Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option. View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

In 2009, Scott Schulte and Marisel Del Valle (together, Appellants) executed a promissory note and, as security for the note, a mortgage on real property. The note and mortgage were later assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing. In 2010, BAC filed a foreclosure petition alleging Appellants were in default, and the district court entered a decree of foreclosure. In 2012, Bank of America, as successor by merger to BAC, filed a notice of rescission of foreclosure and, contemporaneously, filed a motion to set aside decree. Appellants opposed the motion to set aside decree, arguing that neither the motion nor the notices of rescission were timely filed within one year of the entry of judgment as required by Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1012 and 1.1013 and were therefore time barred. The district court found the rescission notices timely filed, concluding that a two-year limitations period applied under Iowa Code 654.17, and accordingly, granted Bank of America’s motion to set aside the decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it confirmed that the rescission action was timely filed and granted the motion to set aside decree. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte" on Justia Law

Appellants owned residential real estate in West Des Moines. In 2011, the Dallas County Board of Review established an assessment value of Appellants’ property for tax purposes. In 2012, the Board established a new, greater value for the property. Appellants filed a petition with the Board protesting the assessment. The petition stated that the protest was lodged against the 2011 property valuation. At a hearing before the Board, Appellants stated that they wished to protest the valuations for both 2011 and 2012. The Board denied Appellants’ protest, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 2011 protest was untimely. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellants’ petition was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board and bring Appellants’ protest within the Board’s authority to review; and (2) the Board had the authority to entertain a request for amendment of Appellants’ petition and relate it back to the original filing. Remanded. View "Allen v. Dallas County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their sons, their former attorney, a limited liability company (SMP), and others, challenging the validity of their mortgages delivered to SMP. Without first seeking mediation, SMP counterclaimed to foreclose on a mortgage granted by Plaintiffs on their agricultural property. The district court foreclosed the mortgage and denied Plaintiffs' motion to quash or stay the sheriff's sale. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to foreclose on the agricultural property because SMP had not first obtained a mediation release as required by Iowa Code 654A.6(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SMP was not required to obtain the mediation release prior to filing a counterclaim to foreclose its mortgage. View "Schaefer v. Putnam" on Justia Law

Property owners (Owners) had a lengthy dispute with Linn County over whether houses they had built were subject to the County's zoning and subdivision ordinances. In two separate decisions, the Linn County Board of Adjustment (Board) (1) denied an agricultural exemption for a six-acre parcel that included Owners' residence, and (2) denied an agricultural exemption for a second house on a forty-three-acre parcel that Owners argued was an additional farmhouse. The district court found that substantial evidence support both decisions of the Board and denied Owners' petitioners for writ of certiorari. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board's determinations that the houses at issue were not "primarily adopted, by reason of nature and area, for use for agricultural purposes." View "Lang v. Linn County Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted further review of this dissolution-of-marriage case to consider the proper distribution of a retired spouse's monthly pension benefits. The district court awarded the entirety of those benefits to the retired spouse. The court of appeals reversed and divided the benefits between the spouses to the extent they were accrued during the marriage. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision in part and affirmed the district court's judgment as modified, holding that the court of appeals did not err in ruling that the benefits should have been divided but erred in dividing the benefits without taking into account the remaining allocation of property between the parties. Remanded. View "In re Marriage of O'Brien" on Justia Law

In this real estate dispute, some of the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, alleging Defendant brought the action to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. The district court ordered sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel for $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions, ordering them payable to the jury and witness fund. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of the sanction at $1,000; (2) the court abused its discretion by ordering the sanction be paid to the jury and witness fund; and (3) given Rule 1.413(1)'s preference of compensating victims, the district court should enter an order requiring Plaintiff's counsel to pay the sanction in equal sums to the defendants who sought the sanction as partial reimbursement of the legal fees they incurred in defending against the unfounded claims brought against them. Remanded.

An owner and contractor entered into an agreement for the construction of a new home. During construction, the owner refused to pay the contractor after discovering markups on the cost of materials. In response, the contractor halted construction and filed an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. The contractor subsequently filed a petition to foreclose the mechanic's lien. Although the contractor did not complete construction, the district court found the contractor rendered substantial performance under the contract and entered a judgment against the owner. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the contractor had substantially completed work for the owner. Remanded.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's ruling consolidating condemnation appeals from proceedings by two separate condemning authorities taking property from the same parent tract of farmland. The takings were four months apart for unrelated projects. The district court consolidated the landowner's appeals, finding common question of law or fact and a lack of prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that consolidation was an abuse of discretion, as (1) fact finders must determine just compensation for different types of takings by separate condemning authorities four months apart for unrelated projects; and (2) certain evidence in each case would be inadmissible in the other, thus creating a substantial risk of prejudice and jury confusion. Remanded for separate trials.

The board of directors of a nonprofit condominium association approved necessary but nonemergency repairs to the association's parking garage without a full vote by its members. The repairs were completed at an amount eight times greater than the theshold in the bylaw, which required preapproval of a supermajority of owners to authorize certain expenditures exceeding $25,000. Several condominium owners sued for a judicial declaration that the board's violation of the bylaw's preapproval requirement excused their obligation to pay. The association counterclaimed against the owners to collect their share of the completed repairs and for attorney fees. The district court ruled in favor of the owners. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) holding that the business judgment rule applies to the governance decisions of this board when it acts within its authority; and (2) because the bylaw at issue was ambiguous, the Court deferred to the board's authority under the governing declaration to decide questions of interpretation or application of the bylaws. Remanded.