Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

High Maine, LLC, challenged the Town of Kittery's issuance of a marijuana retail store license and approval of a change of use and modified site plan for GTF Kittery 8, LLC, to operate a marijuana retail store in the Town’s C-2 zone. High Maine argued that the Town's actions violated local and state regulations, particularly concerning the proximity of the proposed store to a nursery school.The Superior Court (York County) dismissed High Maine's complaint for lack of standing, reasoning that High Maine, as a pre-applicant on the waiting list for a marijuana retail store license, did not suffer a particularized injury. The court concluded that High Maine's status as a prospective license-holder was unchanged by the Town's decisions, and thus, it was not directly affected.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that High Maine had alleged a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The court noted that High Maine's opportunity to obtain the single license available in the C-2 zone was directly and negatively affected by the alleged defects in the licensing process. The court found that High Maine's complaint suggested that GTF Kittery 8 obtained an unfair advantage in the lottery by submitting multiple applications for the same building, which was within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that High Maine's allegations were sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to demonstrate its standing to challenge the Town's actions. View "High Maine, LLC v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

Roger K. Moreau sought to operate an automotive repair shop on his lot in the Town of Parsonsfield, which is accessed via Reed Lane, a private road. The lot, created from a larger parcel, lacks frontage on a public road. Reed Lane, dating back to 1991, is a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way with a fifteen-foot-wide gravel road. Moreau had been operating the repair shop without a permit since 2015-2018. Nelligan, who owns adjacent property, opposed the business.The Town of Parsonsfield Planning Board initially denied Moreau's application for a site plan review permit but later approved it after Moreau acquired additional property. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) vacated this approval, stating the lot remained nonconforming. Moreau submitted a third application, which the Planning Board approved, but the ZBA again vacated the decision, citing the insufficient width of Reed Lane for commercial use. Moreau appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the ZBA's decision, finding the Planning Board's approval valid.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the commercial road standards in the Town’s Land Use and Development Ordinance required a sixty-foot-wide right-of-way for a business, which Reed Lane did not meet. The court concluded that Moreau's commercial use of the lot was not grandfathered and must comply with current ordinance standards. Consequently, the court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and directed entry of judgment in favor of Nelligan and the Town of Parsonsfield, affirming the ZBA's decision. View "Moreau v. Town of Parsonsfield" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two condominium associations, Longview Hotel Condominium Association (Longview) and Pearl Inn Condominium Association (Pearl), over a strip of land used for parking. Longview owns a beachfront property with six units and an adjacent parking lot, while Pearl owns a nearby property with eight units. The contested area is a rectangular strip of land adjacent to Pearl's building, which has been used by Pearl's residents for parking for decades. Longview claims that Pearl's use of this land constitutes trespass, while Pearl asserts it has acquired the land through adverse possession.The Superior Court (York County) ruled in favor of Pearl, finding that Pearl had acquired the strip of land by adverse possession. The court determined that Pearl's use of the land was continuous, open, and notorious for the required twenty-year period. The court also directed Pearl to submit a proposed judgment with a specific metes-and-bounds description of the adversely possessed area. Longview appealed, arguing that the court erred in its determination of continuous use and in setting the boundaries of the land acquired by adverse possession.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's finding that Pearl had satisfied the elements of adverse possession, including continuous use. The court found sufficient evidence that Pearl's residents had used the disputed area for parking consistently over the years. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment concerning the boundaries of the adversely possessed land. The court found that the description provided by Pearl included areas not supported by evidence of actual or continuous use. The case was remanded for a revised metes-and-bounds description that accurately reflects the area used by Pearl's residents. View "Longview Hotel Condominium Association v. Pearl Inn" on Justia Law

Geoffrey S. Stiff and Carolyn B. Stiff own a lot on Long Pond in Belgrade, Maine. Their neighbors, Stephen C. Jones and Jody C. Jones, own an adjacent 1.23-acre lot within the limited residential district of the Belgrade shoreland zone. The Joneses' lot is legally non-conforming and already contains a non-conforming house and a shed. In 2017, the Joneses sought a permit to build a garage with a laundry room and playroom. However, they constructed a two-story structure with three bedrooms, two bathrooms, a laundry room, and a playroom with kitchen appliances, which was not in accordance with the permit.The Stiffs objected to the new structure, leading the Joneses to apply for an after-the-fact permit from the Town of Belgrade Planning Board. The Planning Board approved the permit with the condition that kitchen appliances be removed. The Stiffs appealed to the Board of Appeals (BOA), which remanded the matter due to a lack of findings of fact or conclusions of law. On remand, the Planning Board again approved the permit, finding the new structure to be an accessory structure. The Stiffs appealed to the BOA again, and after the BOA denied their appeal, they filed a complaint in the Superior Court, which also denied their appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the Planning Board had misconstrued the Belgrade Shoreland Zoning Ordinance (SZO). The court held that the new structure was not an accessory structure as defined by the SZO because it was not incidental and subordinate to the existing house. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the BOA, which would then remand to the Planning Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Stiff v. Town of Belgrade" on Justia Law

