Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was the Privilege Tax Statute, which provides that an entity may be taxed on the privilege of beneficially using or possessing property in connection with a for-profit business when the owner of that property is exempt from taxation. But the tax may not be imposed unless the entity using or possessing the exempt property has "exclusive possession" of that property. Alliant Techsystems (ATK) challenged the imposition of a privilege tax on its use of government property. The district court granted summary judgment against ATK, concluding that ATK had "exclusive possession" of federal government property because there was no evidence that anyone other than the government, the landowner, had any possession, use, management or control of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the Statute, "exclusive possession" means exclusive as to all parties, including the property owner, and thus, exclusive possession exists when an entity has the present right to occupy and control property akin to that of an owner or lessee; and (2) because the record indicated disputed material facts regarding ATK's authority to control the government property, summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.

The City of Red Wing enacted an ordinance requiring inspections of rental property before landlords could obtain operating licenses and allowing the City to conduct inspections by application for and judicial approval of an administrative warrant in the absence of landlord or tenant consent. Appellants in this case were nine landlords and two tenants who refused to consent to inspections of their properties and successfully challenged three separate applications for administrative warrants. At the same time Appellants opposed the City's application, they filed a separate declaratory judgment action seeking to have the rental inspection ordinance declared unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action for lack of standing, concluding that Appellants had not alleged an injury that was actual or imminent. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the rental inspection ordinance presented a justiciable controversy. Remanded.

Plaintiff entered into a lease with the housing authority in 2007 as "Resident" and named her two sons as "Household Members." The lease provided that certain criminal activities could lead to immediate eviction. Plaintiff received a notice to vacate a few weeks later, after a visit by her daughter led to a gunfight in the parking lot. While plaintiff's challenge was pending, second and third notices issued. Police had been called to her apartment and determined that plaintiff had stabbed her husband, who was living at the apartment and was high on cocaine. Officers found joints on the counter. Plaintiff vacated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The case is moot because plaintiff never contested the second and third notices and, therefore, cannot be restored to the apartment; there was evidence that she lied on her application and was never eligible for tenancy. She incurred no expenses and state court proceedings provided all the process that was due. The court rejected a claim of emotional distress and a claim that the complex constituted segregated housing.

The Heins rented a house from Julia Benintendi and the Perkerwicz family (hereinafter B&P). B&P alleged the Heins caused considerable damage to the property when they vacated the premises. The Heins countered that B&P unlawfully retained their security deposit and refused to reimburse the Heins for home and lawn improvements. B&P sued and obtained a default judgment. The district court subsequently set aside the default judgment and held a jury trial. B&P were awarded damages but not attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to both parties; (2) the district court incorrectly required each party to bear its own costs because, as the prevailing party, B&P was entitled to its costs under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because it had good cause to do so.

The Belangers rented a trailer from John Mulholland. The Belangers informed Mulholland about problems with their running water and toilet, but no repairs were made. When the Belangers were eventually evicted from their trailer, they had lived there without running water for nine months and without a functioning toilet for five months. The Belangers sued Mulholland for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The trial court ruled in favor of the Belangers and awarded the Belangers five months' rent. The Belangers appealed, contending that they were entitled to damages for an additional four-month period when they lacked running water but still had a functioning toilet. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding that the Belangers were entitled to damages for an additional four months because, by itself, the lack of running water in the Belangers' trailer for four months rendered the trailer unfit for human habitation.

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case.

Defendant-Tenant Wendy Wilson appealed a district court ruling that she breached her lease with Plaintiff Nashua Housing Authority. She rented an apartment in a public housing development. The lease provided that tenants "shall not engage in any drug related criminal activity on or off NHA property." Breach of that clause is cause for eviction from the leased unit. After reading a newspaper article about Defendant's arrest, the landlord sent her an eviction notice and subsequently brought a possessory action against Defendant for breach of the lease. At the eviction proceeding, the landlord introduced three criminal drug complaints that alleged Defendant "unlawfully dispensed and sold a certain narcotic drug, to wit: morphine." Defendant contended on appeal that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove she breached her lease. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the criminal complaints were not sufficient to prove that Defendant had actually engaged in the alleged activity. As such, the Court reversed the eviction court's decision to the contrary.

Plaintiff's claims against her landlord, on behalf of her children, alleged violations of the disclosure requirements contained in the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. 4851-4856. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The statute does not provide the children with a cause of action to sue for the violations.

Two appeals between MPQ, Inc. (d/b/a Freedom Enterprises) and Birmingham Realty Company were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purposes of this opinion. The parties entered into a commercial lease agreement. Birmingham Realty filed suit against MPQ for unpaid rent in circuit court. MPQ filed a counterclaim. Birmingham Realty filed a separate unlawful-detainer action against MPQ in district court. The district court dismissed the detainer action, reasoning that the simultaneous actions in the district and circuit courts violated Alabama's abatement statute. Birmingham Realty appealed the district court's dismissal to the circuit court and filed a motion to dismiss MPQ's counterclaim. The circuit court conducted a hearing on all pending motions. It then entered an order affirming the district court's dismissal of the unlawful-detainer action and dismissed MPQ's counterclaims in the rent action. The court suggested that Birmingham Realty move to dismiss the rent action without prejudice so it could refile its unlawful-detainer action in the district court and then later refile an action in circuit court to seek the unpaid rent. Birmingham Realty took the court's advice and filed the suggested motions. MPQ filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the court's decision in its counterclaim. The circuit court did not rule on either motion. The parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Birmingham Realty's appeal from the district court to the circuit court was not timely, and as such, the court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal with regard to the unlawful-detainer action and remanded the remaining issues for further proceedings.

Steven and Lauren Siwinski, homeowners in the town of Ogden Dunes, rented their home despite receiving a cease and desist letter advising them that that rentals were prohibited by the town zoning ordinances. The town filed suit against the Siwinskis for violating town ordinances. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the town's motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the town in the amount of $40,000. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court enter summary judgment in favor of the Siwinskis. On transfer, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the town, holding that the Siwinskis impermissibly rented their dwelling in violation of the town's ordinances. The Court then held that the fine for violating this ordinance should not have exceeded $32,500. Remanded.