Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Bingham Greenebaum Doll law firm that enforced the mortgage on Meredith Lawrence's Gallatin County property, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved by the trial court before summary judgment could be granted.The trial court proceedings in this case resulted in the foreclosure and judicial sale of some of Lawrence's property. On appeal, Lawrence challenged the grant of summary judgment and attacked the validity of the judicial sale of the property. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred in granting Bingham summary judgment because numerous genuine issues of material facts remained unresolved. View "Lawrence v. Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that a promissory note executed by Ronny Stamper in April 1997 qualified as a negotiable instrument and, consequently, applying the six-year statute of limitations under Article 3 of Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code, holding that the court of appeals properly considered Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.3-118 and that the note was a negotiable instrument under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.3-104.Community Financial Services Bank brought this suit in January 2016 to enforce the promissory note at issue. Stamper argued that the action was untimely under the fifteen-year statute of limitations for written contracts. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bank, concluding that the fifteen-year statute of limitations had not yet expired based on the maturity date listed on the promissory note. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations was section 355.3-118 and, therefore, the action was time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank's attempt to enforce the promissory note was untimely under section 355.3-118. View "Community Financial Services Bank v. Stamper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Bingham Greenbaum Doll law firm (Bingham) in this ongoing dispute between Bingham and Meredith Lawrence, holding that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Bingham.The litigation in this case resulted in the foreclosure and judicial sale of some of Lawrence's property. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding (1) Lawrence's arguments challenging the Gallatin Circuit Court's jurisdiction over his case were without merit; and (2) the trial court erred in granting Bingham summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained unresolved. View "Lawrence v. Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing a jury verdict and resulting judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in a way that allowed the jury to address a factual dispute to resolve it.The parties in this case owned adjoining farms. At issue was whether Plaintiffs' use of a road access across Defendants' land had ripened into a prescriptive easement. The jury found in favor of Defendants, which meant that Plaintiffs had no right to use the disputed road. The trial court entered judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in conformance with the rule in Ward v. Stewart, 435 S.W.2d (Ky. 1968). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when confronted with conflicting evidence on the issue of permissive versus prescriptive use of the road at issue, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide a burden-shifting Ward instruction; and (2) Ky. R. Evid. 801A(c)(2) did not apply to except certain testimony under the hearsay rule. View "Melton v. Cross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s claim against the heirs of the Decedent seeking to enforce a judgment lien against real property owned by the Decedent at his death, holding that Plaintiff’s tort claim, which accrued prior to the date of death, made Plaintiff a creditor of the Decedent and his Estate.Plaintiff filed a tort action against the Decedent, who subsequently died, and judgment was entered for Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a judgment lien against the Estate’s property. In a separate action, Bank filed a foreclosure action seeking to enforce its mortgages against the Decedent’s real property. Plaintiff sought to intervene in the foreclosure action. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because at the time of death, the Decedent’s real property immediately passed to his heirs at law, subject only to the claims of creditors, and that Plaintiff’s tort claim did not qualify him as a creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff became a creditor of the Decedent when the tort occurred, and the fact that the claim was reduced to judgment and a judgment lien filed postmortem had no impact on Plaintiff’s status as a creditor of the estate. View "Gregory v. Hardgrove" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in enforcing Deed of Restrictions for Woodlawn Estates Subdivision Section II by granting judgment in favor of Don Hensley against Keith Gadd and JHT Properties, LLC (collectively, Gadd) on the basis that Gadd was renting private residences in the Subdivision as short-term vacation rentals in contravention of restrictions on commercial use of the property at issue.Hensley filed a complaint against Gadd alleging violations of the restrictions. Gadd filed a counterclaim for harassment. The trial court concluded that Gadd’s short-term rentals constituted a business in violation of the restrictions and dismissed Gadd’s harassment counterclaim. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the restrictions were ambiguous in that they permitted rentals and should be construed in favor of the free use of property. The court, however, affirmed dismissal of Gadd’s counterclaim. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated so much of the court of appeals’ opinion as reversed the trial court’s judgment and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the restriction limited commercial uses and required the lots to be used for single-family residential purposes, and (2) Gadd’s use of the property violated the Deed of Restrictions. View "Hensley v. Gadd" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain action challenging the just compensation paid for property to be taken, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals dismissing this appeal for failure to name an indispensable party, holding that Riley v. Department of Highways, 375 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1963), remains sound and applicable to the circumstances before the Court in this case.The court of appeals dismissed this appeal because the notice of appeal failed to include the name of Edward Gravell, the husband of one of Appellants, a tenant-in-common owning the property. The court of appeals reasoned that Edward’s interest, an inchoate right, would be affected by the appellate court’s decision, and thus, he was an indispensable party. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals’s decision was contrary to applicable precedent in Riley; and (2) Edward was not an indispensable party at this stage of the proceeding. View "Hagan v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal reversing the circuit court’s interlocutory judgment concluding that Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) properly exercised its power of eminent domain in the taking of a permanent easement on Appellee’s land for the public purpose of constructing a storm water culvert and drainage system, holding that the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.Specifically, the Court held that the court of appeals (1) failed to give appropriate deference to the circuit court’s finding that LFUCG acted in good faith; (2) improperly extended the holding in Sprint Communications v. Leggett, 307 S.W.3d 109 (Ky. 2010); and (3) failed to follow controlling precedent by requiring that local governments condemn property in fee simple when a lesser interest would be equally effective. View "Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Moore" on Justia Law

In this dispute between neighboring landowners over the location of the boundary line between their adjoining properties the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Appellants, holding that the Court of Appeals exceeded its scope of review by reversing the trial court.The location of the boundary line in this case determined which of the parties was entitled to $440,000 of coal royalties from mining that occurred in the disputed area between the properties. The circuit court ruled in favor of Appellants. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of Appellees and the mining company. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining the boundary line in the manner that it did, that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, and that the Court of Appeals erred by improperly substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. View "C.W. Hoskins Heirs v. Wells" on Justia Law

Stigma damages are a measure of damages stemming from actual injury to property, but if remediation damages are settled and a claim on the stigma damages resulting from the actual damages is reserved, the injured party may be awarded stigma damages regardless of the partial settlement on remediation.Plaintiffs’ property was damaged from oil contamination. In a federal action, the parties entered into a partial settlement that allocated $60,000 to Plaintiffs for repair costs, intended to remedy actual damages to their property. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss all claims against Defendants except for a reserved claims asserting the diminution of the value of their real estate due to the stigma resulting from the contamination. Plaintiffs then filed this state claim alleging negligence, trespass, and permanent nuisance. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the partial settlement barred the state action because Plaintiffs were fully compensated for the actual damages the contamination caused to their property. The circuit court dismissed the stigma damages claim, holding that Plaintiffs could not seek both the costs of remediation and the diminution in value due to stigma damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs’ claim for damages resulting from the stigma of the contamination may be recovered in addition to the settled repair costs. View "Muncie v. Wiesemann" on Justia Law