Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Brattons brought an action against CitiFinancial, Inc. (Citi) alleging that Citi erroneously placed a mortgage on their property and did not release the mortgage after it was notified of the error. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Brattons and awarded damages pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 382.365. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Brattons failed to comply with the requirements of section 382.365(4) because they did not give notice by certified mail. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that section 382.365 simply did not apply to the situation in this case. View "Bratton v. CitiFinancial, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between a condominium association (the Council) and one of its co-owners (Ballard) regarding the need to replace and who should bear the cost of replacement of a two-story wall of windows in Ballard's condominium. Ballard filed suit against the Council seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. The Council, meanwhile, replaced the wall of windows and filed a lien statement and lis pendens to serve as notice that it was asserting a lien against Ballard's condominium. The Council counterclaimed. Ballard amended her complaint to assert, inter alia, a slander of title claim. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded judgment to Ballard and ordered the Council to release its lis pendens notice and statement of lien from Ballard's condominium. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Ballard's slander of title claim was properly submitted to the jury; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the Council did not have a fiduciary duty to Ballard, and therefore, the fiduciary claim should have been dismissed rather than a new trial ordered. Remanded. View "Ballard v. 1400 Willow Council of Co-Owners, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, several individuals, contended that a Robertson County passway was a private drive, and Appellees, Robertson County, the County Fiscal Court, and an individual (collectively, Fiscal Court), argued that the passway was a part of the formal county road system of the County. Appellant asked the Fiscal Court to acknowledge there had never been a formal adoption of the passway into the official county road system, but the Fiscal Court declined. Appellants subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that the passway was not a lawfully adopted county road. The trial court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment. The Fiscal Court appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by treating the case as an original action pursuant to the declaratory judgment statute instead of an appeal from an action of the County Fiscal Court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellants' action could be brought in the circuit court only as an appeal from the decision of the County Fiscal Court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because no appealable event occurred under the facts of this case, Appellants properly invoked the declaratory judgment process to challenge the legal status of the passway. View "Whitley v. Robertson County" on Justia Law

Brian and Lori Peay purchased a home manufactured by Energy Homes, Division of Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (SEHI). At closing, SEHI offered the Peays certain warranties on the home in exchange for the Peays' agreement that any disputes over the home would be submitted to binding arbitration. Brian Peay accepted the warranties and signed the arbitration agreement. After discovering flaws in the home, the Peays filed suit against SEHI, among other defendants. SEHI moved to enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, contrary to the findings of the court of appeals, (1) the arbitration agreement was not prohibited by the merger and integration clause of the purchase contract; (2) the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable; and (3) Lori Peay was bound to the arbitration agreement even though she did not sign the agreement. Remanded. View "Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay" on Justia Law

Appellee sought to void or reform a deed resulting from a sale of property through Appellant's real estate company. Specifically, Appellee claimed that the deed grossly misrepresented the amount of land he contracted to buy. The deed's description called for 300 acres but showed the property was being sold by tract, not acreage. Appellee learned through other sources that the property did not consist of 300 acres. After closing, a survey showed the tract contained forty-four acres. The trial court ruled in favor of Appellants, concluding that, because Appellee was aware at the time of closing that the tract did not contain 300 acres of land, no fraud existed that warranted reforming the deed. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because Appellee was aware there was a deficiency in acreage, Appellee was on notice regarding the deficiency in the property, and the common law doctrine of caveat emptor applied. View "Manning v. Lewis" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was passway located in Robertson County. Appellants, several individuals, contended that the passway was a private drive, whereas Appellees, Robertson County and one individual, contended that the passway was a county road. Appellants unsuccessfully petitioned the county fiscal court to abandon, or discontinue, the county road system. Appellants then filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that the disputed section was not a lawfully adopted county road. The circuit court treated Appellants' action as a de novo action for declaratory judgment, giving no deference to prior findings of the fiscal court action. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants' action could be brought in the circuit court only as an appeal from a decision of the fiscal court refusing to order the abandonment of the county road, not as a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants properly invoked the declaratory judgment process of Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.040 to challenge the legal status of the disputed passway and that the action could not be characterized as an appeal from a fiscal court decision because no appealable event had occurred. View "Whitley v. Robertson County" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet denied Kentucky Southern Coal Corporation's (KSCC) application to renew its surface and underground coal mining permit, finding that a bona fide dispute existed over KSCC's right of entry to 18.1 acres within the permit boundaries. The circuit court affirmed the Cabinet's decision, finding that the expiration of a surface lease adjudicated by another circuit court created a bona fide dispute over the rights of KSCC to mine the coal on the 18.1-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a bona fide property dispute existed in this case, which the Cabinet had no legal authority to adjudicate; and (2) accordingly, the Cabinet did not err in denying KSCC's renewal permit. View "Ky. S. Coal Corp. v. Ky. Energy & Env't Cabinet" on Justia Law

Appellant and Appellees were engaged in a commercial real estate transaction. Appellant was unable to secure adequate financing to close the transaction, and Appellees retained his earnest money deposit. Appellant filed suit, and the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) given that there was an ambiguity in the language of the contract regarding whether the earnest money clause constituted a proper liquidated damages provision, summary judgment in this case was inappropriate; (2) there was a question of genuine fact as to whether the amount of the earnest money deposit was reasonable or so unreasonably large that it was unenforceable on the grounds that public policy would deem it to be a penalty; and (3) if the deposit is deemed to be an unenforceable penalty, a constructive trust should have been established in order to protect the funds. View "Patel v. Tuttle Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee filed suit in the circuit court against Tammie and Brooksie Horn to obtain a judgment securing his right to an easement on property owned by the Horns and property owned by Appellant. Appellant was added as a defendant to the suit. The trial court granted Appellee a sixteen-foot easement over Appellant's and the Horns' property. Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because Appellant had failed to name two indispensable parties - Brooskie and Tammie Horn - in his appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brooksie and Tammy Horn were each an indispensable party to the appeal; and (2) Tammie Horn was not named a party of Appellant's appeal. View "Browning v. Preece" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a mortgage lienholder has standing to an agreed judgment between the property owner and the purchaser of the property owner's delinquent property tax liens. The court of appeals determined that the mortgage lienholder in this case (Appellee, Commonwealth Bank & Trust Company) did have standing to contest the agreed judgment between the property owner (Appellee, Teretha Murphy) and the owner of the owner's delinquent property tax liens (Appellant, Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Commonwealth Bank had standing to contest the monetary amount awarded in the agreed judgment. View "Tax Ease Lien Invs. 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust" on Justia Law