Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc. (the Resort) and the State of Maine. In 1986, the State sold a ski area, along with easements and a portion of the abutting parcel, to the Big Squaw Mountain Corporation (BSMC). The deed included restrictive covenants prohibiting timber harvesting and requiring the continued public use of the ski area. In 1995, the Resort acquired the property, including the restrictive covenants. The Resort later closed half of the ski area and harvested timber from the area, actions which the State argued violated the covenants.The Superior Court of Kennebec County granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Resort had breached both covenants. The court ordered the Resort to pay damages for the timber harvested and to place funds into an escrow account for the repair and reopening of the ski area.The Resort appealed, arguing that the State could not enforce the covenants as it did not own a parcel that benefited from them, that the court erred in its interpretation of the public use covenant, and that the court erred in granting summary judgment because the public use covenant was unreasonable, the State failed to notify the Resort of its alleged breach, and the State was barred from enforcing the covenant by the doctrine of laches.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the State could enforce the covenants without owning a benefiting parcel, that the public use covenant required the Resort to make reasonable efforts to keep the whole ski area open for public use, and that the doctrine of laches did not apply as the Resort had not shown that the State's delay in enforcement was unreasonable or resulted in prejudice to the Resort. View "State v. Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Delanna Garey, who was employed as the director of operations of an apartment building managed by Stanford Management until her termination in January 2023. In February 2023, Stanford and its current director of operations, Eve Dunham, requested the Rumford Police to serve Garey with a criminal trespass notice, barring her from entering the building for a year. In March 2023, Stanford and Dunham posted copies of the criminal trespass notice on the building and sent a letter to the residents stating that former employees were not permitted on the premises. Garey filed a complaint against Stanford alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.The Superior Court granted Stanford’s motion to dismiss Garey’s complaint in its entirety, concluding that Garey failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that Stanford’s statements were not provably false; they were statements of opinion, not of fact; the statements were subject to multiple interpretations and should not be attributed their worst possible meaning; and in the alternative, even if the statements were defamatory, they were conditionally privileged.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Garey met her burden and vacated the Superior Court judgment with respect to her claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy. The court affirmed the dismissal of her claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as moot. The court found that Garey’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Stanford published statements that falsely imply that Garey engaged in dangerous conduct such that the community needs protection. The court also concluded that Garey has sufficiently alleged a claim for false light invasion of privacy. However, Garey’s declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims were moot because she is no longer precluded from entering the building property. View "Garey v. Stanford Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Peter M. Beckerman and Ricky and Monica Conant over a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway. The parties own abutting waterfront properties in Rome, Maine. Beckerman's property, the Conant property, and a third property, formerly known as the Bruce Pooler lot, are connected to South Crane Lane by a horseshoe-shaped driveway that runs across all three properties. Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway to access South Crane Lane.Previously, Beckerman had filed an action against the Poolers, previous owners of the other two lots, to establish the location of the common boundaries of the three lots. The parties settled the action at mediation, resulting in a consent order in 2002 that established the current boundaries of the three properties. As part of the settlement, Beckerman secured a right-of-way over the driveway on the Bruce Pooler lot in order to access South Crane Lane.In 2012, Beckerman filed a post-judgment motion for contempt, alleging that the Conants were in contempt of the 2002 consent judgment by impeding his use of the right-of-way over the Conant lot. The court denied Beckerman’s motion for contempt because the language of the consent order was ambiguous. Beckerman appealed and the court affirmed the denial of the contempt but vacated the portion of the court’s determination regarding whether Beckerman had an easement by deed.On remand, after a three-day bench trial, the court entered a judgment declaring that Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants’ driveway and enjoining the Conants from interfering with that right-of-way. The Conants appealed the judgment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. The court found that the language of the 2016 judgment was clear and specific, and the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Conants in contempt. The court also found that the Superior Court did not err in concluding that Beckerman may use the entire paved driveway as needed to access his property. The court further held that the doctrine of claim preclusion did not apply in this instance as there was no valid final judgment entered with