Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the business and consumer docket dismissing as time-barred Plaintiff's complaint against U.S. Bank, N.A., the servicer of a mortgage she executed to secure a loan, holding that the court correctly dismissed the complaint as untimely filed.Plaintiff fully performed her obligations arising from a transaction in which she borrowed money and executed a mortgage to secure the loan. Four years after her claim accrued, Plaintiff brought this action under Me. Rev. Stat. 33, 551, alleging that U.S. Bank did not fulfill its statutory duty when it came time for the mortgage to be discharged. The business and consumer docket concluded that the claim was subject to the one-year limitation period set forth in Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 858 and was thus time-barred. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court correctly dismissed the complaint because it was subject to the one-year statute of limitations. View "Denutte v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying First Financial, Inc.'s motion for relief from judgment after the court denied its motion to dismiss its foreclosure complaint against Peter and Judith Morrison and granted the Morrisons' motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the trial court did not err.In their motion for judgment on the pleadings the Morrisons asserted that First Financial's notice of default and the right to cure did not comply with the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. First Financial then filed a motion to dismiss its foreclosure complaint without prejudice. The court summarily denied First Financial's motion to dismiss and granted the Morrison's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where evidence of a properly served notice of default and mortgagor's right to cure in compliance with statutory requirements is an essential element to support a judgment of foreclosure, the court did not err in granting the Morrisons' motion for judgment and denying First Financial's motion for dismissal without prejudice. View "First Financial, Inc. v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Appellants' claim for a declaratory judgment in this zoning dispute, holding that the superior court did not err in dismissing the claim as duplicative of Appellants' appeal from a municipal action that was included in the same complaint.Appellants owned a parcel of land that abutted a parcel owned by Landowners. After the zoning board of appeals (ZBA) approved Landowners' application for permission to raze an existing house located on their property and to build a new one Appellants filed a complaint against the Town of Cape Elizabeth and Landowners, asserting, inter alia, a request for judicial review of the ZBA's approval of Appellants' application pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B and an independent claim for a declaratory judgment that section 19-6-11(E)(2) of the Cape Elizabeth Zoning Ordinance is preempted by the state's Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 439-A(4)(C)(1). The superior court dismissed the declaratory judgment claim as duplicative of the Rule 80B appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants' claim for declaratory relief was not independent from its Rule 80B, the superior court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim as duplicative was not an abuse of discretion. View "Cape Shore House Owners Ass'n v. Town of Cape Elizabeth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Business and Consumer Docket entering a declaratory judgment invalidating all rules and regulations previously promulgated by Fall Line Condominium Association's Board of Directors, holding that the declaratory judgment voiding rules and regulations not approved by a majority in interest of unit owners that concern the use of units, common areas, and facilities was proper but that the declaratory judgment as to all other rules and regulations was not.Plaintiffs, who owned a unit at Fall Line, filed a complaint against the Association and certain members of the Board seeking a declaratory judgment that all rules, regulations, and limitations affecting unit owners and their use of their units and any common element at the condominiums not approved by a majority in interest by the unit owners were void. The Business Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Association's bylaws unambiguously states that the Board, in order to promulgate or amend rules of conduct concerning the use of the units, common areas, and facilities, must seek approval from a majority in interest of unit owners; and (2) there is no such limitation on other types of rules or regulations governing the general operation and use of the property. View "Scott v. Fall Line Condominium Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Property Owners in this property dispute, holding that rockweed, a species of seaweed that grows in Maine's intertidal zone, is private property that belongings to the adjoining upland landowner who owns the intertidal soil in fee simple and is therefore not public property.Acadian Seaplants, Ltd. harvested rockweed attached to intertidal land without permission of Property Owners, owners of upland property where the rockweed grew. Property Owners commenced this action against Acadian seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Property Owners. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that rockweed in the intertidal zone belongs to the upland property owner and is therefore not held in trust by the State for public use and cannot be harvested by members of the public as a matter of right. View "Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Matthew Needham on a foreclosure complaint filed by Wilmington Savings Fund Society as Trustee for Hilldale Trust (Wilmington) and remanded the matter for entry of judgment for Wilmington, holding a mortgagee may delegate to an agent its duty to provide a notice of the right to cure pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111(1).After Needham defaulted on his loan, loan servicer BSI Financial Services sent Needham a notice of the right to cure on behalf of Ventures Trust, the then-holder of the note and mortgage. Thereafter, Ventures Trust filed a foreclosure complaint. Wilmington, which was assigned the mortgage and note, was subsequently substituted as Plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment for Needham, concluding that because the notice was sent by the loan servicer rather than the mortgagee, the notice was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that neither the mortgage contract nor Me. Rev. Stat. 6111(1) prohibited the mortgagee from delegating to an agent loan servicer its duty to give a notice of the right to cure to Needham. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Needham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Plaintiffs’ Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint for review of factual findings made by the Board of Appeals of the Town of York, holding that the superior court had jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision.Plaintiffs contacted the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) to express their concern that their neighbor’s use of his property was not consistent with the previous owner’s nonconforming use. The CEO found no violations. The Board found that the neighbor’s use of the lot did not constitute a change in use but was rather an intensification of the previous use. Plaintiffs appealed to the superior court pursuant to Rule 80B. The court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the Board’s review of the CEO’s decision was advisory and, therefore, unreviewable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, absent an express provision in the Town’s ordinance stating that Plaintiffs may not appeal, a determination of whether there has been a violation of the ordinance is reviewable on appeal. View "Raposa v. Town of York" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the the district court granting summary judgment in favor of MaineStream Finance on Jacob Berry’s complaint seeking the return of a 2016 Chevrolet Camaro, holding that summary judgment was improper on the facts of this case.In 2016, MaineStream filed an action against Dwight Moody, Berry’s uncle, to repossess two race cars - including the car called “Outlaw" - that Moody had pledged as collateral in a security agreement. The court found that Moody was the owner of Outlaw and entered a final judgment. In 2017, Berry brought this action against MaineStream, alleging that MaineStream wrongfully seized his 2016 Chevrolet Camaro. The district court granted MaineStream’s motion for summary judgment based on MaineStream’s assertion that, in the 2016 action, the court determined that Moody owned the car and that Berry was barred from seeking relief pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that summary judgment was improper because the record did not establish that Outlaw was the same vehicle was the one that was at issue in the instant case. View "Berry v. Mainstream Finance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Littlebrook Airpark Condominium Association on the Association’s action for a declaratory judgment on the issue of the effectiveness of a lease amendment, holding that the amendment was void.The superior court found that, although the lease amendment resulted in a default of the mortgage encumbering property owned by Sweet Peas, LLC, the lease amendment was still effective. On appeal, Sweet Peas and party-in-interest Jean Hardy argued that the amendment was void because any rights created by the amendment were subordinate to the existing mortgage on the property and were therefore extinguished by Hardy’s foreclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that the lease amendment was invalid because it was a new interest created after the mortgage, rendering the amendment junior to the mortgage. View "Littlebrook Airpark Condominium Ass’n v. Sweet Peas, LLC" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the location of the boundary between the land of Appellees and the land of Appellants, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court declaring the location of that boundary line, holding that the superior court did not err or abuse its discretion.On appeal, Appellants generally challenged the discretionary decisions made by the trial court in its management of the proceeding. The Supreme Judicial Court denied the challenges, holding that, contrary to Appellants’ contentions, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion either in its case management orders or in its findings and conclusions. View "Gammon v. Boggs" on Justia Law