Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, residents of Baltimore experienced a sewage backup in their basement in 2019, after having no prior issues during their nine years at the property. The backup was caused by a clog in the City’s main sewage line. The residents contacted the City’s nonemergency line, and a cleaning crew arrived roughly 17 hours later to resolve the situation. Expert testimony at trial indicated there were no written industry standards for response time to such incidents, and there was no evidence that the City’s actions were negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous, nor was there an ongoing problem—only a single, isolated event.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the City’s requests for judgment as a matter of law, allowing both the negligence and private nuisance claims to proceed to the jury. The jury found in favor of the City on negligence but held the City liable for private nuisance, awarding damages to the residents. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the interference with the residents’ property was significant and could be considered continuous or repetitive, thus supporting private nuisance liability despite the absence of negligent conduct.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court clarified that, under Maryland common law, private nuisance liability requires not only a substantial interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property but also wrongful conduct by the defendant—such as negligence, recklessness, abnormally dangerous activity, or conduct causing a continuous or recurring unreasonable intrusion. Since the City’s actions did not meet these criteria and the incident was a single event, the Supreme Court held there was insufficient evidence for private nuisance liability and ordered judgment in favor of the City. View "Mayor of Baltimore v. Abel" on Justia Law

The case arose after a sewage backup occurred in December 2019 in the basement of a home rented by the plaintiffs. Prior to this incident, they had experienced no similar issues, and neither had their neighbors. The backup was traced to a blockage in the City of Baltimore’s main sewage line. The plaintiffs contacted the City’s nonemergency service and, after multiple calls, a crew arrived about 17 hours later and resolved the problem. The plaintiffs’ expert attributed the backup to insufficient cleaning of the sewer line following a prior upstream blockage days earlier, but the court limited the expert’s testimony for lack of factual foundation.At trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the plaintiffs pursued claims of negligence and private nuisance against the City. The jury found for the City on negligence but found the City liable for private nuisance, awarding damages. The City appealed, arguing that the evidence did not establish a private nuisance under Maryland law. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the lower court, holding the jury could find the backup was a continuous or repetitive interference with the plaintiffs’ use of property.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Maryland determined that Maryland’s common law of private nuisance requires not only a significant invasion of the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land but also wrongful conduct by the defendant. Wrongful conduct may be negligent, reckless, abnormally dangerous, or, if not otherwise tortious, must create a continuous or recurring and unreasonable intrusion. The Supreme Court concluded that, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiffs, there was no legally sufficient evidence that the City engaged in wrongful conduct or that the intrusion was continuous or recurring. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision and ordered judgment entered in favor of the City. View "City of Baltimore v. Abel" on Justia Law

In 2025, the Frederick County Council enacted legislation establishing a Critical Digital Infrastructure (CDI) Overlay Zone, enabling data centers and related infrastructure to be built on a limited portion of county land. The boundaries and zoning designations of the Overlay Zone were later set by Ordinance 26-01-001 (the CDI Ordinance), which included color maps as exhibits to indicate the precise locations and zoning designations. A group of residents, the Frederick County Data Center Referendum Committee, sought to challenge this ordinance by referendum and gathered sufficient signatures for a petition. However, the petition included only black-and-white reproductions of the ordinance’s maps, which did not clearly show the Overlay Zone boundaries or zoning distinctions.The sufficiency of the petition was initially upheld by the Director of the Frederick County Board of Elections, who found it met requirements as to form, though she did not decide whether the ordinance was a proper subject for referendum. Several parties opposed the referendum, arguing in the Circuit Court for Frederick County that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County Charter and that the petition was deficient because it did not include a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance. The circuit court agreed, finding both that the CDI Ordinance was not a “law” subject to referendum under the Charter and that the petition’s reproduction of the ordinance was insufficient due to the lack of accurate color maps.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that under the Frederick County Charter, zoning ordinances, such as the CDI Ordinance, are not subject to referendum because the Charter intended to maintain pre-Charter limitations on referenda for such ordinances. Additionally, the Court held that the petition was insufficient because it did not contain a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance, as the black-and-white maps omitted essential information. View "In re: Frederick Cnty. Data Center Referendum" on Justia Law