respect to Beckerman’s August 2016 motion for contempt. Lastly, the court held that the Superior Court was within its discretion to award Beckerman attorney fees under M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C). View "Beckerman v. Conant" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an easement, a right to cross or otherwise use someone else's land for a specified purpose. The plaintiffs, Kinderhaus North LLC, Prime Properties ME LLC, and Karen and Brian Fullerton (collectively, the Fullertons), own four lots in a subdivision and have an expressly deeded easement across a lot owned by the defendants, Karl and Stephanie Nicolas. The Fullertons claimed that the Nicolases had obstructed their easement by installing a granite lamp post and several trees. The Fullertons removed some of these trees, leading to a dispute over whether they had the right to do so and whether they had committed a timber trespass by cutting down the trees.The Business and Consumer Docket found that the Fullertons had an expressly deeded easement across the Nicolases' property, but that the easement was ambiguous as to its scope and purpose. The court found that the Fullertons did not have an unlimited right to use the full length and width of the easement as a driveway, and that the trees and lamp post did not prevent vehicle or pedestrian passage within the easement. The court also found that Karen Fullerton had committed a timber trespass by intentionally cutting down four trees within the easement, and awarded the Nicolases damages for this trespass. The court further found that Karen Fullerton had committed a common law trespass by entering the Nicolases' property without their consent, and awarded nominal and punitive damages for this trespass. The court granted summary judgment for the Nicolases on the Fullertons' slander of title and abuse of process claims.The Fullertons appealed, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court's judgment on several issues and remanded for further findings. The court held that the Fullertons had the right to remove obstacles within their easement, and that Karen Fullerton was therefore an "owner" within the meaning of the timber trespass statute. The court also held that punitive damages may be awarded in common law trespass cases where nominal damages are awarded, but remanded for the lower court to make further findings under the guidelines established by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining punitive damages. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all other respects. View "Kinderhaus North LLC v. Nicols" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a contract zone agreement that would have allowed development on a property in Saco, Maine. The property owners, Amarjit Singh Dhillon and Ajinder Kaur, appealed from a lower court's grant of partial summary judgment to Michael Dahlem, who owns neighboring property and challenged the contract zone agreement. Dahlem cross-appealed from the court's dismissal of his Rule 80B appeal and denial of his motion to reconsider that dismissal, and from the court's denial of summary judgment on two counts in his complaint.The lower court had granted summary judgment to Dahlem on several counts, declaring that the 2017 agreement became null and void in 2019 and thereafter could not be amended, was invalid and unlawful for noncompliance with the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and was inconsistent with Maine’s Mandatory Shoreland Zoning statute and therefore preempted and invalid. The court denied summary judgment to all parties on the count of whether the 2021 agreement was compatible with the City’s comprehensive plan.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects and dismissed Dahlem’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that Dahlem properly challenged the 2021 agreement by asserting claims for declaratory relief, that the 2017 agreement became null and void on November 20, 2019, and could not thereafter be amended, that the 2021 agreement was invalid and unlawful under the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and that the 2021 agreement was preempted by the Mandatory Shoreland Zoning provisions. View "Dahlem v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

The case at hand involves a dispute over the interpretation of a will left by Robert Pettengill Beckey, who was survived by his three children, Sandra L. Arthur, Angela M. Beckey, and Timothy E. Beckey. The will included specific instructions for dividing real property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., Greene, ME, among the three children. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the Probate Court erred in its interpretation of the will, particularly regarding Angela's share.Specifically, Angela's share was described in the will as "1/3 of property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., minus the valuation of a piece of land on water by property line of 'Caron's'". The Probate Court had ruled that this description was ambiguous and that Angela's share therefore fell into the residue of the estate, to be divided equally among the three children. However, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the ambiguity of the "minus" clause was irrelevant because Robert never conveyed any part of the land to Angela. Therefore, Angela was entitled to a one-third share of the Allen Pond Road property’s value without any reduction.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Probate Court's ruling was not consistent with Robert's intent for his children to receive equal shares of the property's value. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Estate of Robert Pettengill Beckey" on Justia Law

