Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute between the Mattesons and the Batchelders over fee ownership of less than one acre of land on a stream and the location of a deeded right-of-way on property owned by the Mattesons. The superior court (1) concluded that the Mattesons owned the disputed parcel of land; and (2) reformed the deed to locate the easement along a field road that crossed that Mattesons' property, concluding that the deed description of the right-of-way was ambiguous. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court did not err in finding that the Mattesons obtained the property in dispute, which was included in the deed's property description; and (2) the court erred in reforming the deed to reflect a new location of the easement along the field road where there was no mutual mistake of fact that anything other than the shoreline was the boundary, as described in the deed. Remanded.

The town planning board (Board) granted a dredge-and-fill permit for two culverts on property owned by the Berdeens. Scott Marquis, who owned property abutting the Berdeens' property, (1) appealed the Board's decision, and (2) filed an appeal with the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which the ZBA denied. Marquis's main contention was that an illegal subdivision had been created on the Berdeens' property, which he claimed the Board should have addressed in determining whether to approve the application for the dredge-and-fill permit. The superior court consolidated Marquis's appeals and remanded them. In their decisions, the Board and the ZBA each determined that the Berdeens' property did not qualify as a subdivision pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4401(4) and local law. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the Board's decision to grant a dredge-and-fill permit; (2) vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with instructions to vacate the Board's and ZBA's decisions applying the subdivision law because those determinations were not ripe for review; and (3) instructed the superior court to dismiss the appeal of the ZBA decision as premature.

Fannie Mae instituted foreclosure proceedings against Nicolle Bradbury for residential property she owed in Maine. Fannie Mae named GMAC Mortgage, the loan servicer, as a party-in-interest. During a deposition, a GMAC employee testified that he did not read the affidavits he signed or execute the affidavits before a notary. Fannie Mae subsequently filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of the deposition, which the district court denied. The district court ultimately dismissed without prejudice the complaint after finding Fannie Mae submitted a bad faith affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. As sanctions, the court ordered Fannie Mae to pay Bradbury for the attorney fees and costs she incurred in demonstrating the bad faith of the affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to find GMAC in contempt even though the affidavit was executed by a GMAC employee; and (2) failing to award Bradbury attorney fees and costs in defending against the motion for a protective order.

Hannaford Brothers applied for a site plan review permit to construct a grocery store and drive-through pharmacy. The town's Planning Board voted to grant the permit. The Biziers and other concerned citizens directly appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board. The Biziers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record amply supported the Board's findings that the project was harmonious and in good scale with the natural terrain and surrounding development of the area in accordance with the town's zoning ordinance; and (2) the Board did not err in failing to conclude that Hannaford's plan to modify the dimensions of a landowner's property would create an illegal back lot, and the dimensions of the landowner's resulting lot did not bar the issuance of the site plan review permit to Hannaford.

Appellees in McCormick v. LaChance (McCormick I) brought a motion for reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of a portion of the Supreme Court's opinion in McCormick I. In McCormick I, Appellant appealed the judgment of the superior court granting Appellees summary judgment in an action regarding location of an easement. The Supreme Court affirmed. In the instant action, Appellees contended that because the only issue presented for decision in McCormick I was whether the prior owner of Appellant's land could, by deed referencing a plan, relocate an easement on the face of the earth, the Court should not have addressed an issue of whether actions that Appellant had taken on the face of the earth could have accomplished a relocation of a previously existing easement benefiting Appellees. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and revised its opinion, concluding that in addressing Appellant's attempts to relocate the easement by his actions on the ground after receipt of the deed, the Court misapprehended the issues and addressed matters not presented to the trial court in the summary judgment proceeding and, thus, not properly preserved and presented to the Court for consideration on appeal.

Wife initiated a divorce from Husband. After a trial and after applying the parties' premarital agreement to the evidence presented to divide the parties' real and personal property, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $145,000. The court then ordered Wife to pay Husband $300,000 to achieve an equitable distribution. Wife appealed. Wife subsequently moved the district court to enforce the preliminary injunction, claiming Husband removed her from his health insurance policy in violation of the injunction. The trial court denied Wife's motion. Wife appealed this judgment and consolidated her appeals. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's action with respect to Wife's motion for a preliminary injunction as the parties' premarital agreement unequivocally barred the awarding of spousal support, and therefore, neither spouse could be required to provide the other with health insurance; and (2) affirmed most of the divorce judgment but vacated the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding Husband $300,000 to create an equitable division of the marital estate because there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that $300,000 of the assets awarded to Wife were marital property. Remanded.

Plaintiffs, two individuals, purchased a parcel of land bisected by a railroad track. Maine Central Railroad Company denied Plaintiffs' request to install utility lines across the railroad track for residential access. Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action, requesting that the court declare a perpetual right-of-way appurtenant to their property over the property of Maine Central. After the case was remanded, the superior court found that an implied quasi-easement existed over the Railroad's land but concluded that (1) the quasi-easement's use was limited to its historical use as a farm crossing, and (2) therefore, the scope of the easement did not include the right to install utility services or use as residential access. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly determined the scope of Plaintiffs' implied quasi-easement by limiting it to its originally-intended purposes.

The Belangers rented a trailer from John Mulholland. The Belangers informed Mulholland about problems with their running water and toilet, but no repairs were made. When the Belangers were eventually evicted from their trailer, they had lived there without running water for nine months and without a functioning toilet for five months. The Belangers sued Mulholland for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The trial court ruled in favor of the Belangers and awarded the Belangers five months' rent. The Belangers appealed, contending that they were entitled to damages for an additional four-month period when they lacked running water but still had a functioning toilet. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding that the Belangers were entitled to damages for an additional four months because, by itself, the lack of running water in the Belangers' trailer for four months rendered the trailer unfit for human habitation.

Edgar and Sheryl Peters owned a parcel of land that abutted and was uphill from oceanfront property owned by Richard O'Leary. After a series of disputes with the Peterses, O'Leary planted a row of at least seventy-four trees near the parties' boundary, which obstructed ocean views from the Peterses' newly constructed home. The Peterses sued O'Leary. The superior court found that O'Leary had created a nuisance pursuant to Maine's spite fence statute and the common law and granted injunctive relief to the Peterses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that O'Leary created a nuisance pursuant to the spite fence statute because (1) the plantings created a structure in the nature of a fence, and (2) the evidence was adequate to support a finding that O'Leary maintained the structure for the purpose of annoying the Peterses.

Janelle Gabay defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mortgage of her real property. HSBC Bank USA, the holder of the mortgage, filed a complaint for foreclosure and sale against Gabay. The district court granted HSBC's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that entry of judgment as a matter of law was precluded where (1) HSBC's statement of material facts failed to properly present proof of ownership of the mortgage note; (2) HSBC's statement of material facts did not contain an adequate description of the mortgaged premises including a street address; (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the order of priority and amounts due to other parties-in-interest; and (4) the amount of costs due as part of the amount due on the mortgage was not included in the summary judgment record as required. Remanded.