Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Jared and Katherine Sommer brought a declaratory judgment claim against Misty Valley, LLC, after receiving written notice that the real estate developer planned to use an express easement across the Sommers’ land for access to a recently platted residential subdivision. The Sommers contended the planned use constituted an impermissible expansion of the scope of the easement, and brought a claim to terminate the easement. After a bench trial, the district court limited the use of the easement to the dominant parcel, which only included part of Misty Valley’s planned subdivision, and declined to terminate it. Misty Valley appealed the district court’s judgment, and the Sommers cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

Edward and Janice Easterling owned three contiguous parcels of real property in Ammon, Idaho. The Easterlings brought suit against Hal Pacific Properties, L.P. (“HAL”), claiming an easement by necessity over and upon HAL’s property in order to access their three merged parcels. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, a motion for reconsideration, and a short bench trial, the district court largely ruled in the Easterlings’ favor. The district court denied HAL’s affirmative defense that the Easterlings’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court further held that the Easterlings were entitled to an easement by necessity over and upon the HAL Parcel to allow access to all three of the Easterlings’ merged parcels. The district court placed the easement at the western border of the HAL Parcel and set its width at twenty-six feet. HAL appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, contending the district court erred by denying its statute of limitations affirmative defense, granting the Easterlings’ claim for an easement by necessity for all three of their parcels, and improperly determining the location and width of the easement. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision at summary judgment rejecting HAL’s statute of limitations defense under Idaho Code section 5-224. Because of this, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment and reversed its decisions that the Northern Parcel was entitled to an easement by necessity over the HAL Parcel; and that the width of the easement was set at twenty-six feet. The Supreme Court further reversed the district court’s decisions setting the location of the easement and granting an easement by necessity as to the Southern and Eastern Parcels over the HAL Parcel. The matte was remanded for further proceedings. View "Easterling v. Hal Pacific Properties, L.P." on Justia Law

Dennis and Sherrilyn Munden (the Mundens) and their limited liability company, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, purchased property in Bannock County, Idaho in 2012 (the Upper Property), and acquired adjoining property (the Lower Property) in 2014. The Mundens’ ranch was accessible by a gravel road (the Road) which left a paved public road before crossing the Lower Property. It then traversed a neighbor’s parcel to the Upper Property, before exiting to the north. The Mundens began ranching on the Lower Property in 2013 and started construction of a barn and living quarters on the Upper Property in 2015 after obtaining a three-year building permit. In 2017, the Mundens were informed by the Bannock County Commissioners that, pursuant to a 2006 county ordinance, the Road had been designated by the Commissioners for “snowmobile use only” between December 15 and April 15. All other vehicular use was prohibited during this timeframe. In January 2019, Bannock County passed an ordinance which gave discretion to the Bannock County Public Works Director (the Director) to determine when snowmobile trails would be closed to all but snowmobile use. Subsequently, the Director decided to close the Road for the 2018–19 winter season. The Mundens filed a complaint in district court against Bannock County, bringing several claims involving the Road, and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) to prohibit enforcement of the 2019 ordinance. The County moved to dissolve the TRO, which the district court granted. The district court then awarded attorney fees to the County. The Mundens amended their complaint to add their ranching operation, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, as a plaintiff, to which the County responded with an answer and counterclaim, alleging that the Road was a public right-of-way with no winter maintenance that had been designated as a snowmobile trail by the 2006 ordinance. The County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion, concluding that because the claims turned on a legal determination of the Road’s status, the Mundens were required by Idaho Code section 40-208(7) to first petition for validation or abandonment proceedings with the Board of County Commissioners before they could bring a lawsuit. The district court accordingly entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint in its entirety. Ultimately, the district court entered a judgment certified under IRCP 54(b)(1) authorizing an immediate appeal, and the Mundens timely appealed. The only error the Idaho Supreme Court found in review of this case was that the district court erred in issuing a writ of execution before there was a final appealable judgment. Judgement was affirmed in all other respects. View "Munden v. Bannock County" on Justia Law

