Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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Karen and Keith Hood owned real property in Washington County, near Cambridge, Idaho. The Hoods’ property was near property owned by Gayle and Paul Poorman and Rusty Anderson. The Hoods’ property had three decreed appurtenant water rights; the water from two of these water rights was diverted from Rush Creek and conveyed to the Hoods’ property through an irrigation ditch (“the Hood ditch”). The crux of this case involved that portion of the Hood ditch which ran through the Poormans’ and Anderson’s properties. The Hoods filed a complaint in November 2019, seeking to have the district court: (1) enjoin the Poormans and Anderson from interfering with their maintenance of the Hood ditch right-of-way; (2) declare the Hoods’ rights with respect to the right-of-way; and (3) award damages against the Poormans and Anderson for damage done to the Hood ditch right-of way. Anderson sought to have the Hoods reinstall a bridge over the ditch on Anderson’s property. The Poormans asked the district court to require the Hoods to replace removed culverts on the Poormans’ property, and refrain from removing trees and other vegetation outside the scope of the Hood ditch right-of-way. The Poormans also requested monetary compensation for damage to their property as a result of the Hoods’ ditch maintenance, including the removal of trees and vegetation. The district court issued a written decision granting the Hoods’ motion for partial summary judgment that incorporated the limitations proposed by the Poormans and Anderson. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court found that while the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to enjoin the Hoods from excessively accessing the right-of-way, some of the district court’s specific limitations on when the Hoods could access the right-of-way were an abuse of discretion because they were either unsupported by evidence in the record or contradicted by the evidence presented at trial. On remand, the Supreme Court gave the district court a mandate to issue two judgments: one defining the purpose, length, width, and location of the primary easement to run with the land and bind the parties’ successors-in-interest; the second second to identify the injunctive relief limiting the Hoods’ exercise of their secondary easement rights and include the declaratory and monetary relief awarded, not to run with the land or bind the Hoods’ successors-in-interest. View "Hood v. Poorman" on Justia Law

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In October 1998, Andrea and Brad Hall, together with Linda and Frank Exler, purchased real property in Roberts, Idaho. The Halls owned a two-thirds interest in the property and the Exlers owned one-third. In September 2005, Linda deeded all of her interest in the property to Frank. Frank died intestate in March 2006. Travis Exler, Frank’s son and sole heir, was appointed as the personal representative of Frank’s estate (“the Estate”). The parties dispute their relationship in the years between Frank's death and the filing of the underlying lawsuit. Brad testified he received notice from the County rearding unpaid taxes on the property. Travis said he was unable to pay the Estate's portion of the overdue taxes. Brad testified the parties reached an agreement by which Travis would deed the property to the Halls if they paid the outstanding tax balance. Within weeks of their conversation, Brad contacted a law firm to prepare a quitclaim deed. In contrast, Travis stated he would transfer the Estate’s interest in the property if the Halls reimbursed his costs associated with cleaning up the property. Travis testified that in 2009 the parties also agreed the Halls would take care of cleanup costs and taxes. Travis stated that he did not transfer ownership of the property to the Halls and was never presented with a quitclaim or personal representative’s deed. It was undisputed that the Halls had sole control, use, and operation of the property since 2009. The Halls oversaw the administration of the lease and maintenance of the property. Travis did not list any profit or loss from the property on his personal taxes. In addition, the Halls paid the overdue taxes on the property, and made all tax payments on the property since 2009. The Halls and Travis did not communicate between 2009 and 2019. In June 2010, Travis voluntarily filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Travis did not list the property on his bankruptcy petition. The Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee moved to dismiss based on Travis’s failure to list an interest in the property, rental income, and the transfer of an apartment building and 150 cattle. The bankruptcy court dismissed Travis’s petition. After Travis refused the Halls’ request to reopen probate of the Estate, the Halls filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court issued a memorandum decision and order, quieting title to the disputed property in the Halls based on the lost deed doctrine. Travis appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Hall v. Exler" on Justia Law

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Gerald Neeser, in his capacity as trustee of the Gerald E. Neeser Revocable Living Trust (Neeser), owned two adjacent parcels of land, Lots 3 and 4, on the south shore of Spirit Lake in Kootenai County, Idaho. Inland Empire Paper Company (IEP) owned several hundred acres of land adjacent to Neeser’s, which it used to grow and harvest timber. Neeser filed a complaint alleging that he had a prescriptive easement over IEP’s land, specifically a road known as the “M1 Road,” for ingress and egress to his property. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Neeser’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that Neeser had established a prescriptive easement over IEP’s land benefiting Lots 3 and 4 and that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding that issue. Several months later, IEP moved the district court to reconsider its order on summary judgment, which the district court denied. IEP timely appealed. Finding that the district court abused its discretion in declining to strike portions of Neeser’s declaration that was outside of his personal knowledge, and that Neeser did not offer admissible evidence eliminating issues of material fact regarding the elements of a prescriptive easement, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment. View "Neeser v. Inland Empire Paper Company" on Justia Law

