Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court determining that Appellant's claim for attorney fees and expenses should be decided by the court and not a jury, holding that Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights does not guarantee the right to a jury trial to determine an award of attorney fees and expenses.The two cases leading to the attorney fee dispute arose of the sale of real property to Appellant. The first lawsuit was filed in 2013, and the second lawsuit was filed in 2015. After the case was decided, the district court denied Appellant's request for a jury trial on the issue of attorney fees and expenses, determining that the issue would be heard by the court and not by a jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Kansas Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury trial to determine whether attorney fees and expenses should be award; (2) Appellant waived her request for a jury trial to determine attorney fees in the 2013 case; and (3) Appellant's claim for attorney fees under the third-party litigation exception to the American rule is an equitable claim that should be decided by the court rather than a jury. View "Harder v. Estate of Foster " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying GFTLenexa, LLC relief in an action based on contractual relationships but brought as an inverse condemnation proceeding, holding that there was no error in the reasoning or conclusions of the district court.GFTLenexa, LLC alleged in this action that a condemnation through an eminent domain action resulted in GFTLenexa's intangible property rights being damaged. The action was predicated on its reduced rental income because of an action that it lost to its sublessee involving the condemnation. The district court denied summary judgment to GFTLenexa. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the proper venue for GFTLenexa to assert its rights was in the eminent domain proceeding, even if it could not have successfully asserted them there because it surrendered its rights through its contractual obligations. View "GFTLenexa, LLC v. City of Lenexa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals' judgment reversing the district court's judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for, inter alia, product liability, holding that the Kansas Product Liability Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-3301 et seq., does not subsume or extinguish any legally viable alternative cause of action seeking recovery for direct or consequential economic loss.After Plaintiffs built thousands of homes they installed bathroom ceiling fans constructed by Defendants. Several ceiling fans caught fire and damaged several homes. Plaintiffs removed and replaced the remaining fans and then brought this lawsuit asserting several claims, including claims for product liability. The district court concluded that the economic loss doctrine barred Plaintiffs from recovery. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs from asserting a product liability claim because the property damage to the homes was not economic loss. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals properly reversed the summary judgment with respect to any property damage; and (2) because it cannot be discerned whether some or all of the claims Plaintiffs claimed as removal and replacement damages were legally recoverable in an unjust enrichment cause of action, the case must be remanded. View "Corvias Military Living, LLC v. Ventamatic, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court upholding the validity of a transfer-on-death deed that was signed by a benefiting party at the direction of the party seeking to make the transfer, holding that the district court did not err.The district court deemed the transfer-on-death deed to constitute an enforceable transfer of Roxie Moore's real property to Maureen Miles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court considered evidence relating to the authority by which Maureen signed the deed, notwithstanding the notary's designation of signature through power of attorney; (2) the district court's determination that Maureen signed the deed as an amanuensis was supported by clear and convincing evidence; (3) the facts as found by the district court rebutted the presumption of invalidity of the deed under the clear and convincing evidence standard; and (4) Appellant failed to present even a preponderance of evidence demonstrating that Roxie lacked the capacity to make knowing and understanding conveyance. View "In re Estate of Moore" on Justia Law

In this quiet title action involving the mineral interests in two tracts of real estate, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that the grantees' successors in interest obtained ownership of minerals when twenty years expired without production on the property, holding that the common-law rule against perpetuities (the rule) should not be applicable to the circumstances of this case.The tracts at issue were conveyed by deeds in which the grantor excepted the mineral interests for a "period of 20 years or as long thereafter" as minerals may be produced. The grantor's successors in interest claimed full ownership of the mineral interest in both tracts, arguing that the future ownership of the minerals when the grantor's excepted term interest ended violated the rule, thereby voiding those conveyances ab initial and preventing them from devolving to the grantees' successors in interest. The district court concluded that the grantees' heirs obtained ownership of the minerals when twenty years expired without production on the property. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that the rule did not apply under these circumstances. View "Jason Oil Co. v. Littler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that Alice King was the legal owner of minerals under a section of land that was the subject of this lawsuit (the Property) and that Luther Term Interest Holders could not establish the elements of adverse possession in this case.In 2009, Oxy USA, Inc. developed an oil and gas well on a unitized production unit of land that included the Property. While the well was not located on the Property, the owner of the minerals under the Property was entitled to receive royalties from the production. Oxy initiated this interpleader and quiet title action to determine the rightful legal owner of the minerals under the property. King owned the surface of the property and an undisputed one-half interest in the minerals. Luther Term Interest Holders, dozens of people and entities, claimed some fraction of the disputed one-half mineral interest. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Luther Term Interest Holders. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that title in the disputed minerals must be quieted in favor of King. View "Oxy USA, Inc. v. Red Wing Oil" on Justia Law

