Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Maine Supreme Judicial Court
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The Scotts joined owned inland property located in the Town of Owls Head. The Edwardses jointly owned waterfront property near the Scotts’ property. A way extended across the Edwardses’ property, terminating in a cul-de-sac that was located partly on the Edwardses’ property. In 2011, the Edwardses sued the Scotts and the the Town seeking a declaratory judgment that the Scotts had no right to use and the Town had no interest in Plaintiffs’ property. The superior court concluded (1) a 1986 dedication and its acceptance by the Town created a public easement that extended over the way and cul-de-sac located on the Edwardses’ land; and (2) a 1924 conveyance created an easement over the beach located on the Edwardses’ property that benefitted the Scotts’ property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err in finding that the Edwardses’ predecessor intended to create a public easement over the way and cul-de-sac; and (2) did not err in concluding that the dedication petition sufficiently described the property. View "Edwards v. Blackman" on Justia Law

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Richard French was the owner of an undeveloped lot with no road access. When the Estate of Martha Gutzan denied French use of an access easement across property owned by the Estate, French brought this action to quiet title. After a nonjury trial, the trial court concluded that French owned an access easement over the Estate’s property. Specifically, the court found that an 1880 transaction reserved the easement in question and that the easement passed with the land to French. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that French owned an access easement across the Estate’s property. View "French v. Estate of Gutzan" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure complaint against Jeffrey White. In 2014, based on an agreed-to judgment by the parties, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. Thereafter, White moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (4), alleging that Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose and that Wells Fargo’s failure to establish standing deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering the judgment void. The district court denied White’s motion, finding that White was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief pursuant to either Rule 60(b)(1) or (4), as (1) the parties had not been mistaken about the facts or the law regarding standing when they agreed to the entry of judgment; and (2) Plaintiff had a fair opportunity and a significant incentive to challenge Wells Fargo’s standing but failed to do so. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. White" on Justia Law

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A Bank filed a residential foreclosure complaint against Appellant, alleging that Appellant executed a promissory note and a mortgage securing the note on certain property and that Appellant defaulted on the note. The Bank claimed that, through a series of endorsements and assignments, the Bank had acquired rights in the mortgage and authority to enforce the note. The trial court entered a judgment in Appellant’s favor, concluding that the Bank failed to provide Appellant with a statutorily-complaint notice of the default and of his right to cure. The court then prospectively reserved to the Bank the right to relitigate a second foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the judgment reserving to the parties the right to relitigate all issues in a future foreclosure action, as the trial court entered a final judgments on the merits in favor of Appellant, and there was no special reason identified for affirmatively reserving the parties’ rights to relitigate. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law