Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff applied for abatement of real property taxes that the Town of Lebanon assessed against her property for the tax years 2011 through 2013. The Town denied the application on the basis that the taxes had been paid. After a de novo hearing, the York County Commissioners ultimately denied Plaintiff’s application for abatement for tax years 2011 and 2012 and remanded the matter for further action with respect to tax year 2013. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Commissioners with respect to the 2011 and 2012 tax years. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to supply the Court with a complete and defined record of the evidence and arguments presented to the Commissioners, the Court could not review Plaintiff’s argument that the Commissioners were compelled to authorize an abatement. View "Penkul v. Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

Carol Reece applied for a coastal sand dune permit to create a vehicle access way to her property abutting a beach and to develop and lawn and walkway on the property. The Department of Environmental Protection granted the permit. Abutting landowner Jonathan Day and others appealed. The Board of Environmental Protection reached a de novo decision granting Reece’s application. The superior court vacated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the Board’s interpretations of its own ambiguous rules do not conflict with the relevant statutes or with the rules, and the rules do not compel at the interpretation reached by the superior court. Remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board’s decision to grant Reece the permit. View "Day v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

John Dyer gave a promissory note and a mortgage on property securing the note to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage contained language naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as lender’s nominee. The Bank of New York later filed a complaint for foreclosure, asserting that Dyer had stopped making payments on the note and that he owed the Bank over $1 million. During the trial, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss its complaint without prejudice on the ground that it did not have the requisite standing to pursue its claim. Dyer filed an objection requesting that any dismissal be with prejudice and that he be awarded his attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and declined to award additional attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint without prejudice and in declining to award Dyer his full attorney fees and costs. View "Bank of New York v. Dyer" on Justia Law

The Scotts joined owned inland property located in the Town of Owls Head. The Edwardses jointly owned waterfront property near the Scotts’ property. A way extended across the Edwardses’ property, terminating in a cul-de-sac that was located partly on the Edwardses’ property. In 2011, the Edwardses sued the Scotts and the the Town seeking a declaratory judgment that the Scotts had no right to use and the Town had no interest in Plaintiffs’ property. The superior court concluded (1) a 1986 dedication and its acceptance by the Town created a public easement that extended over the way and cul-de-sac located on the Edwardses’ land; and (2) a 1924 conveyance created an easement over the beach located on the Edwardses’ property that benefitted the Scotts’ property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err in finding that the Edwardses’ predecessor intended to create a public easement over the way and cul-de-sac; and (2) did not err in concluding that the dedication petition sufficiently described the property. View "Edwards v. Blackman" on Justia Law

Richard French was the owner of an undeveloped lot with no road access. When the Estate of Martha Gutzan denied French use of an access easement across property owned by the Estate, French brought this action to quiet title. After a nonjury trial, the trial court concluded that French owned an access easement over the Estate’s property. Specifically, the court found that an 1880 transaction reserved the easement in question and that the easement passed with the land to French. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that French owned an access easement across the Estate’s property. View "French v. Estate of Gutzan" on Justia Law

In 2011, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure complaint against Jeffrey White. In 2014, based on an agreed-to judgment by the parties, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. Thereafter, White moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (4), alleging that Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose and that Wells Fargo’s failure to establish standing deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering the judgment void. The district court denied White’s motion, finding that White was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief pursuant to either Rule 60(b)(1) or (4), as (1) the parties had not been mistaken about the facts or the law regarding standing when they agreed to the entry of judgment; and (2) Plaintiff had a fair opportunity and a significant incentive to challenge Wells Fargo’s standing but failed to do so. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. White" on Justia Law

A Bank filed a residential foreclosure complaint against Appellant, alleging that Appellant executed a promissory note and a mortgage securing the note on certain property and that Appellant defaulted on the note. The Bank claimed that, through a series of endorsements and assignments, the Bank had acquired rights in the mortgage and authority to enforce the note. The trial court entered a judgment in Appellant’s favor, concluding that the Bank failed to provide Appellant with a statutorily-complaint notice of the default and of his right to cure. The court then prospectively reserved to the Bank the right to relitigate a second foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the judgment reserving to the parties the right to relitigate all issues in a future foreclosure action, as the trial court entered a final judgments on the merits in favor of Appellant, and there was no special reason identified for affirmatively reserving the parties’ rights to relitigate. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law