Mary Eich appealed a district court judgment ordering her to vacate property owned by the trustees of the Wilbur Eich and Henrietta Eich Revocable Trust (the “Trust”). In 2015, Mary filed an action seeking to quiet title to 2.5 acres of an 80-acre tract of real property owned by her father, who held title to the property as trustee of his Trust. Mary alleged that her parents had gifted her the 2.5 acres with the intent that she build a home and reside there for the rest of her life. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that there was no valid transfer between Mary and her parents, but permitted Mary to pursue an equitable claim of promissory estoppel. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of Mary and that she had a year to obtain Teton County’s approval to partition the 2.5 acres from the remaining Trust property. If she could not do so within the time prescribed, the Trust would have to pay Mary $107,400 for the value of improvements she had made on the land plus her reasonable relocation costs, and Mary would have to vacate the property. Mary worked for several years to separate the 2.5 acres from the remaining Trust property to no avail. In August 2019, the Trust moved to compel enforcement of the district court’s alternative remedy and for entry of final judgment. In January 2020, a newly assigned district court judge granted the Trust’s motion and entered a declaratory judgment ordering the Trust to pay Mary $107,400, plus reasonable relocation expenses, and for Mary to vacate the property. Mary appealed, arguing that the newly assigned district court judge abused his discretion by deviating from the original judge’s equitable remedy. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision ordering Mary to vacate the property and for the Trustees to pay Mary $107,400. View "Eich v. Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

Pheasant Run VI, LLC, Robert Drinkard, and Nancy Drinkard (collectively, “the Drinkards”) appealed a district court’s order renewing a judgment for Alpha Mortgage Fund II (“Alpha”) for $1,842,509.59. Pheasant Run was a company wholly owned by the Drinkards. Pheasant Run obtained a loan from Alpha. Robert and Nancy acted as guarantors for the loan. Pheasant Run ultimately defaulted on the loan and Alpha foreclosed on property the Drinkards used as collateral for the loan. Although Alpha recouped the property, a significant deficiency existed between the amount Pheasant Run owed and the property’s fair market value. Alpha thereafter sued Robert and Nancy for the amount of the deficiency. The Original Judgment was entered in 2010, and renewed in 2015. Alpha did not record the 2015 judgment. In 2020, Alpha moved the district court to again renew the Original Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1111. The Drinkards objected, leading to this appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court did i not err when it granted Alpha’s motion to renew the Original Judgment, even though the 2015 judgment was not recorded: the judgment remained unsatisfied, and Alpha’s motion was filed within five years of the most recently renewed 2015 judgment. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Alpha Mortgage Fund v. Drinkard" on Justia Law

Sharon Bruno appealed following a bench trial on a quiet title matter. Bruno and her father Howard Frost sought to quiet title to an express easement, pursued quiet title for an easement by prescription, and requested an injunction against two other nearby property owners. The gravamen of the suit was to establish an easement for irrigation hand lines and piping as well as to ensure access to irrigation equipment. The hand lines had been in place since the early 1980s. They originated at a pump near the Payette River and crossed an adjacent property now owned by Dana and Elisa Gilbert (the Gilberts) before reaching Bruno’s property. Bruno also contended that the way she and her father accessed the pump since its installation in 1981 was over a driveway on what was now the Gilberts’ property, as well as a switchback on adjacent property now owned by Alfred Alford. The Gilberts counterclaimed alleging trespass and slander of title. They also sought a declaratory judgment to extinguish the express easement which had been in effect since 2011. Alford also counterclaimed alleging trespass and seeking a declaratory judgment that Bruno had no interest in his property for purposes of accessing the pump. Bruno unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction. The claims were bifurcated, with the easement-related claims to be tried first before a judge, and the trespass claims to follow before a jury. At the close of the first trial, the district court found that the express easement clearly allowed Bruno ingress and egress along the legal description of the easement; however, the district court rejected the requested prescriptive easement across the Gilberts’ driveway and the switchback on Alford’s property. The district court found that any use of these roads had been permissive and therefore did not satisfy the requirements for a prescriptive easement. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Bruno’s prescriptive easement-related claims. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration, Bruno moved the district court to enter a 54(b) certificate to enable an immediate appeal, which was granted. Bruno then timely appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error in the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Frost v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