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Andrew Ashmore, agent for appellant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC, (“Breckenridge”) arrived at a foreclosure sale with endorsed checks to support Breckenridge’s bid. Jesse Thomas, agent for Cornerstone Properties, LLC, (“Cornerstone”) was also present. Before the auction, the auctioneer provided Ashmore and Thomas a packet of paperwork. The last page contained a requirement that endorsed checks would not be accepted as payment for a bid. Because Ashmore only had endorsed checks, the auctioneer gave Ashmore one hour to cure the payment defect, but the auction eventually proceeded with Ashmore unable to secure a different form of payment. The property ultimately sold to Cornerstone. Breckenridge filed a complaint against the two respondents and a third defendant, alleging: (1) violations of Idaho Code section 45-1506; (2) estoppel; and (3) negligence/negligence per se, seeking mainly to void the sale to Cornerstone. Breckenridge also recorded a lis pendens against the property. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment for all defendants and quashed the lis pendens. The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Cornerstone and the auctioneer under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enterprises, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Olive Fountain Land Company, LLC (“Olive Fountain”), and Greenfield Family Trust (“Greenfield Trust”), owned neighboring properties along Lake Coeur d’Alene in Kootenai County, Idaho. Olive Fountain had permission to construct an easement road across Greenfield Trust’s land to access its undeveloped property. However, portions of the construction did not occur along the agreed and specified boundaries of the easement. Additionally, logs from the construction were sold by Olive Fountain’s agent in violation of an earlier easement agreement requiring any trees removed from the right of way to remain on Greenfield Trust’s property. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that by partially constructing a road across Greenfield Trust’s property outside the easement boundaries, Olive Fountain had committed a willful and intentional trespass under Idaho Code section 6-202. The court also determined there was a timber trespass, which entitled Greenfield Trust to recover treble damages from Olive Fountain. However, when addressing civil trespass damages, the court found the testimonial evidence on property damages from Greenfield Trust’s witnesses to be neither credible nor reasonable, and only awarded $50 in nominal damages. Greenfield Trust appealed, arguing that the court erred and abused its discretion in refusing to award damages for the diminution in property value. Finding no such abuse of discretion nor error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Greenfield Family Trust v. Olive Fountain Land Company, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Jefferson County, Idaho Board of Commissioners (“the County”) granted Appellant Tina Gilgen a conditional use permit that allowed her to place a mobile home on real property she owned with her husband, Kelly Gilgen. The Gilgen property fell within the City of Ririe’s area of impact (“AOI”). The City of Ririe (“the City”) petitioned for judicial review, claiming the County erroneously approved Gilgen’s application by applying Jefferson County zoning ordinances within the AOI instead of City ordinances, which would have resulted in a denial of Gilgen’s application. The City relied on an area of impact agreement between Jefferson County and the City of Ririe, in which the County specifically agreed to apply the City’s ordinances to property located within the AOI (“AOI Agreement”). After the County filed a notice of non-objection, the district court entered an order granting the City’s petition, reversing the County’s original decision, and remanding the matter to the County. On remand, the County issued an amended decision that denied Gilgen’s application for a conditional use permit. Several months later, Gilgen filed three motions for reconsideration of the district court’s order remanding the case, alleging the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the City’s petition. Each of the motions was denied. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the City did not have standing to petition the district court for review of the County’s decision. The trial court’s judgment was vacated. View "City of Ririe v. Gilgen" on Justia Law