The case involves a property dispute in the Holiday Beach neighborhood of Owls Head, Maine, between John M. Carter and Christine C. Carter (the Carters) and their neighbors, Michael A. Voncannon and N. Kermit Voncannon (the Voncannons), and Zachary Rogers and Kathryn Rogers as Trustees of the Nancy C. Rogers Irrevocable Trust (the Rogerses). The dispute centers on the ownership and use of two "paper streets"—Austin Avenue and the Reserved Way—that transect their properties.The Business and Consumer Docket (Murphy, J.) held a bench trial and found that the Carters had superior title to Austin Avenue, while the Voncannons and Rogerses had acquired title to the Reserved Way through adverse possession. The court determined that the Carters' deed conveyed the Reserved Way to them, but the Voncannons and Rogerses had used the Reserved Way openly, notoriously, and exclusively for over twenty years, thus meeting the requirements for adverse possession. The court also found that the Reserved Way terminates at Holiday Beach Road and does not extend to the high-water mark of Owls Head Harbor.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The Court held that the Carters had full record title to Austin Avenue and that the Voncannons and Rogerses' activities on Austin Avenue constituted trespass. The Court also upheld the finding that the Reserved Way terminates at Holiday Beach Road, not the high-water mark. Additionally, the Court agreed that the Voncannons and Rogerses had acquired title to their respective halves of the Reserved Way through adverse possession, as their use of the land was actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under a claim of right, continuous, and exclusive for the statutory period. The Court found no clear error in the trial court's factual determinations and legal conclusions. View "Carter v. Voncannon" on Justia Law

