Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Rodney and Tonda Ross, along with Laura Field, sued Norman Terry Nelson and his corporate entities for trespass and nuisance. Nelson operated an industrial hog-farming operation and installed pipelines beneath a public road to transport treated pig waste to his farmland, which caused odors and fly infestations affecting the Rosses' property. The plaintiffs claimed Nelson did not have permission to install the pipelines and that the resulting conditions constituted a nuisance.The Phillips District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the trespass claim, ruling that Nelson needed the landowners' permission to install the pipelines, which he did not have. The court also denied Nelson's motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claim, concluding that Nelson was not entitled to the statutory presumption of "good agricultural practice" under Kansas' right-to-farm statutes because his actions violated state law by trespassing on the plaintiffs' land. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs for both trespass and nuisance, including punitive damages.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings. It held that Nelson's installation of the pipelines exceeded the scope of the public highway easement because it was for his private and exclusive use, thus constituting a trespass. The court also agreed that Nelson was not entitled to the right-to-farm statutory protections because his agricultural activities were not "undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws," given the trespass.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that Nelson's use of the public highway easement for private pipelines was outside the easement's scope and constituted a trespass. The court also held that Nelson's agricultural activities did not conform to state law, disqualifying him from the statutory presumption of good agricultural practices and the right-to-farm protections. View "Ross v. Nelson" on Justia Law

American Warrior, Inc. owned an oil and gas lease on a 177-acre tract in Finney County, Kansas. In 2020, Huber Sand, Inc. acquired surface rights to the same tract and applied for a conditional use permit to operate a sand and gravel quarry. The Finney County Board of Zoning Appeals approved the permit with conditions after public meetings and consideration of community feedback.The Finney District Court upheld the permit's issuance, ruling that the County properly delegated the authority to issue conditional use permits to the Zoning Board. American Warrior appealed, arguing that the local procedure conflicted with state law, specifically K.S.A. 12-757, which outlines procedures for amending zoning regulations. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the County's procedure conflicted with state law, relying on precedents from Crumbaker v. Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. and Manly v. City of Shawnee.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Finney County's zoning regulations did not conflict with state law. The Court found that K.S.A. 12-757 applies only to amendments of zoning regulations and not to the issuance of conditional use permits. The Court also determined that the County's regulations, which allow the Zoning Board to issue conditional use permits, were valid under K.S.A. 12-755 and K.S.A. 12-759. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the validity of the conditional use permit issued to Huber Sand, Inc. View "American Warrior, Inc. v. Board of Finney County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of a panel of the court of appeals reversing the district court's determination that a prescriptive easement existed over land owned by the Galls, holding that the panel erred in finding that the Pyles' use was not exclusive because the Pyles did not exclude all others from the asserted easement.The Pyles filed petition seeking to quiet title to a disputed boundary land in this case. The district court found that the Pyles acquired the land by adverse possession and acquired a prescriptive easement across the northern sixty feet of the Galls' land. The court of appeals affirmed the court's adverse possession findings but reversed the finding of a prescriptive easement, concluding that the evidence did not show that the Pyles exclusively used the northern boundary of the Galls' land. The Supreme Court reversed as to the issue subject to review, holding that the element of exclusivity was established in this case in the context of a prescriptive easement. View "Pyle v. Gall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's ruling in this eminent domain case between Tenants and City involving the requirement that a condemning authority provide certain relocation benefits and assistance to those displaced by the government's exercise of eminent domain, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition to recover relocation expenses.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition because the Kansas Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 26-501 et seq., neither provides a private right of action to recover relocation benefits nor authorizes judicial review of relocation-benefit determinations in eminent-domain appeals; (2) while the Kansas Relocation Assistance for Persons Displayed by Acquisition of Real Property Act (KRA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 58-3501 et seq., does provide an administrative remedy to vindicate the statutory right to relocation benefits, Tenants' failure to exhaust this administrative remedy deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction under the KRA; and (3) while Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2101(d) authorizes appeals to the district court from certain final judgments and orders of a political subdivision, the statute did not apply in this case. View "Kan. Fire & Safety Equipment v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this case involving permits issued in 2017 and 2018 by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) to four different swine confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), holding that current circumstances rendered moot the legal challenges brought by Sierra Club.In 2017, Husky Hogs LLC formulated a plan to rebuild and expand its CAFO. As part of the plan, the