Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Wells Fargo Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Kenneth and Shelley Burek, alleging that the Bureks had defaulted on a promissory note held by Wells Fargo, thus breaching a condition of a corresponding mortgage held by the bank. During trial, the superior court admitted into evidence the promissory note, mortgage, and loan modification agreement between the Bureks and Wells Fargo proffered by Wells Fargo in addition to other documents. The trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure for Wells Fargo, concluding that the bank failed to prove it was a holder of the note but that it was entitled to enforce the note as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the superior court's conclusion that Wells Fargo certified its proof of ownership of the mortgage note for purposes of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6321 by demonstrating that it was a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 11, 3-1301. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burek" on Justia Law

Padraic Conroy and Heather Wicks owned real property as tenants in common. In 2010, Wicks filed a complaint seeking an equitable partition and sale of the house, with profits to be split equally between her and Conroy. Following a jury-waived trial, the trial court granted Wicks's petition and ordered the sale of the house. The court ordered the profits to be split equally between the parties subject to a credit due to Wicks for Conroy's rent-free occupancy of the downstairs apartment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) finding there was no contract in which the parties agreed Conroy would live in the house rent-free; (2) crediting Wicks for one-half of the fair rental value of the downstairs apartment during the period Conroy lived there; and (3) denying Conroy the opportunity to buy out Wicks's interest in the property. View "Wicks v. Conroy" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Wilk, 14 M.R.S. 6321, attaching documents, including a 2005 mortgage ($459,375) from Wilk in favor of the original lender’s nominee, MERS; a 2008 assignment from MERS to IndyMac; and a 2010 assignment by the FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac, to Deutsche Bank. Trial evidence included a 2011 assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank, executed approximately two weeks prior to the FDIC conveyance to OneWest Bank, purporting to grant “all interest” OneWest Bank then held in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. On cross-examination, Deutsche Bank’s only witness confirmed that the assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank was prior in time to the assignment from the FDIC to OneWest Bank. Deutsche Bank did not introduce the 2010 mortgage assignment, which it had attached to the complaint and which purported to transfer the mortgage from the FDIC to Deutsche Bank. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The Maine Supreme Court vacated, holding that Deutsche Bank failed to prove that it is the assignee of the mortgage. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wilk " on Justia Law

This case involved two potential easements across oceanfront property that provided access to two beaches. Charles Parsons once owned all of the property involved. In 1915, a plan divided the property into lots and identified several roads. One of the lots, commonly referred to as the Farm Lot, was owned by Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill, who acquired title to the lot by deed from their father. The father, in turn, inherited the property through the residuary clause of his wife Helen's will. Rose and Merrill filed a complaint asking the court for a declaratory judgment that the owners of the Farm Lot had the right to use easements over two roads based on chain of title or adverse possession. Defendants, several neighbors, filed a counterclaim asking for a declaratory judgment that Rose and Merrill did not have the right to use the easements. The court found that merger extinguished the easements and no later deed revived the easements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the easements were established through merger, Helen's codicil established easements for the benefit of the Farm Lot. Remanded for consideration of whether the easements created by the codicil still existed or were abandoned. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law

The City Council authorized the City Manager to sell a parcel of oceanfront property known as "the Boat School." Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale agreement was invalid due to the City's failure to advertise in accordance with its charter, and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of the property. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiffs for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs filed a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims of Defendants pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute because Defendants' counterclaims were based on Plaintiffs' petitioning activity. The district court (1) declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss because it was filed after the sixty-day period provided by the statute; (2) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' complaint; (3) granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Defendants' counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' untimely special motion. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased property from Charles Johnson. During the pendency of the sale of the property, Johnson misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a junkyard. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Johnson alleging various causes of action and seeking damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress. While he owned the disputed property, Johnson maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson on Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs and Johnson subsequently reached an agreement resolving the underlying complaint, and the superior court entered a judgment against Johnson for $330,000. Plaintiffs then initiated a reach and apply action against Allstate. The trial court granted summary judgment for Johnson, determining that the policy did not cover the damages Plaintiffs suffered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' damages did not constitute covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" pursuant to the Allstate homeowners insurance policy. View "Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants installed video surveillance cameras at the entrance to an easement crossing their property. Members of a subdivision who benefitted from the easement (Plaintiffs) filed an action for a declaratory judgment and to enjoin Defendants from obstructing their easement rights. Plaintiffs relied on a 2006 settlement to support their position that Defendants were prohibited from installing the cameras. The trial court concluded that Defendants' video surveillance cameras constituted an unreasonable interference with the easement. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the 2006 settlement was relevant evidence to the reasonableness of the cameras, although it was not binding as between the parties to this suit, and the trial court did not err by considering that agreement because its terms provided evidence of the need for injunctive relief; and (2) the placement of the video cameras at issue here did not unreasonably interfere with the access easement benefitting Plaintiffs, nor did the cameras violate the non-disturbance clause in the settlement. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Defendants on the video camera issue. View "Flaherty v. Muther" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Town Landing Road, which was bordered to the west by property owned by the Bayberry Cove Childrens' Land Trust (Trust) and bordered to the east by property owned by Paul and Pauline West. After a dispute about with the Town about access to the road, the Trust filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of the road, which the Wests later joined. The trial court declared that the Trust and Wests owned Town Landing Road free and clear of any interests claimed by the Town on behalf of the public in general. The Town appealed, arguing that the court erred in rejecting its contention that it acquired a public way by prescriptive use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town failed to sustain its burden to prove continuous use of the road for the required period. View "Bayberry Cove Childrens' Land Trust v. Town of Steuben" on Justia Law

The Scarborough Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a setback variance to property owners in the Higgins Beach neighborhood of Scarborough. The property abutted land owned by Summerwind Cottage, LLC. Peter and Libby Cassat owned the land directly across the street. The superior court affirmed the decision of the ZBA. Summerwind Cottage and the Cassats appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map to conclude that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District and in concluding that the property met the requirements for a variance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Summerwind's arguments failed to establish that the ZBA erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map in determining that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ZBA's decision to grant the ordinance. View "Summerwind Cottage, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law