fickenwirths’ driveway and the split-rail fence in Lanning’s backyard. This dispute arose when Lanning removed the split-rail fence and erected a new fence running directly along the western side of the Fickenwirths’ driveway that more closely adhered to the boundaries described in the deed. The Fickenwirths brought suit to quiet title to the strip of land between the split-rail fence on Lanning’s property and their driveway based on the theories of adverse possession or, alternatively, boundary by agreement. The district court concluded that the Fickenwirths had failed to prove their claims regarding adverse possession and boundary by agreement at the location of the split-rail fence. However, the district court found that the Fickenwirths had proved a claim of boundary by agreement at the location of the new fence, near the side of the driveway, but leaving a small strip of grass between the driveway and the fence. Lanning appealed this determination, claiming there was never an agreement that the boundary line was at the location of the new fence. After review and finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Fickenwirth v. Lanning" on Justia Law

Between 2015 and 2019, BitterSweet Ranch and its managers (“BitterSweet”) leased three parcels of farmland from Frank Sullivan and two of his business entities, The Green Desert, LLC, and The Sullivan Limited Partnership (collectively, “Sullivan”). The parties signed three identical five-year leases (“the Leases”) involving three separate parcels of real property, each owned by one of the three Sullivan parties. The Leases specified that Sullivan was to be responsible for payment of the property taxes, but that those parties were to be reimbursed by BitterSweet, and that BitterSweet was to be responsible for bi-annual rent payments, utilities, and water assessments. For a variety of reasons, the parties purportedly orally agreed to modify the Leases to offset amounts owed to each other throughout the terms of the Leases. Shortly before the Leases were set to expire at the end of their five-year terms, Sullivan claimed that BitterSweet was in breach of the Leases for its alleged failure to make timely rent payments, to pay all property taxes, and to pay the water assessments pursuant to the terms of the Leases. Sullivan then filed three lawsuits (one for each of the Leases and in the names of each of the three parties) in district court. The district court ordered the cases consolidated and then granted summary judgment in favor of BitterSweet, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact had not been created as to whether BitterSweet had breached the Leases. Sullivan appealed the adverse order. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sullivan v. BitterSweet Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

A large, dead tree near a mobile home rented by Tammy and Thomas Sankey fell and damaged the Sankeys’ vehicles, killed one of their cats and traumatized the other, and caused Tammy Sankey to experience emotional distress. Proceeding pro se, the Sankeys filed a small claims action against the owner of the mobile home park where they lived and the owner and managers of their mobile home. After losing in small claims court because they failed to prove on whose land the offending tree was located, the Sankeys filed for a trial de novo in magistrate court and paid for a land survey. The Sankeys submitted both documents attached to a joint declaration from them in opposition to motions for summary judgment filed by the owners and managers, along with a declaration from the Sankeys’ neighbor setting forth the neighbor’s lay testimony that the tree was located on the lot occupied by the Sankeys. The owners and managers of the mobile home and the mobile home park filed motions to strike the declaration from the neighbor as well as portions of the Sankeys’ declaration and the attached Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit. The magistrate court granted the motions, holding that no foundation had been laid for the Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit and that they were inadmissible hearsay. The magistrate court also struck the declaration of the neighbor because her testimony about the location of the fallen tree was not based on her personal knowledge. Without admissible evidence of who owned the land where the fallen tree was located, the magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of the owners and managers. The magistrate court denied the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration. The district court, sitting in its appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Sankey v. Ivey" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from a dispute regarding a purchase option within a lease agreement. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, and its manager and registered agent, Brandon Paine (collectively “Bronco Elite”), operated a gymnastics facility in Garden City, Idaho. The gymnastics facility was located on property that Bronco Elite leased from 106 Garden City, LLC (“106 Garden City”), and Tricon Properties, LLC (“Tricon”). The lease agreement provided Bronco Elite the option to purchase the Property five years into the initial ten-year lease term. However, when Bronco Elite attempted to exercise its option, 106 Garden City and Tricon refused to honor the option. Bronco Elite sued 106 Garden City and Tricon, seeking specific performance. 106 Garden City and Tricon argued that Bronco Elite was precluded from exercising its purchase option because Bronco Elite had breached the lease agreement by consistently failing to pay rent on time and the lease terms only permitted Bronco Elite to exercise the purchase option if it was not in breach. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bronco Elite and ordered 106 Garden City and Tricon to convey the Property to Bronco Elite. The specific performance ordered by the district court was stayed pending appeal. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Bronco Elite, however, the Court found the trial court erred in setting the purchase price of the Property in the way that it did. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC v. 106 Garden City, LLC" on Justia Law

