Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Attorney Larry Stoller filed a multicount petition on behalf of NuStar Farms, LLC against Robert and Marcia Zylstra, alleging that the Zylstras agreed to sell NuStar a parcel of farmland but failed to tender the requisite deed and that the Zylstras did not abide by certain terms contained in certain manure easement agreements. The Zylstras filed a motion seeking to disqualify Stoller as the attorney for NuStar based on a conflict of interest. Specifically, the Zylstras alleged that Stoller’s representation of NuStar was a concurrent conflict of interest with his representation of them. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in holding that Stoller could not be disqualified under the substantial relationship test; but (2) abused its discretion in not disqualifying Stoller from representing NuStar in the action because Stoller did have a concurrent conflict of interest. View "NuStar Farms, LLC v. Zylstra" on Justia Law

A citizens group and a school district (collectively, Appellants) challenged a city’s amendment of an economic development urban renewal plan. Specifically, Appellants challenged the use of tax increment financing (TIF) for economic development purposes and argued that the plan violated Iowa law by unlawfully extending the duration of a TIF area, unlawfully using revenue from that TIF area to support development in other parts of the city, and failing to conform to the terms of the city’s general plan. The district court ruled in favor of the city. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the city impermissibly extended the duration of the TIF area; (2) revenue may be shared within the consolidated, larger TIF area subject to certain time limits; and (3) the city’s general plan and the urban renewal plan were not inconsistent with each other. View "Concerned Citizens of Southeast Polk Sch. Dist. v. City of Pleasant Hill" on Justia Law

The Polk County assessor set the 2011 valuation of Wellmark, Inc.’s corporate headquarters located in Des Moines at $99 million. Wellmark protested. The Polk County Board of Review denied the protest. On appeal, the district court found the value of the property on January 1, 2011 was $78 million. At issue in this case was whether the property should have been valued as if it were a multi-tenant office building, which would likely be the result if the property were sold, or whether the property should have been valued according to its current use as a single-tenant headquarters building. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while there had been a showing of no active market for a single-tenant office building such as the Wellmark property, value should be based on the presumed existence of a hypothetical buyer at the property’s current use. View "Wellmark, Inc. v. Polk County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Bank was the holder of a promissory note executed by Mortgagors and the mortgage that secured the note. After Mortgagors defaulted on the note Bank brought a foreclosure action and obtained an in rem judgment and decree of foreclosure against Mortgagors. More than two years after the entry of the original judgment, the property had not been sold, and Bank filed a notice of rescission of the foreclosure. Bank subsequently filed this foreclosure action and moved for summary judgment. Mortgagor counterclaimed for quiet title and wrongful foreclosure, arguing that she was entitled to own the property because the house was not sold within two years of the foreclosure decree. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two-year special statute of limitations in Iowa Code 615.1(1) does not limit the period of time for a mortgagee to rescind a prior foreclosure judgment. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Callen" on Justia Law

At issue in this quiet title action was whether the two-year special statute of limitations in Iowa Code 615.1(1) applies only to judgment liens or whether the underlying debt is also extinguished after the end of the two-year period. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Callen, the two-year special statute of limitations in section 615.1(1) does not apply to rescission; and (2) Mortgagor’s unclean hands defense to foreclosure has been waived. View "Kobal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the terms of two five-year leases, which automatically self-renewed for four additional five-year terms unless the tenant unilaterally opted out of the lease, offended Iowa Const. art. I, 24. James Gansen rented land used for agricultural purposes from the Charles Gansen Trust until the trustee unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a higher rent from James. The trustee filed a petition for declaratory action, alleging, inter alia, that the leases violated Iowa Const. art. I, 24, which provides that no lease of agricultural lands “shall be valid for a longer period than twenty years.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust, concluding that the leases violated article I, section 24. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although prior litigation took place between the parties involving the same agricultural leases, claim preclusion did not apply to bar the Trust’s claim that the leases violated the Iowa Constitution; and (2) the leases at issue violated article I, section 24 to the extent they remained in effect after the passage of twenty years from their inception. View "Gansen v. Gansen" on Justia Law

The City of Waterloo agreed to transfer to a residential developer property the City originally acquired for use as a road right-of-way. Taxpaying residents of the City challenged the legality of the proposed transfer, arguing that the City failed to follow statutory procedures for the sale of unused right-of-way, including compliance with certain appraisal, notice, right-of-first refusal and public bid requirements. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the subject property was not unused right-of-way. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the property was unused right-of-way, and therefore, the City could not sell or transfer it to the developer without first following the procedure prescribed in Iowa Code 306.23. View "Hartog v. City of Waterloo" on Justia Law

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option. View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

In 2009, Scott Schulte and Marisel Del Valle (together, Appellants) executed a promissory note and, as security for the note, a mortgage on real property. The note and mortgage were later assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing. In 2010, BAC filed a foreclosure petition alleging Appellants were in default, and the district court entered a decree of foreclosure. In 2012, Bank of America, as successor by merger to BAC, filed a notice of rescission of foreclosure and, contemporaneously, filed a motion to set aside decree. Appellants opposed the motion to set aside decree, arguing that neither the motion nor the notices of rescission were timely filed within one year of the entry of judgment as required by Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1012 and 1.1013 and were therefore time barred. The district court found the rescission notices timely filed, concluding that a two-year limitations period applied under Iowa Code 654.17, and accordingly, granted Bank of America’s motion to set aside the decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it confirmed that the rescission action was timely filed and granted the motion to set aside decree. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte" on Justia Law

Appellants owned residential real estate in West Des Moines. In 2011, the Dallas County Board of Review established an assessment value of Appellants’ property for tax purposes. In 2012, the Board established a new, greater value for the property. Appellants filed a petition with the Board protesting the assessment. The petition stated that the protest was lodged against the 2011 property valuation. At a hearing before the Board, Appellants stated that they wished to protest the valuations for both 2011 and 2012. The Board denied Appellants’ protest, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 2011 protest was untimely. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellants’ petition was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board and bring Appellants’ protest within the Board’s authority to review; and (2) the Board had the authority to entertain a request for amendment of Appellants’ petition and relate it back to the original filing. Remanded. View "Allen v. Dallas County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law