Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After acquiring a parcel of oceanfront property, Osprey Landing, LLC purchased a title insurance policy from First American Title Insurance Company. In connection with litigation with neighboring landowners, the subject property’s previous owner executed affidavits and a deposition that Osprey claimed created the risk of a future public prescriptive easement claim adverse to Osprey’s title. Osprey sent a request to First American invoking title insurance coverage asking First American to take some action to either perfect osprey’s title or compensate Osprey for this perceived title defect. First American declined, and Osprey filed suit to enforce First American’s purported duty to defend and indemnify Osprey. The superior court granted First American’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Miller’s statements did not create a “triggering event” requiring First American to take any action, and no obligation was imposed on First American under these circumstances to preemptively indemnify Osprey. View "Osprey Landing, LLC v. First American Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

David Bordetsky filed a complaint for foreclosure against JAK Realty Trust, alleging that Gregory O’Halloran, as trustee of the Trust, executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage on property located in Benton and that the Trust had defaulted on the note. After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment in favor of the Trust, concluding that Bordetsky was required to, but did not, comply with the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in section 6111 did not apply to Bordetsky’s foreclosure action against the Trust. Remanded. View "Bordetsky v. JAK Realty Trust" on Justia Law

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. filed a complaint against Terrance Lowell seeking foreclosure on residential property. The complaint alleged that Lowell had defaulted by failing to make payments due on a promissory note. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of JPMorgan. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the district court properly admitted certain documents pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule; but (2) the district court erred by finding that the notice of default issued by JPMorgan complied with the requirement established in Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111(1-A)(C), which is a required element of foreclosure. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Lowell. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Lowell" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

Gloria Carignan, whose property was bordered by Willow Street - a paper street - filed a complaint against Paul Dumas and Robert Richard, an alleged contractor for Dumas, asserting six causes of action relating to Richard’s use of Willow Street to access Dumas’s parcel of land. Carignan later amended her complaint to seek declaratory judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Carignan and denied summary judgment for Dumas. Dumas appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting a provision of the Paper Streets Act to apply retrospectively. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and therefore vacated the entry of summary judgment for Carignan and the denial of summary judgment for Dumas, holding that the court erred in its application of sections 3031 and 3032 of the Paper Streets Act and its finding that Dumas had abandoned any easement to which he might be entitled. Remanded. View "Carignan v. Dumas" on Justia Law

After a public hearing, the Town of Stockton Spring’s Board of Selectman determined that a structure owned by Hollie Beal was a dangerous building or nuisance pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17, 2851. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Board. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Beal’s contention that the Board violated her due process rights when it allegedly denied her the opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have an impartial fact-finder was unavailing; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings. View "Beal v. Town of Stockton Springs" on Justia Law

21 Seabran, LLC applied for two permits necessary to renovate a garage on a lakefront parcel. The Town of Naples Code Enforcement Officer denied the permits, concluding that the parcel would have insufficient shore frontage to comply with state and local law. The Town of Naples Board of Appeals denied 21 Seabran’s appeal, concluding that the proposed renovation would add to the parcel a second “residential dwelling unit” for purposes of the Town of Naples Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, which would render the parcel noncompliant. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Board’s determination that the proposed structure was a residential dwelling unit was erroneous; and (2) the Board’s conclusion that the parcel failed to comply with the minimum lot size law and rules was erroneous. View "21 Seabran, LLC v. Town of Naples" on Justia Law

Friends of the Motherhouse, a nonprofit corporation and two individuals (collectively, Friends) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Portland City Council’s rezoning of a parcel owned by Sea Coast at Baxter Woods Associates, LLC and Motherhouse Associates LP (collectively, Sea Coast) was invalid. Sea Coast successfully moved to intervene and then moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Sea Coast. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its broad legislative authority, and therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that Sea Coast was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Friends of the Motherhouse v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Fryeburg Academy, a private secondary school, applied to the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board for permits authorizing changes in the use of two parcels of leased land. Following a hearing, the Planning Board approved the Academy’s applications for both parcels. Specifically, the Town allowed the Academy to use one parcel of land (the Land Lot) as an outdoor classroom and to use a building on the second parcel of land (the House Lot) to house administrative offices. The Fryeburg Trust, which owns property abutting both lots, appealed. The superior court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision to grant the Land Lot permit but vacated the Planning Board’s decision to grant the House Lot. The Trust, the Academy, and the Town all appealed, challenging the interpretation of the definition of secondary school in Fryeburg’s Land Use Ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Planning Board, holding (1) the Academy’s proposed use of the Land Lot fit within the definition of secondary school; and (2) the proposed use of the House Lot was permissible under the Ordinance. View "Fryeburg Trust v. Town of Fryeburg" on Justia Law