Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Nancy Ramsey filed a complaint against Baxter Title Company and the company's owner, James Lemieux, for breach of fiduciary duty and duty of care and for punitive damages arising from a real estate transaction. The superior court dismissed Ramsey's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ramsey's complaint did not allege the kind of close, confidential relationship necessary for a court to find the existence of a fiduciary duty; and (2) Baxter Title and Lemieux did not owe Ramsey a duty of care to explain to her that the loan she secured was more favorable to the lender than to her. View "Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co." on Justia Law

The Lougee Conservancy; Eleanor Lougee Chapin, as trustee and beneficiary of the Lougee Conservancy; David Lougee, as trustee and beneficiary of the Lougee Conservancy; and Arthur “Jim” Lougee, as beneficiary of the Lougee Conservancy (collectively, the Lougees) appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CitiMortgage, Inc. The court granted summary judgment on the Lougees’ complaint for common law and statutory trespass, invasion of privacy, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and negligence, and in favor of Safeguard Properties, LLC, and David and Shelly Alley, d/b/a D&S Properties, LLC, on all claims except common law and statutory trespass. The Lougees' claims arose when an unencumbered home and barn owned by the Lougee Conservancy were entered and secured as part of CitiMortgage’s foreclosure action that pertained to a neighboring property. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the claims for invasion of privacy, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages, and vacated on the claim of negligence as to all three defendants. View "Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. (DHL), and Oak Leaf Realty, Inc. (OLR). DHL owned property in Washington County, and OLR owned several thousand acres in Hancock County. The DHL and OLR properties have a four-rod-wide rail corridor running over them that was once owned by the Maine Central Railroad Company which was later conveyed to the State of Maine, which the Department of Transportation (DOT) claimed to own in fee simple absolute by virtue of deeds given to Maine Central's predecessor in title from 1897 to 1898. DHL and OLR contended that Maine Central held only a railroad easement that it abandoned prior to its purported conveyance to the State, and therefore DOT owned nothing. Alternatively, OLR contended that if DOT held an interest in the corridor, two deeds in DOT's chain of title contained covenants allowing OLR to compel DOT to build and maintain a fence along a portion of the corridor in Hancock County. DHL and OLR appealed the grant of summary judgments entered in favor of DOT by the Superior Court on their complaints seeking a declaration on who owned what. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly found that DOT held an easement that had not been abandoned in the Washington County portion of the corridor, and owned the fee simple in the Hancock County portion of the corridor. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the covenants requiring Maine Central to build and maintain a fence along the corridor were not enforceable against DOT in equity. View "Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the notice provision of the Paper Streets Act requires that the person asserting the claim to own a paper street notify all record lot owners in the subdivision that includes the street, or only those lot owners that the person asserting ownership of the paper street seeks to exclude from the paper street property. Barbara Carson appealed a superior court judgment in favor of her neighbors who brought suit to determine if they had rights to use a portion of a paper street that bisected Carson's property in order to access another paper street that provides access to the Atlantic Ocean. Because the Court concluded that notice to all subdivision lot owners is required, the Court affirmed that portion of the trial court's judgment addressing the notice issue. View "Brooks v. Carson" on Justia Law

Petitioners David F. and Jeannette A. D'Alessandro appealed a superior Court judgment that affirmed a Town of Harpswell Board of Appeals decision. The Board had denied the D'Alessandros' appeal of a permit issued by the code enforcement officer to several subdivision landowners to install a seasonal stairway for shore access over an easement that burdens land the D'Alessandros own in the same subdivision. The D'Alessandros opposed the permit, arguing that the Harpswell Shoreland Zoning Ordinance allowed for only one stairway to the shore in this subdivision and there was an existing stairway providing shore access in another location within the subdivision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings: The Board's finding that "the location of the proposed stairs is reasonable under the ordinance" did not apply the standard as it is set forth in the ordinance and provided no finding regarding the actual question presented by the ordinance: did a reasonable access alternative exist? Thus, although the Supreme Court reviewed the Board's factual findings under a deferential standard of review, here the Board erred because it failed to make a finding as to whether there was no reasonable access alternative.

Richard Hurlbert, Audrey McGlashan, and Hurlbert-McGlashan, LLC (collectively, Hurlbert) had record title to property abutting Andrew and Melinda Weinstein's (collectively, Weinstein) property. This action arose from the parties' dispute about ownership of certain property. The superior court declared that Weinstein held title to the disputed land through adverse possession. Hurlbert appealed, arguing that the trial court erred because Weinstein failed to satisfy his burden of establishing the required elements of an adverse possession claim. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that Weinstein's use of the property was not sufficiently hostile and notorious to put the true owner on notice that the land in question was actually, visibly, and exclusively held by Hurlbert in antagonistic purpose.

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim.

This appeal arose from the City of Saco's approval of a contract zoning agreement for property purchased by Estates at Bay View, LLC. Several nearby property owners (collectively, the Neighbors) filed a five-count complaint in the superior court challenging the legality of the contract zoning agreement and the Saco Planning Board's subsequent approval of a subdivision and site plan for the property. The superior court granted the City's motion to dismiss three of the counts, granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Bay View on one of the counts, and affirmed the decision of the Board on the final count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no merit in the Neighbors' arguments regarding all of their claims except the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City; and (2) the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City and Bay View, as the contract zone agreement met the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4352(8)(C).

Several lot owners appealed from a judgment entered in the superior court finding that they were not entitled to form a road association pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 23, 3101 and were bound by certain restrictive covenants to pay an annual maintenance fee to Pine Springs Road and Water, LLC (PSRW) for subdivision road maintenance. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court, holding (1) the lot owners were authorized to establish a statutory road association pursuant to section 3101; and (2) the lot owners were not obligated to pay PSRW or its predecessor an annual road maintenance fee under the restrictive covenants. Remanded.

Judith Kehl and Port of Call, LLC filed a motion to modify an order of prejudgment attachment and attachment on trustee process that had been entered in favor of Centrix Bank and Trust, following a contested hearing, ten months earlier. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching its merits, concluding that the final judgment rule barred the appeal because (1) Appellants' motion raised arguments that should have, and could have, been raised before the attachment order was issued and on direct appeal from that order, and therefore, Appellants waived any rights by failing to challenge the attachment order through proper procedural avenues; and (2) no exception to the final judgment rule applied in this case.