A Maryland religious corporation sought to reclaim possession of its real property, used as a parsonage, from the individual who had served as its Bishop. The corporation purchased the property for use by the Bishop, and the respondent resided there with permission. After the Church’s Holy Synod defrocked the respondent and removed him as Bishop, the corporation repeatedly asked him to vacate the property. The respondent refused, arguing that the Synod was illegitimate and that his removal was improper, asserting a right to remain as the rightful Bishop.The District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County dismissed the corporation’s wrongful detainer action, reasoning that resolving the property dispute would require it to determine the legitimacy of the Synod’s actions under church law, which was barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed that dismissal, concluding that determining who was entitled to occupy the property required deciding internal church governance issues.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply because the dispute can be resolved using neutral principles of Maryland law, without interpreting religious doctrine or governance. The court found that the corporation held legal title to the property, there was no lease or evidence of tenancy, and the respondent occupied the property as a licensee. A license can be revoked at any time, and the corporation had revoked the respondent’s license to occupy the property. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the lower courts’ decisions and held that the corporation is entitled to judgment on its claim for wrongful detainer. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including determination of damages and attorney’s fees. View "Ertritrean Orth. Tweahdo Diocese v. Sinoda" on Justia Law

After a homeowners association obtained a money judgment against a homeowner for unpaid assessments, it levied the homeowner’s interest in her property and proceeded with a sheriff’s sale. The homeowner did not satisfy the judgment or obtain release of the levy before the sale occurred. A third-party bidder purchased the homeowner’s interest in the property at auction. After the sale but before the court ratified it, the homeowner paid the judgment in full to the association. The association then notified the court of the satisfaction and requested that the sale be vacated, arguing the judgment had been satisfied prior to ratification.The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County, agreed with the association, concluding that the sale could be vacated since the homeowner satisfied the judgment before ratification. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed, holding a hearing and again ruling that the sale was not complete until ratification and thus could be undone by post-sale satisfaction of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that a judgment-debtor’s satisfaction of the judgment after a sheriff’s sale, but before ratification, cannot be raised as an exception to the sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1). Post-sale satisfaction is not an irregularity in the sale and does not void the purchaser’s inchoate equitable interest in the property acquired at auction. The Court emphasized that the judgment-debtor may obtain release of the levy only before sale, and that post-sale options for release are not available. The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to allow the homeowner thirty days to file exceptions to the sale, beginning after remand to the District Court. View "Baltimore XV Props. v. Newsteps' Choice North Homeowners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

A homeowners association obtained a money judgment against a homeowner for unpaid assessments and placed a levy on the homeowner’s property. The homeowner did not satisfy the judgment prior to a sheriff’s auction, and the property was sold to a third-party purchaser. After the auction, but before the court ratified the sale, the homeowner satisfied the judgment by paying the full amount to the association. The association then asked the court to vacate the sale and return the purchase funds to the buyer, arguing that the post-sale satisfaction of the judgment should nullify the auction outcome.The District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County agreed with the association, finding it proper to vacate the sale since the judgment was satisfied before ratification. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County held a de novo hearing and affirmed the District Court’s decision, maintaining that the sale was not complete until ratified and thus could be undone by satisfaction of the judgment at that stage. The purchaser sought review from the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a judgment-debtor’s post-sale satisfaction of the judgment cannot be raised as an exception to a sheriff’s sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1). The Court explained that such satisfaction is not an irregularity with respect to the sale, and that a purchaser acquires an inchoate equitable interest after the auction, with a right to the ratification process. Allowing satisfaction of the judgment after the sale to void the auction would undermine that right and negatively affect the sheriff’s sale system. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, permitting the homeowner thirty days to file exceptions to the sale under the proper rule. View "Baltimore XV Props. V. Newsteps' Choice N." on Justia Law

