Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary judgment entered by the superior court ejecting Defendant from real property pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6701-7053, holding that the trial court properly entered judgment for Plaintiffs, the property owners.Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to eject Defendant from the property and obtain a writ of possession. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for their claim of ejectment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) correctly interpreted Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6961 and the legal framework governing real actions for ejectment; (2) did not err in entering partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs granting them a writ of possession; and (3) did not err in concluding that its judgment rendered Defendant's counterclaim for declaratory judgment moot. View "Ogden v. Labonville" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a residential foreclosure judgment, the Supreme Judicial Court clarified the criteria under the business record exception to the hearsay rule for admitting into evidence records that a business has obtained from another entity and integrated into its own records or operations by reaffirming the interpretation set forth in Northeast Bank & Trust Co. v. Soley, 481 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me. 1984).Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a record that one business has received from another is admissible under Me. R. Evid. 803(6) without testimony about the practices of the business that created the record, provided that (1) the proponent of admission establishes that the receiving business has integrated the record into its own records, has established the accuracy of the contents of the record, and has relief on the record in the conduct of its operations; and (2) the opponent of admission has not shown that the record is nonetheless not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Shone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the superior court denying U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.'s motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal as to its foreclosure complaint against James D. Keefe, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion as untimely.In denying U.S. Bank's motion seeking an extension of time to file its notice of appeal the trial court determined determined that U.S. Bank had shown good cause for the trial court to grant its motion to extend but that its authority to grant an extension of time had expired, and therefore, the motion was untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the pertinent Rules of Appellate Procedure or in denying U.S. Bank's untimely motion for an extension of time. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Keefe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket concluding that the Town of Cape Elizabeth's proffered evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the Town's right to accept the "incipient dedication" of a particular portion of land lapsed at common law, holding that the court did not err in its application of the common law lapse standard.Pilot Point, LLC sought a declaratory judgment that the Town's right to accept the incipient dedication of a portion of Surf Side Avenue (the "Pilot Point Section") had lapsed at common law (count one) and, alternatively, that the Town's right was limited by the scope of the original dedication (count two). The court granted the Town's motion for judgment as a matter of law on count one and dismissed count two as unripe. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in determining that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the Town's right to accept the dedication of the Pilot Point section had lapsed at common law; and (2) in dismissing without prejudice count two as unripe for judicial review. View "Pilot Point, LLC v. Town of Cape Elizabeth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Casco Zoning Board of Appeals in which the Board denied the request for a shoreline zoning permit filed by Mark and Valerie Tomasino, holding that the Tomasinos lacked standing to seek such a permit.On appeal, the Tomasinos argued that the Board erred in determining that they demonstrated insufficient right, title, or interest in the property to obtain a permit to remove three trees from property owned by Lake Shore Realty Trust, the abutting property owner, over which the Tomasinos claimed a deeded easement. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that the Tomasinos demonstrated that they had some interest in the particular portion of property at issue in this case, they failed to demonstrate that they had the kind of interest that would allow them to cut the trees if they were granted a permit to do so. View "Tomasino v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Lisa Berry following a bench trial on the complaint for foreclosure filed by Wilmington Trust, National Association, as Trustee for MFRA Trust 2014-2 (Wilmington), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the district court did not err by excluding evidence of business records showing Berry's payment history with various loan services because the business records were untrustworthy; (2) Wilmington failed to prove that Berry received a properly served notice of default and mortgagor's right to cure; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Berry. View "Wilmington Trust, National Ass'n v. Berry" on Justia Law

In this action for recovery of personal property the Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part the judgment of the district court finding Kathryn Colton in contempt and imposing a jail sentence and ordering her incarceration, holding that the district court violated Colton's right to due process by ordering her to be incarcerated without an opportunity to "show cause" in some fashion.Debbie Silverwolf, a former tenant on Colton's property, brought an action against Colton for recovery of personal property. The court entered judgment in favor of Silverwolf and ordered Colton to return the property. When Colton failed to do so the judge held Colton in contempt and ordered her incarceration. No show cause proceeding was held. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for a show cause hearing, holding (1) the court did not err in finding Colton in contempt, and the court's factual findings were supported by the evidence; and (2) the court denied Colton the opportunity to show cause, notwithstanding her attempt to make an offer of proof. View "Silverwolf v. Colton" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure action, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court entered in favor of Duane Beedle, holding that the court erred in concluding that U.S. Bank, N.A. did not prove that it owned the mortgage and therefore did not have standing to file a foreclosure action.In 2003, Beedle executed a note and mortgage in favor of Fleet National Bank for the purchase of certain property. In 2012, the mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank, as trustee for Assignee #1. In 2016, Beedle was sent a notice of default. Beedle declared the entire principal amount outstanding. In 2017, a second assignment was executed, by which U.S. Bank claimed that Assignee #1 assigned its interest in the mortgage to U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank subsequently commenced this foreclosure action. The district court entered judgment for the Beedles, concluding that U.S. Bank failed to prove ownership of the mortgage due to a "faulty" 2012 assignment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the 2012 assignment of the mortgage was enforceable. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Beedle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering a declaratory judgment in favor of Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust, holding that the trial court erred in interpreting a 1941 deed that contained language restriction development of three lots in a subdivision.In 2012, Ingrid Doyon acquired the three lots - Lots 3, 5, and 72 - as trustee of her father's trust. Doyon subsequently conveyed two of the lots but retained her interest in Lot 72. In 2014, Doyon initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the restrictive covenant burdening Lot 72 permitted her to construct a single family home and garage on the property. The court issued a judgment in favor of Doyon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the 1941 deed unambiguously limited the construction that could take place on Lot 72 to a garage to be used with Lot 3, subject to certain setback specifications. View "Doyon v. Fantini" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the Town of York Board of Appeals purporting to grant Daniel and Susan Raposa's appeal from a decision of the Town's Code Enforcement Officer (CEO), holding that because the Board's written findings of fact directly nullified its decision to grant the appeal, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings.The Raposas contacted the Town's CEO to express their concern that Joshua Gammon's use of his property was not consistent with his predecessor's lawful nonconforming use. The CEO determined that Gammon's operation of his business on his property was not a change in use from his predecessor's use of the property. On appeal, the Board granted the Raposas' appeal as to the change-of-use issue. In the Board's written decision, however, the Board stated, "The use of the lot by Mr. Gammon's landscaping business does not constitute a change of use but is an intensification of the same use." The superior court affirmed, concluding that the Board's written decision was the operative decision for judicial review. The Supreme Judicial Court held that because the Board's written decision contained factual findings directly contradicting its initial decision, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Raposa v. Town of York" on Justia Law