The Day family and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust appealed a district court’s decision to grant the Idaho Transportation Department’s (“ITD”) motion for involuntary dismissal. ITD cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In 1961, the Days learned that access to their property via public highways would be affected when the state highway converted to a controlled-access federal interstate highway, then known as Interstate 80. The Days entered into a preliminary agreement with the Idaho Department of Highways (“IDH,” predecessor to ITD) that allowed IDH to take possession of approximately nine acres of the Day Property for construction of the interstate. In 1967, the Days entered into a right-of-way contract with IDH in furtherance of the 1961 Agreement. The 1967 Contract included an agreement for IDH to provide access to a future frontage road from I-80 to the Day Property. In the 1990s, the State began construction on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day Property. The Interchange Project eliminated a portion of the original 50-foot right of way that provided access to the Day Property under the 1967 Contract. Because of this, ITD provided replacement access easements to the Day Property. These replacement access easements were located southwest of the Interstate. The Days informed ITD the family was dissatisfied with the replacement easements and did not think they afforded the Days equivalent access to what they had prior to the construction of the Interchange. The Days sold the property to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings Inc. (“Groves”) in 2005, with the purchase price secured by a mortgage held by the Day Family. Groves later defaulted in its mortgage agreement with the Days during the recession in December of 2008. As a result, ownership of the Day Property reverted to the Day Family by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure. After the Days reacquired the property, they had difficulty obtaining title insurance because of concerns that “the access easement was owned by ITD and [the Days] did not have any statement that the easement was for the benefit of the Days.” They sued alleging inverse condemnation, and breach of contract. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Day v. Idaho Transportation Department" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a 2019 lease by Respondents the City of Sandpoint (“the City”) to The Festival at Sandpoint (“The Festival”), a nonprofit corporation, to operate a multi-day music concert series in War Memorial Field Park. The Festival had a long-standing policy of prohibiting festival patrons from bringing weapons, including firearms, into the event. On August 9, 2019, Scott Herndon and Jeff Avery purchased tickets to the festival and attempted to enter. Avery openly carried a firearm and Herndon possessed a firearm either on his person or in a bag (the record was unclear on this point). Security personnel for the event denied entry to both. After discussions with a City police officer and the City’s attorney, who was coincidentally attending the same event in his private capacity, Herndon and Avery eventually left the music festival and received a refund for their tickets. Appellants Herndon, Avery, the Idaho Second Amendment Alliance, Inc., and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. subsequently sued the City and The Festival, asserting several claims, including seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the Respondents from violating the Idaho and United States Constitutions, particularly the Second Amendment and the Idaho Constitution’s provision securing the right to keep and bear arms in public for all lawful purposes. The district court ultimately granted the Respondents’ motions for summary judgment, awarded both the City and The Festival attorney fees and costs, and dismissed all the Appellants’ claims with prejudice. The issue raised on appeal was whether a private party who leased public property from a municipality may govern those who come and go from the property during the lease. The Idaho Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Herndon v. City of Sandpoint" on Justia Law

Jay Wright appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his ex-wife, Kristie Parish. Wright and Parish were married in 2002 and divorced in 2019. Before they were married, Wright and Parish, as single persons, purchased two adjacent parcels of real property in Island Park, and their ownership of the property did not change following their marriage. A magistrate court presided over their divorce proceedings and the distribution of their community property. The magistrate court classified as community property certain loan payments and improvements that had been made for the benefit of the Island Park Properties but specifically declined to divide the properties because the court concluded the properties were separate property and that it “lack[ed] authority to divide the property.” The magistrate court concluded that Wright and Parish “apparently” owned the properties as tenants-in-common, each with a fifty percent interest, though it never made a definitive ruling on each party’s interest, concluding only that they were “joint owners[.]” Roughly one year after the magistrate court entered its final judgment for the divorce, Wright filed suit seeking a partition of the Island Park Properties and for Parish to deed them to him, arguing in part that his ownership interest in the properties exceeded the fifty percent determination that the magistrate court had ostensibly made. In response, Parish moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wright’s claim that he was entitled to a greater ownership interest was precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court granted Parish’s motion for summary judgment after determining that the issues in Wright’s complaint had already been litigated in the prior divorce proceedings. As a result, the district court concluded that the proceeds from the sale of the properties should be equally divided between Wright and Parish. Wright appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Parish, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether Wright could produce evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership in the properties. View "Wright v. Parish" on Justia Law

Petitioners-appellants the Reeses and their neighbors challenged the Blackfoot City Council’s decision to approve a Planned Unit Development (“PUD”) in a “Residential Ranchette” zoning district. The district court dismissed their petition for judicial review after holding the Reeses did not demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Reese v. City of Blackfoot" on Justia Law