The case involves Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc. (the Resort) and the State of Maine. In 1986, the State sold a ski area, along with easements and a portion of the abutting parcel, to the Big Squaw Mountain Corporation (BSMC). The deed included restrictive covenants prohibiting timber harvesting and requiring the continued public use of the ski area. In 1995, the Resort acquired the property, including the restrictive covenants. The Resort later closed half of the ski area and harvested timber from the area, actions which the State argued violated the covenants.The Superior Court of Kennebec County granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Resort had breached both covenants. The court ordered the Resort to pay damages for the timber harvested and to place funds into an escrow account for the repair and reopening of the ski area.The Resort appealed, arguing that the State could not enforce the covenants as it did not own a parcel that benefited from them, that the court erred in its interpretation of the public use covenant, and that the court erred in granting summary judgment because the public use covenant was unreasonable, the State failed to notify the Resort of its alleged breach, and the State was barred from enforcing the covenant by the doctrine of laches.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the State could enforce the covenants without owning a benefiting parcel, that the public use covenant required the Resort to make reasonable efforts to keep the whole ski area open for public use, and that the doctrine of laches did not apply as the Resort had not shown that the State's delay in enforcement was unreasonable or resulted in prejudice to the Resort. View "State v. Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Delanna Garey, who was employed as the director of operations of an apartment building managed by Stanford Management until her termination in January 2023. In February 2023, Stanford and its current director of operations, Eve Dunham, requested the Rumford Police to serve Garey with a criminal trespass notice, barring her from entering the building for a year. In March 2023, Stanford and Dunham posted copies of the criminal trespass notice on the building and sent a letter to the residents stating that former employees were not permitted on the premises. Garey filed a complaint against Stanford alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.The Superior Court granted Stanford’s motion to dismiss Garey’s complaint in its entirety, concluding that Garey failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that Stanford’s statements were not provably false; they were statements of opinion, not of fact; the statements were subject to multiple interpretations and should not be attributed their worst possible meaning; and in the alternative, even if the statements were defamatory, they were conditionally privileged.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Garey met her burden and vacated the Superior Court judgment with respect to her claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy. The court affirmed the dismissal of her claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as moot. The court found that Garey’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Stanford published statements that falsely imply that Garey engaged in dangerous conduct such that the community needs protection. The court also concluded that Garey has sufficiently alleged a claim for false light invasion of privacy. However, Garey’s declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims were moot because she is no longer precluded from entering the building property. View "Garey v. Stanford Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Peter M. Beckerman and Ricky and Monica Conant over a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway. The parties own abutting waterfront properties in Rome, Maine. Beckerman's property, the Conant property, and a third property, formerly known as the Bruce Pooler lot, are connected to South Crane Lane by a horseshoe-shaped driveway that runs across all three properties. Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway to access South Crane Lane.Previously, Beckerman had filed an action against the Poolers, previous owners of the other two lots, to establish the location of the common boundaries of the three lots. The parties settled the action at mediation, resulting in a consent order in 2002 that established the current boundaries of the three properties. As part of the settlement, Beckerman secured a right-of-way over the driveway on the Bruce Pooler lot in order to access South Crane Lane.In 2012, Beckerman filed a post-judgment motion for contempt, alleging that the Conants were in contempt of the 2002 consent judgment by impeding his use of the right-of-way over the Conant lot. The court denied Beckerman’s motion for contempt because the language of the consent order was ambiguous. Beckerman appealed and the court affirmed the denial of the contempt but vacated the portion of the court’s determination regarding whether Beckerman had an easement by deed.On remand, after a three-day bench trial, the court entered a judgment declaring that Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants’ driveway and enjoining the Conants from interfering with that right-of-way. The Conants appealed the judgment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. The court found that the language of the 2016 judgment was clear and specific, and the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Conants in contempt. The court also found that the Superior Court did not err in concluding that Beckerman may use the entire paved driveway as needed to access his property. The court further held that the doctrine of claim preclusion did not apply in this instance as there was no valid final judgment entered with respect to Beckerman’s August 2016 motion for contempt. Lastly, the court held that the Superior Court was within its discretion to award Beckerman attorney fees under M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C). View "Beckerman v. Conant" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an easement, a right to cross or otherwise use someone else's land for a specified purpose. The plaintiffs, Kinderhaus North LLC, Prime Properties ME LLC, and Karen and Brian Fullerton (collectively, the Fullertons), own four lots in a subdivision and have an expressly deeded easement across a lot owned by the defendants, Karl and Stephanie Nicolas. The Fullertons claimed that the Nicolases had obstructed their easement by installing a granite lamp post and several trees. The Fullertons removed some of these trees, leading to a dispute over whether they had the right to do so and whether they had committed a timber trespass by cutting down the trees.The Business and Consumer Docket found that the Fullertons had an expressly deeded easement across the Nicolases' property, but that the easement was ambiguous as to its scope and purpose. The court found that the Fullertons did not have an unlimited right to use the full length and width of the easement as a driveway, and that the trees and lamp post did not prevent vehicle or pedestrian passage within the easement. The court also found that Karen Fullerton had committed a timber trespass by intentionally cutting down four trees within the easement, and awarded the Nicolases damages for this trespass. The court further found that Karen Fullerton had committed a common law trespass by entering the Nicolases' property without their consent, and awarded nominal and punitive damages for this trespass. The court granted summary judgment for the Nicolases on the Fullertons' slander of title and abuse of process claims.The Fullertons appealed, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court's judgment on several issues and remanded for further findings. The court held that the Fullertons had the right to remove obstacles within their easement, and that Karen Fullerton was therefore an "owner" within the meaning of the timber trespass statute. The court also held that punitive damages may be awarded in common law trespass cases where nominal damages are awarded, but remanded for the lower court to make further findings under the guidelines established by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining punitive damages. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all other respects. View "Kinderhaus North LLC v. Nicols" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a contract zone agreement that would have allowed development on a property in Saco, Maine. The property owners, Amarjit Singh Dhillon and Ajinder Kaur, appealed from a lower court's grant of partial summary judgment to Michael Dahlem, who owns neighboring property and challenged the contract zone agreement. Dahlem cross-appealed from the court's dismissal of his Rule 80B appeal and denial of his motion to reconsider that dismissal, and from the court's denial of summary judgment on two counts in his complaint.The lower court had granted summary judgment to Dahlem on several counts, declaring that the 2017 agreement became null and void in 2019 and thereafter could not be amended, was invalid and unlawful for noncompliance with the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and was inconsistent with Maine’s Mandatory Shoreland Zoning statute and therefore preempted and invalid. The court denied summary judgment to all parties on the count of whether the 2021 agreement was compatible with the City’s comprehensive plan.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects and dismissed Dahlem’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that Dahlem properly challenged the 2021 agreement by asserting claims for declaratory relief, that the 2017 agreement became null and void on November 20, 2019, and could not thereafter be amended, that the 2021 agreement was invalid and unlawful under the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and that the 2021 agreement was preempted by the Mandatory Shoreland Zoning provisions. View "Dahlem v. City of Saco" on Justia Law