The case centers around the dispute over the requirement for a supermajority vote in the Town of Bar Harbor's amendment to its Land Use Ordinance (LUO) concerning vacation rentals. Erica Brooks and Victoria Smith, both property owners in the town, argued that due to a 2-2 tie vote by the Planning Board on the proposed amendment, a two-thirds majority vote was necessary for the amendment to pass. The amendment, however, was enacted with a 60% majority vote. The Superior Court sided with the Town, asserting that the LUO language did not necessitate a supermajority vote.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision but did so on different grounds. The court agreed with the argument put forth by the Maine Municipal Association in an amicus brief, which asserted that irrespective of the LUO's language, under Maine statutes 21-A M.R.S. § 723(4) (2023) and 30-A M.R.S. § 2501 (2023), only a simple majority vote was required for the amendment to take effect, unless the Town's charter provided otherwise, which it did not. Therefore, the court concluded that the amendment was lawfully enacted with a simple majority vote, rendering the Town's supermajority requirement unenforceable. View "Brooks v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

In this case, Michael Bordick and Monica Bordick defaulted on a loan from Franklin Savings Bank, which was secured with a hunting cabin they owned on property they leased. The Bank filed a complaint for recovery of the cabin, and the Business and Consumer Docket ruled in favor of the Bank. The Bordicks appealed, arguing that the Bank did not make disclosures required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The Bank argued that the credit transaction was not subject to TILA.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that a credit transaction secured by real property in the form of a lease is not exempt from TILA under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603(3). However, the court also found that the lower court applied an incorrect test to determine whether the loan was for commercial purposes and therefore exempt under § 1603(1). The court vacated the judgment in favor of the Bank and remanded the case for the lower court to determine the nature of the loan, looking at the totality of the circumstances.The court also clarified that although the leased land where the cabin was located was not the Bordicks' principal dwelling, the credit transaction is not exempt from TILA under § 1603(3) because it was secured with real property. View "Franklin Savings Bank v. Bordick" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a dispute between Heather Keep and Christopher Indorf regarding the division of real estate they owned jointly. Keep and Indorf were unmarried domestic partners who had one child together. They purchased a house in Saco together, with Indorf contributing the down payment and both parties being liable for the mortgage. When their relationship ended, Keep moved out and Indorf assumed sole responsibility for the house. Keep filed a complaint for equitable partition in 2019. During the litigation process, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement, which was placed on the record during a judicial settlement conference. The agreement stated that for the valuation and division of any expenses associated with the home, they would use the date of May 1st, when Indorf had fully assumed all responsibility for the residence.The District Court (Biddeford, Tice, J.) eventually entered a partition judgment, setting aside the partial settlement agreement and dividing the real estate. Indorf appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by setting aside the settlement agreement.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Indorf. It found that the parties had entered into an enforceable agreement, which the lower court could not simply disregard because it appeared unfair in light of subsequent events. The supreme court held that the agreement was ambiguous and remanded the case back to the District Court to determine the meaning of the agreement and to divide the property accordingly. The supreme court also dismissed Keep's cross-appeal as untimely. View "Keep v. Indorf" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a decision by the District Court granting Camille J. Moulton's motion for summary judgment against J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. Moulton's property in Buckfield was subject to a mortgage held by J.P. Morgan. When Moulton stopped making payments on her loan, J.P. Morgan sent her a notice of default and right to cure. However, the notice overstated the amount required to cure the default due to an amount held in suspense by the bank, and was thus deemed deficient by the court.The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the District Court's decision that the notice was deficient and affirmed that portion of the judgment. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the District Court's judgment that required J.P. Morgan to discharge the mortgage, as there was no basis for the lower court to declare the effect of its judgment without a specific claim for declaratory relief. The court did not disturb the lower court's award of reasonable attorney fees to Moulton for defending against the foreclosure claim. The holding of this case is that a notice of default and right to cure is deficient if it does not clearly inform the borrower of the amount required to cure the default. If a lender has not complied with the prerequisites to acceleration, a court cannot conclude that initiation of a foreclosure action nevertheless accelerates the note balance. When a court enters summary judgment against a lender or dismisses the lender’s foreclosure claim due to a deficient notice, it does not preclude the lender from bringing a future foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire mortgage or effect a transfer of title. View "J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton" on Justia Law