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Black Diamond Compost, LLC (“Black Diamond”), filed a “Claim of Ownership” with the Ada County, Idaho Recorder’s Office to notify the public of its ownership of compost and humus located on real property in Ada County. Black Diamond disputed the ownership of the land and deemed it necessary to notify the public that the compost and humus located on the real property belonged to it. Ford Elsaesser, personal representative of the Estate of Victoria Smith, attempted to sell the real property but could not secure “clear title” in a preliminary title report and claimed this was due to Black Diamond’s Claim of Ownership. Elsaesser filed an action against Black Diamond, alleging the Claim of Ownership was a nonconsensual common law lien prohibited under Idaho Code section 45-811. The court agreed and ordered the release and discharge of the recorded Claim of Ownership. It also awarded Elsaesser a $5,000 civil penalty and granted his request for costs and attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding it did not err in: (1) determining the Claim of Ownership to be a prohibited nonconsensual common law lien; (2) ordering the lien to be released and discharged; (3) imposing a $5,000 civil penalty against Black Diamond; and (4) awarding attorney fees to the Personal Representative pursuant to Idaho Code section 45-811(4). View "Elsaesser v. Black Diamond Compost, LLC" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from an action in which the personal representative of the Estate of Victoria Smith (the “Personal Representative”) sought to eject Riverside Farms, LLC, (“Riverside”) from its real property, referred to by the parties as the “Chinden Property,” after the term of Riverside’s lease expired. Riverside argued that the Personal Representative lacked standing to bring the ejectment action because it was not the true owner of the land. The Personal Representative was earlier granted ownership of the “Chinden Property” pursuant to a Rule 70(b) judgment issued during the probate proceedings following Victoria’s death. Riverside argued that the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata because a prior action, which concerned removal of trees along an easement on the property, had already confirmed that the Personal Representative was not the true owner of the Chinden Property. The district court determined that ejectment of Riverside was proper because the dismissal of the prior case did not preclude the Rule 70(b) judgment issued in the probate case. Riverside filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its decision, but the district court declined to do so. Riverside appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the denial of its motion to reconsider was in error and renewing its argument that the personal representative lacked standing to seek removal of Riverside from the property because the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Elsaesser v. Riverside Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2017, Appellant Shoshone County assessed properties owned by Respondents S&W OPS, LLC; POWDER, LLC; H2O, LLC; GOLF, LLC; APARTMENT, LLC; F&B, LLC; and VILLAGE MANAGEMENT, LLC (collectively “Taxpayers”). Taxpayers disputed the valuation and sought review by the Board of Equalization, and subsequently the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). The BTA reduced the assessed value, and the County appealed to the district court. After a four-day bench trial, the district court upheld the BTA decision, determining that the County’s appraisal evidence was more credible than Taxpayers’ evidence; however, the district court ultimately held the County had not satisfied its burden of showing how the BTA decision was erroneous by a preponderance of the evidence. The County appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the district court applied the wrong standard of review by requiring the County to prove “how or why” the BTA decision was erroneous instead of simply concluding that the market value of the property was different than what was found by the BTA. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the County’s position. The district court’s decision was reversed, the judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions for the district court to consider whether the BTA’s decision on valuation was erroneous given the evidence submitted during the de novo trial. If that decision on valuation was erroneous, the district court, as the fact-finder, had to set the valuation. View "Shoshone County v. S&W OPS, LLC" on Justia Law

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S Bar Ranch owned approximately 3000 acres of land in rural Elmore County, Idaho. S Bar purchased the land in 2015. There were very few structures on S Bar’s property, save for an airplane hangar that included a five-hundred square-foot apartment. S Bar’s address was listed in Sun Valley, Idaho, and its principal, Chris Stephens, used the property for recreational purposes. Cat Creek Energy, LLC, an Idaho company managed by John Faulkner, owned and managed more than 23,000 acres of land in Elmore County near Anderson Ranch reservoir. Faulkner, on behalf of his other companies, leased land to Cat Creek to develop the project at issue in this dispute. In late 2014 and early 2015, Cat Creek began the process of obtaining conditional use permits (“CUPs”) for a proposed alternative energy development (“the project”) in Elmore County. As initially proposed, the project had five components: a 50,000 acre-foot reservoir with hydroelectric turbines, up to 39 wind turbines, approximately 174,000 photovoltaic solar panels, electrical transmission lines, and an onsite power substation. Cat Creek sought to build the project on approximately 23,000 acres of land that it had leased near Anderson Ranch Reservoir. In 2019, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, affirming the Board’s decisions with respect to the CUPs. The district court found that S Bar only had standing to challenge the CUPs relating to wind turbines, electric transmission lines, and the on-site substation. The district court also reiterated its prior oral ruling that a 2017 CUP Order was a final agency action and that S Bar’s petition for judicial review of that order was untimely. With regard to the development agreement and a 2018 CUP Amendment, the district court concluded that the Board did not err in a manner specified by Idaho Code section 67-5279 and that S Bar had not shown that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. S Bar appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Cat Creek. View "S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County" on Justia Law