Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Defendants' motion to preclude the opinions and testimony of Dr. Steven Elliot Caplan, Plaintiff's designated expert in the area of pediatric medicine.Plaintiff alleged that Defendants, who owned and managed property in which Plaintiff lived as a child, were liable for injuries she sustained as a result of exposure to lead-based paint at the property. After Plaintiff designated Dr. Caplan as her expert Defendants moved to preclude his opinions and testimony. The circuit court granted the motion and then entered summary judgment for Defendants, finding that Dr. Caplan lacked a sufficient factual basis for his opinions and that, without his testimony as to causation, Plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in ruling on the motion to preclude, the circuit court erroneously resolved genuine disputes of material fact; (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment; and (3) Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence. View "Oglesby v. Baltimore School Associates" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that the circuit court erred in determining that there was no public road over the parcel of real property in St. Mary's County at issue in this case but did not err in determining that the County owned the property in fee simple absolute, holding that the appellate court did not err.The trustee of the Wilkinson Family Trust sued the Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary's County asserting ownership of the property at issue. The circuit court found that the County owned the property in fee simple absolute and that no public road existed on the property. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate court (1) did not err in concluding that the County owned the property in fee simple absolute; and (2) did not err in holding that, as a matter of law, a public road was established on the property by dedication. View "Bd. of County Commissioners v. Aiken" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the circuit court's judgment reversing the determination of the Board of Public Works that a decision of the procurement officer for the Department of General Services (DGS) was arbitrary and capricious, holding that the procurement officer's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The Maryland Department of General Services (DGS), on behalf of the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA), issued a request for proposal (RFP) for office space. Montgomery Park was originally named the awardee, but through its procurement officer, DGS cancelled the RFP before the award was presented to the Board for approval. Thereafter, the procurement officer renewed MIA's existing lease between MIA and the leased premise. Montgomery Park filed two bid protests, which the procurement officer denied. The Board overturned the procurement officer's decisions determining that they violated Maryland procurement law. The circuit court reversed, and the appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) the procurement officer's decision to cancel the RFP was not arbitrary or capricious; and (2) Montgomery Park lacked standing to protest the renewal of the existing lease between MIA and St. Paul Plaza. View "Montgomery Park v. Md. Dep't of General Services" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the determination of the Planning Board that Amazon Services, LLC's's proposed use of property it owned in Prince George's County fell within the definition of "Warehouse" under section 27 of the Prince George's County Code and was, therefore, permitted by right at the property, holding that the district court did not err.Amazon sought approval to make certain modifications and improvements to its property, which the Planning Board approved, concluding that the proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse" use under the applicable zoning ordinance. The District Council for Prince George's County affirmed. On review, the District Council concluded that the Planning Board correctly determined that Amazon's proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse and distribution facility" use under the zoning ordinance. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the District Council affirming the Planning Board's approval of Amazon's design plan for the property. View "Crawford v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when a first-party, all-risk property insurance policy covers "all risks of physical loss or damage" to insured property from any cause unless excluded, coverage is not triggered when a toxic, noxious, or hazardous substance is physically present in the indoor air of that property, adheres to and can later be dislodged from physical items on the property, and causes a loss of the functional use of the property provided that the substance causes neither tangible, concrete, and material harm to the property nor deprivation of possession of the property.Insurer issued insurance policies to Insured covering policy periods in which Insured's stores were closed in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. Insured submitted claims to Insurer under the policies for "physical loss or damage" to its covered property exceeding $700 million. Insurer denied the bulk of the claim, leading to this lawsuit. The Court of Appeals held the presence of Coronavirus in the air and on surfaces at Insured's properties did not cause "physical loss or damage" as that phrase is used in the policies. View "Tapestry, Inc. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case arising from a dispute over the purchase of residential real property in Charles County, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court granting Sellers' motion to dismiss Purchaser's lawsuit alleging that Seller violated Md. Code Ann. Real. Prop. 14-117(a)(3)(ii) by imposing an amortized water and sewer charge longer than twenty years after the initial date of the sale of the property, holding that there was no error.In moving to dismiss this lawsuit, Seller argued that section 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies only to real property located in Prince George's County. The Court of Appeals agreed and dismissed the case. The court of special appeals affirmed, thus declining to extend the geographic application of the statute beyond Prince George's County. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the plain text of section 14-117(a)(3)(ii) indicates that the twenty-year amortization limit on deferred water and sewage costs only applies to Prince George's County; and (2) the legislative history of the statute confirms that the amortization provision only applies to Prince George's County. View "Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Companies" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that an injured tort claimant's rights under a general liability insurance policy do not vest until the claimant has obtained a judgment against, or entered into a qualifying settlement with, an insured.CX Reinsurance Company issued commercial general liability policies to several Baltimore residential Landlords that included coverage for bodily injuries resulting from lead paint exposure at the Landlords' rental properties. CX field contract rescission actions against the Landlords, which the parties settled. Under the terms of the rescission settlements, the coverage for lead paint-related losses was substantially reduced. Claimants alleged they suffered bodily injuries from lead paint exposure while residing in the Landlords' rental properties, but the majority of claimants had not obtained final judgments against, or entered into settlements with, the Landlords before CX and the Landlords settled. The lower courts ruled that the Claimants were intended beneficiaries of the polices. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the Claimants who did not hold final judgments against or enter into approved settlement agreements with the Landlords were not the intended beneficiaries under the policies; and (2) the Claimants who obtained final judgments against their Landlords prior to the settlements of the applicable rescission cases may enforce the pre-settlement terms of the policies. View "CX Reinsurance Co. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Forest Conservation Act of 1991 (the Act) and regulations promulgated by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources (DNR) required a right to appeal the approval of a forest conservation plan and that a county agency's approval of a forest conservation plan is a "final decision" for appeal purposes.At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the approval of a forest conservation plan, as well as an associated waiver that authorizers a developer to remove trees that would otherwise be protected under the Act, is a final agency decision subject to independent judicial review under the Harford County Forest Conservation Program. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court of special appeals with directions to remand the case for further proceedings in the circuit court, holding that the Act and regulations promulgated by DNR require a right to appeal the approval of a forest conservation plan and that a county agency's approval of a forest conservation plan is a "final decision" for appeal purposes. View "Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. CREG Westport I, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County erred in reversing an administrative law judge's determination that substantial changes existed between an original development plan and a later proposed development plan, holding that, contrary to the Board's conclusion, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar approval of the later-proposed development plan.After a hearing, the Board issued an opinion concluding that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in ruling that the most recent development plan modification at issue was not barred by collateral estoppel. The circuit court reversed the Board's decision, concluding that the Board misapplied the law and misconstrued the facts in making its decision. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board erred in concluding that collateral estoppel barred the approval of the most recent development plan. View "Becker v. Falls Road Community Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this action challenging a proposed amendment that would remove two schoolhouses from a county list of historically protected sites the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding that the adoption of CR-72-2019 was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by substantial evidence, holding that Prince George's County Council acted within its legal boundaries when it adopted the minor amendment CR-72-2019.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) the arguments raised by the Town of Upper Marlboro had not been waived because CR 72-2019 was not a final appealable decision; (2) CR 98-2019 was a final agency action subject to judicial review, and the Town was permitted to challenge CR 98-2019 by alleging deficiencies in CR-72-2019; and (3) CR-72-2019 was not procedurally deficient because the resolution adequately provided the purpose and scope of the minor amendment pursuant to Prince George's County Code 2727-642. View "Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George's County Council" on Justia Law