Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At dispute in this case was passway located in Robertson County. Appellants, several individuals, contended that the passway was a private drive, whereas Appellees, Robertson County and one individual, contended that the passway was a county road. Appellants unsuccessfully petitioned the county fiscal court to abandon, or discontinue, the county road system. Appellants then filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that the disputed section was not a lawfully adopted county road. The circuit court treated Appellants' action as a de novo action for declaratory judgment, giving no deference to prior findings of the fiscal court action. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants' action could be brought in the circuit court only as an appeal from a decision of the fiscal court refusing to order the abandonment of the county road, not as a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants properly invoked the declaratory judgment process of Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.040 to challenge the legal status of the disputed passway and that the action could not be characterized as an appeal from a fiscal court decision because no appealable event had occurred. View "Whitley v. Robertson County" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet denied Kentucky Southern Coal Corporation's (KSCC) application to renew its surface and underground coal mining permit, finding that a bona fide dispute existed over KSCC's right of entry to 18.1 acres within the permit boundaries. The circuit court affirmed the Cabinet's decision, finding that the expiration of a surface lease adjudicated by another circuit court created a bona fide dispute over the rights of KSCC to mine the coal on the 18.1-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a bona fide property dispute existed in this case, which the Cabinet had no legal authority to adjudicate; and (2) accordingly, the Cabinet did not err in denying KSCC's renewal permit. View "Ky. S. Coal Corp. v. Ky. Energy & Env't Cabinet" on Justia Law

Appellant and Appellees were engaged in a commercial real estate transaction. Appellant was unable to secure adequate financing to close the transaction, and Appellees retained his earnest money deposit. Appellant filed suit, and the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) given that there was an ambiguity in the language of the contract regarding whether the earnest money clause constituted a proper liquidated damages provision, summary judgment in this case was inappropriate; (2) there was a question of genuine fact as to whether the amount of the earnest money deposit was reasonable or so unreasonably large that it was unenforceable on the grounds that public policy would deem it to be a penalty; and (3) if the deposit is deemed to be an unenforceable penalty, a constructive trust should have been established in order to protect the funds. View "Patel v. Tuttle Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee filed suit in the circuit court against Tammie and Brooksie Horn to obtain a judgment securing his right to an easement on property owned by the Horns and property owned by Appellant. Appellant was added as a defendant to the suit. The trial court granted Appellee a sixteen-foot easement over Appellant's and the Horns' property. Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because Appellant had failed to name two indispensable parties - Brooskie and Tammie Horn - in his appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brooksie and Tammy Horn were each an indispensable party to the appeal; and (2) Tammie Horn was not named a party of Appellant's appeal. View "Browning v. Preece" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a mortgage lienholder has standing to an agreed judgment between the property owner and the purchaser of the property owner's delinquent property tax liens. The court of appeals determined that the mortgage lienholder in this case (Appellee, Commonwealth Bank & Trust Company) did have standing to contest the agreed judgment between the property owner (Appellee, Teretha Murphy) and the owner of the owner's delinquent property tax liens (Appellant, Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Commonwealth Bank had standing to contest the monetary amount awarded in the agreed judgment. View "Tax Ease Lien Invs. 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

Appellants and Appellees were adjoining landowners who disputed the rights to the use and maintenance of a road or access easement across Appellees' property. The circuit court ordered Appellees to permit Appellants to use the road for the purpose of the Appellants' personal, non-commercial access to part of their property but allowed Appellees to maintain the gate and to keep the gate locked at all times. The trial court further adjudged that Appellants had a duty to maintain the road for the purpose of making it passable for vehicles and farm equipment but barred them from paving or otherwise materially changing the current condition of the roadway. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellants had an express easement to the road, without any reservations or restrictions, and therefore, (1) the trial court's judgment that Appellees could maintain a gate on the road was erroneous; and (2) the trial court's restriction limiting Appellants' use of the road to personal use and prohibiting Appellants from paving or rocking the road was unreasonable. View "Sawyers v. Beller" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment in a partition action for the sale of jointly owned real estate, having found that the statute of frauds prevented enforcement of an alleged oral "buy/sell" agreement between the parties. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants, as the party attempting to force the sale, were impermissibly using the statute of frauds as a "sword" and not a "shield" and because "no action" was brought by Appellees that might trigger the application of the statute. The court therefore remanded the matter for a determination as to whether the oral buy/sell agreement existed and its effect on the disposition of the property at issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that because there was no signed writing in this case, and because there was no evidence that the agreement was not reduced to writing because of fraud at the time of omission or evidence that the application of the statute of fraud would result in Appellants being unjustly enriched, summary judgment was proper.

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether Appellee, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) had "good cause" for failing to timely release a satisfied real estate lien it held on Gary and Sharon Hall's property. The circuit court concluded that the Halls were not entitled to statutory damages because, although MERS filed a release referencing the wrong mortgage, the Halls provided insufficient notice to MERS of the release's actual deficiency. Thus, the court found MERS had "good cause" not to file a new release once it checked and found it had already filed one. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MERS satisfied the "good cause" requirement under these particular circumstances.

This case presented the question of whether the doctrine of equitable subrogation may be used to reorder the priority of a mortgage lien where the mortgage holder had constructive but not actual knowledge of a pre-existing lien when it paid off an earlier mortgage as part of a refinancing deal and there was no fraud or other misconduct that would have prevented the discovery of the lien. The trial court applied the doctrine to reorder the priority of liens. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the doctrine did not apply under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because equitable subrogation is not available to a lienholder who has actual or constructive knowledge of a preexisting lien, the court of appeals was correct in concluding that the remedy was not available to the mortgage holder.

After the fiscal court voted to discontinue maintenance on a county road, Appellant, who owned property and lived on the road, erected a locked gate blocking the road and provided a key to each property owner on the road. Appellees, a non-profit association known as Preserve Rural Roads of Madison County, filed suit against Appellant to force him to remove the gates. The circuit court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellees had standing and that Appellant was without legal right or ownership to prohibit others from using the road. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rural Roads had associational standing in this matter; (2) the discontinuance of maintenance on the county road did not affect any public easement rights; and (3) the lower courts' decisions in this case, holding that the county road is a public road and that Appellant could not block the road with gates, did not constitute an unlawful taking of Appellant's land.