In 2015, Ralph Isom filed for bankruptcy. Ultimately, a bankruptcy trustee for the estate settled with Isom’s primary creditor, Farms, LLC (“Farms”). As part of the settlement, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed a ten-acre parcel from the bankruptcy estate to Farms. Isom was living on the ten-acre parcel at the time. When Isom refused to vacate the ten-acre parcel, Farms initiated this forcible detainer action. The magistrate court entered judgment for Farms and ordered Isom to vacate the ten-acre parcel. Isom appealed to the district court, but also vacated the property as the magistrate court had ordered. Because Isom had vacated, and thus no longer occupied or owned the ten-acre parcel, the district court held that Isom’s appeal was moot. Further, the district court rejected the merits of Isom’s appeal. Isom appealed the district court’s decision on the merits, but failed to appeal the district court’s holding that his appeal was moot. The Idaho Supreme Court found that because Isom failed to raise, let alone argue against, the district court’s decision as it related to mootness, the issue was considered waived."Isom’s waiver is dispositive. As a result, we will not reach the merits of his appeal as it relates to the sufficiency of proof regarding the forcible detainer action." Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Farms, LLC v. Isom" on Justia Law

Loyd Eugene Ware filed suit against the City of Kendrick (the City) alleging that in December 2016, a water pipe maintained by the City failed and flooded his property, causing damage. The City answered, claiming that Ware had failed to file a timely notice of tort claim within 180 days of the City’s alleged negligence, a statutory prerequisite to filing suit against a governmental entity under Idaho Code section 6-906. The City averred the flooding occurred on December 17, 2016, and the notice of tort claim was not filed until two hundred twenty-two days later. The City thus moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. Ware timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ware v. City of Kendrick" on Justia Law

Alicia Gangi brought a declaratory judgment action against Mark and Jane Doe Debolt (“Debolts”), the owners of a parcel adjacent to Gangi’s property. While a water tank and deck lie on Gangi’s property, the system only served the Debolts’ property with water. Moreover, the Debolts enjoyed exclusive use and enjoyment of an above-ground deck atop the water tank, since their property included an easement to the land where the water tank and deck were located. After the district court denied Gangi’s motion for summary judgment, Gangi dismissed her own case with prejudice. Thereafter, the Debolts sought attorney fees on the basis of a recorded agreement Gangi’s and the Debolts’ predecessor in interest had with a third party regarding the water system. The agreement provided that attorney fees would be awarded to the prevailing party if a suit were brought to enforce or interpret the agreement. On the basis of that agreement, the district court granted Debolts’ request for attorney fees. Gangi appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found that Gangi’s action was not brought to interpret or enforce the Debolts’ predecessor in interest’s agreement. “The true gravamen of the lawsuit was the interpretation of the 2012 Elliott-Debolt easement agreement and whether that agreement provided the Debolts with an exclusive easement to use the water system and the deck. Therefore, inasmuch as the district court’s decision was neither consistent with existing legal standards nor reached through the exercise of reason, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to the Debolts under the prior Elliott-Debolt agreement.” View "Gangi v. Debolt" on Justia Law

This case presented the Idaho Supreme Court with a fundamental, but previously unanswered, question: what duty is owed by a hospital to someone who is on its premises solely to visit one of its patients? Summary judgment was entered against Victor Dupuis in a premises liability case brought against a hospital, Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center. Dupuis was visiting his hospitalized wife in January 2017 when he slipped and fell on ice in the hospital’s parking lot. Dupuis sued the hospital, alleging inadequate snow and ice removal in the parking lot caused him to fall. Dupuis argued that the hospital had breached the duty of care it owed to him as an invitee. The district court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Dupuis was a licensee, and the hospital did not have superior knowledge of the dangerous conditions over that of Dupuis, and, therefore, the hospital did not breach any duty owed to Dupuis. Dupuis appealed, arguing the district court erred in determining that he was a mere licensee, rather than an invitee, and that even if he were a licensee, the hospital assumed and subsequently breached a duty of care to keep the property in reasonably safe condition. The Supreme Court found Dupuis was an invitee, thereby reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, vacating the judgment entered, and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Dupuis v. Eastern Idaho Health Services Inc." on Justia Law