Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Lewis Lubar, the trustee of The Clover Trust, filed a complaint for foreclosure against Frederick Connelly. Connelly filed an answer and several affirmative defenses. The superior court granted Lubar’s motion for summary judgment and ordered the sale of Connelly’s residence. Connelly appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of foreclosure and order of sale, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted because (1) Lubar failed to include the minimum required, properly supported, facts in his statement of material facts, and therefore, Lubar failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the record was rife with genuine issues of fact material to deciding the issues raised in this case, including Connelly’s affirmative defenses. Remanded. View "Lubar v. Connelly" on Justia Law

Over the course of several decades, Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title used a section of their neighbor’s property, now owned by Defendants. In 2011, Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that they had obtained a prescriptive easement over the section of land. The superior court granted Plaintiffs a prescriptive easement over the disputed property, finding that Plaintiffs had established all elements necessary to the cause of action. On appeal, Defendants argued, among other things, that the Supreme Court should adopt a “friendly-neighbor” exception to the presumption of adversity that arises when the other elements of a prescriptive easement have been established. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching Defendants’ legal argument because the superior court did not find that a friendly-neighbor relationship existed during the relevant timeframe. View "Riffle v. Smith" on Justia Law

Bangor Savings Bank filed a foreclosure complaint against Robin Richard. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank. Richard appealed, arguing, that the district court erred in granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment for several reasons. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that, under strict application of the rules of summary judgment in the context of a residential mortgage foreclosure, the Bank did not set forth a properly supported statement of fact regarding the amount due on the mortgage note, and therefore, there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount owed under the mortgage. Remanded. View "Bangor Savings Bank v. Richard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of property fronting a beach in the Town of Kennebunkport, filed this action against the Town and any member of the public who claimed any right to use the beach. The State and neighboring landowners, who filed counterclaims, intervened. The superior court determined (1) the Town and the public enjoyed a public prescriptive easement and easement by custom to engage in recreational activities on both the wet and dry sand portions of the beach; and (2) the public had rights concerning the intertidal zone of the beach pursuant to the public trust doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding (1) the neighboring landowners were not proper parties to the litigation; (2) the superior court erred in awarding the Town and the neighboring landowners a prescriptive easement and easement by custom over the beach; and (3) the superior court erred in deciding that the public had a right to engage in ocean-based activities in the intertidal zone pursuant to the public trust doctrine. Remanded. View "Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant each held a one-third interest in property as tenants in common. Plaintiff and Defendant, assisted by counsel, had discussions via email regarding the possible sale of Plaintiff’s interest. The emails stated that Defendant “offered” to acquire Plaintiff’s interest and that Plaintiff “accept[ed]” the offer. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant seeking, among other things, specific performance of the contract for the sale of his interest in the property to Defendant. The superior court granted partial summary judgment on the specific performance claim, concluding there had been no valid contract formation because the emails between Plaintiff and Defendant did not contain all the material terms necessary to form a contract for the sale of land. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding (1) an email can constitute a writing pursuant to the statute of frauds and the Maine Uniform Electronic Transactions Act; and (2) unresolved issues of material fact existed as to whether a contract for the sale of land was formed in this case. View "McClare v. Rocha" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property near but not on Sebago Lake. Defendants owned shorefront property on the lake. Through their deeds, Plaintiffs acquired an easement consisting of a right-of-way over lot 40A, a strip of land situated between Defendants' lots. In 2007, the lot was conveyed to Defendants. Before the conveyance, Plaintiffs obtained a permit for the construction of a dock extending from the lot to the lake. In 2010, the Town's code enforcement officer rescinded the permit and ordered the dock to be removed. The Town's zoning board upheld the enforcement officer's decision. Plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the zoning board's decision and Defendants' fee simple title to the lot and seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to maintain a dock on the lot. Ultimately, the superior court found Defendants held fee simple title to the lot and that the easement held by Plaintiffs did not grant them a right to maintain the dock. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the deed in Defendants' chains of title unambiguously excepted the lot from a prior conveyance and that deeds in Plaintiffs' chains of title were ambiguous as to whether the dock was allowed. Remanded. View "Sleeper v. Loring" on Justia Law

Shellie and Robert Symonds executed a lease agreement granting AT&T Mobility the right to use a portion of their property to build a wireless communication tower. The town planning board approved AT&T's application seeking approval for the project. William Horton and others appealed, and the town zoning board of appeals (ZBA) upheld the planning board's approval of AT&T's application. Horton appealed, arguing that the lease agreement created a new lot that did not meet the minimum space and setback requirements of the town's zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease did not create a new lot and that the setback requirements of the relevant zoning ordinance were satisfied. View "Horton v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

Anne Sullivan-Thorne (Defendant) executed a mortgage on her house in favor of IndyMac Bank, FSB. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company filed an action against Defendant relating to damage done to the home. As part of the litigation, Defendant filed an action against IndyMac seeking to have all insurance proceeds payable to her alone. IndyMac counterclaimed against Defendant, alleging that Defendant had breached the note and mortgage and that Defendant had caused IndyMac not to receive payment of insurance proceeds in an amount sufficient to repair the property. The superior court dismissed IndyMac's counterclaim and entered a final judgment in which the court ordered that Cambridge re-issue the insurance proceeds and make them payable to Defendant alone. IndyMac later assigned the mortgage to Wilmington Trust Company (Plaintiff), who filed this action seeking a judgment of foreclosure against Defendant. The district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, finding that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that because Wilmington's foreclosure claim did not present matters that "were, or might have been, litigated" in the earlier action, the court erred in entering summary judgment for Defendant on claim preclusion grounds. View "Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sullivan-Thorne" on Justia Law

Appellant was the owner of lots in a subdivision. Appellant and others in the area used a right-of-way to access the lake for recreational purposes. Appellees, who owned lots adjacent to the right-of-way, later refused to let others use the right-of-way. Appellant filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the parties' rights in the right-of-way. The superior court concluded that Appellee owned the right-of-way pursuant to the Paper Streets Act and that the right-of-way was not part of a common scheme of development. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err in its application of the Paper Streets Act; and (2) did not err in finding there was no common scheme of development. View "Tisdale v. Buch" on Justia Law

John Hardy leased part of land to Littlebrook Airport Development Co. (LADC). John Hardy died, leaving his wife Jean as the sole surviving owner of the leased property. In 2005, Jean sold the leased property to and assigned her interest in the lease to Littlebrook Ventures (LV), which executed a mortgage in Hardy's favor. Pursuant to the mortgage LV agreed not to modify the lease without Hardy's prior consent. LADC then assigned its interest in the lease to Windmill USA. Windmill and LV purported to amend the lease in accordance with a previously executed declaration amendment. LV later conveyed the property back to Hardy by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Hardy purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and conveyed it to Sweet Peas, LLC. Littlebrook Airport Condominium Association then brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying the rights of the parties pursuant to the lease. At issue was the effectiveness of the unrecorded amendment to the lease that violated the recorded mortgage covenant. The superior court concluded that the lease amendment was effective. The matter came before the Supreme Court on report. The Court discharged the report, concluding that acceptance of the report would improperly place the Court in the role of an advisory board. View "Littlebrook Airpark Condo. Ass'n v. Sweet Peas, LLC " on Justia Law