Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Lois Young filed a complaint claiming that her transfer of her home to her former foster child, Joseph Lagasse, and his wife was the result of undue influence and therefore should be voided. The trial court concluded Plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing that the property transfer was improvident transfer of title within the meaning of the Improvident Transfers of Title Act, and therefore denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err by not applying a statutory presumption that a transfer of assets by an elderly, dependent person is a result of undue influence unless that person was represented by independent counsel at the time of the transfer; and (2) the record supported a finding that the transfer was not the result of undue influence. View "Young v. Lagasse" on Justia Law

The trust sought a building permit, to replace a dilapidated 1950s minesweeper deckhouse on the Owls Head property with a new, larger single-family residence. The existing structure is located partly within a 75-foot setback zone from the Atlantic Ocean; it contains a wetland of special significance that would necessitate a Maine Department of Environmental Protection permit before building. The new structure would be located partly within the setback zone, but farther from the ocean, with an addition lying completely outside of the setback zone and not encroaching on the wetland. The Planning Board approved the plan, finding that under the Town’s Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, "this is a nonconforming structure and it may be re-located, further away from the ocean, but not into the wetland ... to the greatest extent practical." The Board of Appeals reversed. The Superior Court agreed, finding the Board should not have considered the proposed addition before determining whether the relocation of the existing structure “conforms to all setback requirement[s] to the greatest practical extent.” The proper analysis would have been to first consider how the existing structure could be relocated to conform and to then consider whether an addition outside of the setback area could be constructed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court remanded, agreeing with the BOA and lower court, and finding that the Board applied the wrong ordinance section in considering the permit application. View "Osprey Family Trust v. Town of Owls Head." on Justia Law

Terrence E. Pinkham appealed the Superior Court's award of $41,500 as just compensation for the MDOT's taking of a portion of his property by eminent domain for a road improvement project. The court agreed with Pinkham's contention that the Superior Court erred by ruling that the MDOT was not required to provide in discovery those portions of its appraiser’s report appraising other properties taken for the project pursuant to 23 M.R.S. 63. In this case, the interests of justice require that Pinkham be given the opportunity to review that information in discovery - within the constraints of any protective provisions to preclude its public disclosure pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26 - and to seek its admission at a new trial. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pinkham v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

This case arose from disputes regarding the permissible uses of an easement that burdened the land owned by Charles Wardwell and benefitted and abutting parcel owned by John and Corie Duggins. Wardwell filed a complaint requesting that the superior court declare that the Dugginses’ activities exceeded the scope of the easement. The court declared in part that the scope of the easement included hunting and recreational activity. Wardwell then moved to amend the judgment by excluding the terms “hunting and recreation” from the declaration of the scope of the easement. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err by finding that hunting and recreation were uses contemplated by the parties to the original conveyance and in denying Wardwell’s motion to amend the judgment to exclude those uses from the scope of the easement. View "Wardwell v. Duggins" on Justia Law

This case arose from the revocation of a building permit previously granted to R. Bruce Montgomery and Wanda Haddock (collectively, Montgomery). Montgomery, represented by Judy A.S. Metcalf and William V. Ferdinand Jr. (collectively, the Eaton Peabody attorneys), appealed the revocation of the permit, contesting the revocation of the part of the permit dealing with the construction of a garage. The Georgetown Planning Board left in place a stop-work order on the construction of the garage. Montgomery subsequently hired attorney Clifford H. Goodall to assist him in his attempts to apply for a building permit, without success. Montgomery filed a legal malpractice complaint against the Eaton Peabody attorneys. The superior court dismissed five of the six counts of the complaint. Montgomery subsequently filed a second amended complaint raising legal malpractice claims against Goodall. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodall. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) properly granted the Eaton Peabody attorneys’ motion to dismiss counts one through five of Montgomery’s complaint; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Montgomery’s motion to file a third amended complaint made three years after the commencement of the suit. View "Montgomery v. Eaton Peabody, LLP" on Justia Law

The Town of Carthage filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to two 160-acres parcels of undeveloped land and claiming that it owned the land based on its uninterrupted possession of the land for over a century. Friends of Maine’s Mountains filed an answer and counterclaim, claiming that it obtained an interest in the land by a quitclaim release deed executed through an alleged descendent of the parcels’ last known owner. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town pursuant to the municipal delinquent tax title statute and declared that the Town owned the two lots in fee simple absolute. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in determining that the Town obtained title through a tax sale in 1905. View "Town of Carthage v. Friends of Maine's Mountains" on Justia Law

The beach easement dispute in this case concerned the intertidal area in front of oceanfront lots owned by Beverly and David Gravison, Sandra Titcomb, and Darlene and Lewis Edwards. The Gravisons filed a deed reformation complaint seeking to reform a deed to include the intertidal zone. Neighboring property owners counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment confirming the existence of deed easements over the oceanfront lots at issue. The superior court (1) denied the Gravisons’ reformation claim, (2) declared that the neighboring property owners held easements permitting recreational use of the beach located in front of the Edwardses’ and the Gravisons’ property, and (3) declared that neighboring property owners held easements in a perimeter path located on the properties owned by the Gravisons, Titcomb, and the Edwardses. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of the Gravisons’ complaint for deed reformation; (2) affirmed the superior court’s decision on all issues pertaining to the perimeter path; and (3) affirmed in part and vacated in part the court’s decision regarding the beach easements and clarified the judgment to reflect that the neighbors’ beach rights were limited to recreational activities reasonably related to bathing and boating. View "Gravison v. Fisher" on Justia Law

After Sloan’s Cove, LLC executed a power of sale foreclosure on Armand Vachon’s property, Vachon and Oceanic Inn, Inc. (collectively, Oceanic) filed suit claiming that Sloan’s Cove improperly conducted the sale. The trial court (1) dismissed Oceanic’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (2) granted summary judgment against Oceanic on its claims for breach of contract and accounting and in favor of Sloan’s Cove on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that its foreclosure by sale of the Oceanic Inn property was legal and effective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as amended, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, but that the judgment must be amended to correct a clerical error. View "Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Eastport learned that Husson University would no longer lease seventeen acres of publicly owned oceanfront property after the 2011-12 school year. In 2011, the City Council voted to accept an offer by First Perry Realty, LLC and CPM Constructors to purchase the property for $300,000. Phyllis Bradbury and David Gholson brought this action seeking declaratory and equitable relief that would prevent the sale of the City property, arguing that the sale of the property was not “advertised” within the meaning of the Eastport City Charter then in effect. The superior court denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the City Council took adequate measures to publicly advertise the sale of the property. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law

Defendants defaulted on their mortgage, and U.S. Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure. Following the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Greenleaf, the Bank filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the foreclosure action without prejudice, arguing that it could not proceed with the foreclosure because it did not have a mortgage assignment from the original lender and thus did not have standing to pursue the action. Defendants countered that the motion should be dismissed with prejudice so that they could be awarded attorney fees. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion but dismissed the case with prejudice. The court subsequently issued a correction of the record stating that the dismissal of the Bank’s action was without prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of dismissal with prejudice and subsequent judgment of dismissal without prejudice, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the Bank’s action with prejudice and did not have authority under the circumstances to change that outcome to a dismissal without prejudice. Remanded for the entry of judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Curit" on Justia Law