rebuild planners formed Prairie Dog Pork, LLC, which was granted a portion of Husky Hogs' property. Thereafter, KDHE granted each LLC a permit. Subsequently, the same group of landowners created two additional LLCs to further their growing capacities and were given permits from KDHE. Sierra Club brought this lawsuit alleging that the permits issued to the four CAFOs violated the surface water setback requirements of Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-1,180. The district court held that the permits were unlawful. The CAFOs appealed, and while the appeal was pending KDHE issued four new permits to the CAFOs reflecting new legal descriptions of the four facilities. The court of appeals remanded the case with directions to reinstate the 2017 and 2018 permits, which were no longer operational. The Supreme Court dismissed the case, holding that there was no longer any actual controversy concerning the 2017 and 2018 permits. View "Sierra Club v. Stanek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this lawsuit after its prior decision that a 2006 agreement between the cities of Spring Hill and Olathe was unenforceable as a governmental action that could not bind subsequent city councils, holding that Olathe was not entitled to relief on any of its claims of error.The agreement at issue restricted the cities' future growth by establishing boundaries for annexing land lying adjacent to the two cities. The agreement had no fixed expiration term and stated that termination could occur only upon mutual consent of the parties. In 2021, Olathe filed a petition seeking preliminary and injunctive relief to restrain Spring Hill from annexing certain disputed property. The district court denied the request for injunctive relief and then dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreement was an unenforceable attempt to bind future city councils to a governmental policy decision. View "City of Olathe v. City of Spring Hill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's entry of summary judgment for First Security Bank (FSB) in its foreclosure action against David and Linsay Buehne, holding that that the Buehnes's challenges on appeal were unavailing.FSB brought this foreclosure action after the Buehnes failed to make payments on the commercial promissory note they executed with FSB. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FSB. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that a specific contractual clause in the note waiving the defense of the statute of limitations in advance was not void as against public policy. View "First Security Bank v. Buehne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that the executor of the Estate of Thelma J. Taylor converted estate property and ordering the executor to repay double the converted property's value, as provided by Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-1704, holding that the statute's plain language does not limit its application.The court of appeals upheld the conversion finding but held that section 59-1704 did not apply because the property was taken before the executor was appointed to administer the estate. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on the issue subject to review, holding (1) nothing in section 59-1704 limits its application only to circumstances when the decedent's funds are taken by a court-appointed estate fiduciary after probate proceedings begin; and (2) the district court properly assessed the double penalty against the executor under the plain language of the statute. View "In re Estate of Taylor" on Justia Law

In this case about the enforceability about a mortgage clause the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court dismissing this action, holding that any language in the mortgage agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee that would give the mortgagee the ability to take possession of the property was unenforceable in light of the Supreme Court's historical interpretation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 58-2301.The mortgage clause at issue granted to the mortgagee/lender the right to immediate and exclusive possession of the mortgaged property upon the event of the mortgagor/borrower's default. In reliance on the clause the mortgagee took possession of the property and filed a foreclosure action. The district court granted judgment in favor of the mortgagee. The mortgagor filed suit, asserting that, before the court order authorized the mortgagee's possession of the property, the mortgagee's possession was wrongful. The district court dismissed the action on the basis of the mortgage remedies provision and the mortgagor's default. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the mortgagee's reliance on the provisions of executory agreements was unsupported by Kansas law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no support in state law for the mortgagee's reliance on the provisions of the executory agreements. View "Fairfax Portfolio LLC v. Carojoto LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts determining that a condominium owner's consent was not required before a proposed grocery store could be constructed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment.In 1997, the owner of two adjacent properties (the Borders Parcel and the Development Parcel) in Lawrence executed and recorded an Operation and Easement Agreement (OEA) that restricted the building footprints and prohibited either property from being occupied or used for the sale of groceries. Ownership for the two parcels was subsequently split between two entities. In 2010, a condominium was built on the Development Parcel, and Brian Russell bought a unit in the building. In the instant dispute, the owner of the Borders Parcel sought to construct a building that would exceed the OEA's footprint restriction and contain a grocery store. Russell brought this action claiming that the OEA could not be amended without condominium owner consent. The district court granted summary judgment for the parcel owners. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the OEA's language gave the property owners authority to amend the OEA without Russell's consent; and (2) the property owners could amend the OEA to allow for the proposed changes to the Borders Parcel. View "Russell v. Treanor Investments LLC" on Justia Law