In this dispute over a claim by former tenants for relocation benefits after the City of Topeka negotiated and acquired property where the tenants operated their businesses the Supreme Court rejected the tenants’ contention that displaced persons are owed relocation benefits under Kan. Stat. Ann. 26-518(a) any time a condemning authority acquires real property for a public project.Under section 26-518(a), when real property is acquired by a condemning authority through negotiation in advance of a condemnation action or through a condemnation action, the authority must pay recreation benefits to any person who moves from the property as a result of the acquisition. At issue was the definition of the statutory phrase “negotiation in advance of a condemnation action.” The district court held that the tenants in the instant case were not displaced persons as defined by law and that the property acquisition was not made “in advance of a condemnation action.” The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that whether a negotiation was in advance of a condemnation action is a question of fact to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Nauheim v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

At issue was a real estate contract containing a “first right of refusal” applicable to a separate land tract.Appellant sought specific performance and title to a smaller parcel that was sold after he failed to respond to an earlier offer to sell the entire tract subject to the real estate contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. A Court of Appeals panel reversed. Defendants petitioned for review solely on the panel’s contractual compliance analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel both misread the contract and improperly inserted terms inconsistent with the plain language under consideration; but (2) the first right of refusal was fulfilled after Appellant failed to respond to the offer to sell him the full tract subject to the contract. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings where there remained an unresolved claim as to whether the parties discharged their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when the offer was presented, and the answer to this question will determine whether the first right of refusal provision lapsed when Appellant failed to respond. View "Trear v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that when a railroad quitclaimed its interest in a strip of land to the company from which Sharron Jenkins acquired her interest, the railroad deeded land it was not legally capable of deeding.Jenkins sued to quiet title to real property through which a now-abandoned railway previously ran. The property at dispute was described in an 1886 deed conveying those lots to a railroad company as part of a strip of land running through the grantors’ property along the planned railroad’s centerline. When the railroad abandoned the railway, it quitclaimed its interest in the strip to a company that later quitclaimed its own interest to Jenkins. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment judgment, holding that the language in the 1886 deed demonstrated that the land was conveyed to the railroad for use as a right of way, and therefore, the railroad acquired only an easement, which reverted to the landowners when the railroad abandoned the right of way. Thus, the entity that deeded the lots to Jenkins based on a conveyance from the railroad had no estate to transfer to her. View "Jenkins v. Chicago Pacific Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose from a mortgage foreclosure petition filed by FV-I, Inc. The dispute in this case was between FV-I and Bank of the Prairie (BOP), a bank with junior mortgages on the same property. The parties agreed to sell the property and place the proceeds in escrow pending resolution of this case. Summary judgment was initially granted in favor of BOP. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial to determine whether FV-I had possession of the promissory note underlying the mortgage at the time it filed the mortgage foreclosure. After a trial, the district court concluded that FV-I lacked standing to file the petition because it did not have possession of the original note prior to filing its petition and that BOP’s mortgages were superior to FV-I’s mortgage. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidentiary rulings excluding endorsements on the promissory note require a remand for a rehearing regarding standing and the panel’s priority determination. Remanded. View "FV-I, Inc. v. Kallevig" on Justia Law