Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Rosa Steward leased a home from Holland Family Properties. Rosa's son Dontral suffered lead poisoning as a result of his exposure to high levels of lead paint, which caused severe physical and mental impairments. Dontral, through his mother (Steward), filed a complaint against Holland and Jean Cross, the owner of property Dontral often visited. Both properties contained lead-based paint. Steward claimed that Defendants were liable for his injuries based on theories of negligence per se and common law negligence. The circuit court dismissed both counts on demurrer. At issue on appeal was whether Defendants, landlords subject to the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (VRLTA), had a duty in tort to the tenants of leased properties to comply with building and housing codes concerning public health and safety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a tort duty was not imposed on these landlords by the common law, the leases executed in this case, or the VRLTA.

Quality Auto Body, Inc. and Bradley R. Huebner ("Quality Auto Body") appealed a trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment awarding immediate possession of leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements to Working Capital #1, LLC. Although an order for judgment is not appealable, "an attempted appeal from an order for judgment will be treated as an appeal from a subsequently entered consistent judgment, if one exists." The Supreme Court treated this case as an appeal, and affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Working Capital immediate possession of the leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements.

Plaintiff, owner of a New York City loft, brought an action in ejection against defendant because she occupied an apartment in the loft for which she had not paid any rent since 2003. The court held that the landlord had not complied with Multiple Dwelling Law 302 because the loft did not have a residential certificate of occupancy. The landlord had not received an extension of time to comply and thus could not maintain an ejectment action based on non-payment of rent.

A group of residential tenants (collectively, Tenants) alleged claims of negligence against Canyon Cover Properties, LLC and Apartment Management Consultants, LLC (collectively, AMC). AMC argued that it was relieved from liability because Tenants signed a residential lease agreement (Agreement) that included a limited liability provision (Exculpatory Clause) waiving the right to bring an action for negligence against AMC. The district court concluded that the Agreement and Exculpatory Clause did not violate public policy and were therefore valid and enforceable, and accordingly, granted summary judgment for AMC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because AMC failed to respond meaningfully to Tenants' claim that the Exculpatory Clause was unenforceable because it violated public policy, AMC's brief was rejected and Tenants' claim was accepted that the Exculpatory Clause in the Agreement was unenforceable. Remanded.

This case involved Baygold's lease with MPH, the owner of the premises, for a ten-year term. Baygold, with the consent of MPH, thereafter subleased the premises to its affiliate, Monsey Park. Monsey Park, with MPH's permission, subsequently sub-leased the premises to a non-affiliate, Orzel. At issue was whether the Appellate Division erred in holding that the out-of-possession tenant, Baygold, was not entitled to equitable relief excusing its failure to timely exercise its option to renew a commercial lease with the landlord, MPH. The court concluded that the Appellate Division properly held that Baygold failed to meet the second prong of the J.N.A. Realty v Cross Bay Chelsea test where, among other things, Baygold nor any of its affiliates was a tenant in possession of the premises at the time of the failure to comply with the lease provision; nor can it be said that Baygold, having proffered from its sublease with Orzel since 1985 while having expended no monies or improvements, would incur a "substantial loss" should the lease not be renewed. Finally, the court rejected Baygold's assertion that it was entitled to equitable relief.

Heidi Schumacher signed a renewed lease with Meadowland Apartments. Meadowland later filed an eviction action against Schumacher, alleging that she was in material non-compliance with the lease because Schumacher kept a disruptive dog in her apartment. The magistrate court found that Schumacher's conduct constituted sufficient grounds for termination of the lease. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the magistrate court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Schumacher's motion for a continuance, as Schumacher was given a reasonable opportunity to secure evidence on her behalf; (2) did not abuse its discretion in considering evidence of incidents that occurred prior to the term of Schumacher's most recent lease with Meadowland; and (3) did not err in finding that Meadowland provided reasonable accommodations for Schumacher's disability as required under the Fair Housing Amendments Act.

This was an appeal from a judgment awarding tenant damages for a landlord's breach of a construction-related duty under a build-to-suit lease agreement. The tenant sued asserting that the landlord's failure to adhere to construction plans resulted in a substandard building, diminishing the value of its leasehold. On appeal, the court agreed with the landlord that the cost of repair was the appropriate measure under the circumstances of the case. Because under the appropriate measure, there was no evidence that the tenant had been damaged, the court reversed.

Trustee sought an order allowing him to remove the life tenant (Defendant) from property owned by the trust. The probate court issued an order in conformity with Trustee's petition after Defendant was defaulted for failing to appear. Defendant filed a complaint in superior court purportedly appealing from the decision of the probate court. The trial justice concluded that Defendant had failed to comply with the requirements for filing a claim of appeal from the probate court and granted Trustee's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's appeal for failure to comply with every relevant provision of the statute governing appeals from the probate court, and therefore, the superior court did not err in its judgment.

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.

This case arose when defendant, landlord, without giving notice to or receiving permission from plaintiff, entered the demised premises at issue and installed cross-bracing between two existing steel support columns on both of plaintiff's leased floors causing a change in the flow of patron foot traffic on the first floor and slight diminution of the second floor waiting area. At issue was whether a minimal and inconsequential retaking of space that had been leased to a commercial tenant constituted an actual partial eviction relieving the tenant from all obligation to pay rent. The court concluded, under the circumstances of the case, where such inference by a landlord was small and had no demonstrable effect on the tenant's use and enjoyment of the space, total rent abatement was not warranted.