A group of homeowners and their associations opposed amendments to a planned unit development in Baltimore City, actively communicating their disapproval to the Planning Commission. After the Commission approved the amendments, the developer filed suit against the homeowners and associations, seeking damages and alleging breach of contract and tortious interference. The homeowners and associations, believing the suit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), moved to dismiss under Maryland’s anti-SLAPP statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the lawsuit was a SLAPP and dismissed it, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissal, citing evidence that the suit was intended to deter the homeowners from exercising their rights.Two years after the Appellate Court affirmed the SLAPP dismissal, the homeowners and associations filed a class action for malicious use of process against the developer, its law firm, and its attorney. They alleged unique injuries, including emotional distress, intimidation, diminished property values, and burdensome discovery demands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the “special injury” required for malicious use of process. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the alleged injuries were typical of litigation and not “special” as required by Maryland law.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for malicious use of process because they did not plead a special injury. The Court clarified that litigation expenses, temporary property value diminution, emotional distress, and chilling of constitutional rights are not special injuries under Maryland law. The Court also declined to adopt a rule that victims of a SLAPP inherently satisfy the special-injury requirement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord leased space to a tenant operating a beer and wine store. Under the lease, the tenant was responsible for base rent plus a variety of other charges—such as utilities, real estate taxes, late fees, and attorneys’ fees—which were defined as “Additional Rent.” The lease also included a provision waiving the tenant’s statutory right to redeem the property after a judgment for possession. The tenant fell behind on some of the additional charges but remained current on base rent. The landlord filed a summary ejectment action, seeking repossession based on the unpaid additional charges.The District Court of Maryland for Frederick County found that the tenant was not liable for some claimed costs but determined that the tenant owed certain unpaid additional charges, including utilities, real estate taxes, attorneys’ fees, and late fees. Relying on the lease’s waiver clause, the court entered judgment for the landlord for possession of the premises without a right of redemption. The tenant appealed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which vacated the judgment and remanded for recalculation of attorneys’ fees, finding that not all claimed fees were properly due. The circuit court also held that the waiver of redemption was unenforceable in this context, reasoning that the tenant had not received proper notice of some charges and that enforcing the waiver would violate public policy.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that in a nonresidential lease, a waiver of the statutory right of redemption is not against Maryland public policy and is enforceable absent other contract defenses. The court also held that the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applies only to residential tenants, but that a landlord may only seek possession for rent charges about which the tenant had prior notice and an opportunity to pay, as defined by the lease. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kapneck 14-16 v. Breezy's Speakeasy" on Justia Law

A landlord operating a multi-family apartment complex in Montgomery County, Maryland, filed a summary ejectment action against a civilian tenant for unpaid rent. The landlord did not possess a residential rental license, as required by county regulations, but claimed exemption from those requirements because the apartment complex was located on land originally acquired by the United States in 1941 for military purposes. The complex primarily housed servicemembers assigned to a nearby military medical center, but also leased to civilians when units were available.The District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County found that the landlord was exempt from local licensure requirements based on correspondence from the county’s housing authority and entered judgment for possession and unpaid rent against the tenant. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County reversed, ruling that the landlord was required to obtain a local rental license, at least for units leased to civilians, and vacated the judgment for possession and unpaid rent.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the Enclave Clause of the United States Constitution preempted Montgomery County’s licensure requirements for this property. The court held that for the United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause, the State must consent, cede jurisdiction, and the United States must formally accept that jurisdiction. The record showed that, although the United States acquired title with state consent and cession, there was no evidence that the United States ever formally accepted exclusive jurisdiction as required by federal law at the time of acquisition. Thus, the Enclave Clause did not apply, and the landlord failed to prove exemption from county licensure. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed judgment for the tenant, holding that the landlord could not bring a summary ejectment action without demonstrating compliance with, or exemption from, local licensing requirements. View "Ft. Detrick/W. Reed Army Med. Housing v. Wynn" on Justia Law

A debtor in bankruptcy, Scarlett Bowman, challenged the ability of a passive trust, Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4, U.S. Bank National Association, to collect interest and fees on a mortgage loan it held, arguing that Towd was not licensed under the Maryland Mortgage Lender Law. The asset at issue was a residential property subject to a note and deed of trust assigned to Towd, a passive trust that did not originate the loan but simply held it. It was undisputed that Towd was unlicensed, but the parties disputed whether a license was required under the relevant Maryland law.Previously, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland certified questions to the Supreme Court of Maryland, because the issue of whether passive trusts were required to be licensed under the Maryland Mortgage Lender Law had not been settled by any controlling appellate decision. The dispute arose after the Appellate Court of Maryland’s decision in Estate of Brown v. Ward, 261 Md. App. 385 (2024), which held that passive trusts could be required to obtain a license as “credit grantors” under a different statutory scheme (OPEC), but did not address the Mortgage Lender Law itself. Following Brown and regulatory guidance, the state’s financial regulator attempted to require licensure of passive trusts for all mortgage loans. In response, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Maryland Secondary Market Stability Act of 2025 to clarify that passive trusts were exempt from licensure under the Mortgage Lender Law.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Maryland Mortgage Lender Law did not require passive trusts to obtain a mortgage lender license before the effective date of the Secondary Market Stability Act. Brown did not interpret or change the Mortgage Lender Law’s requirements. Because passive trusts were never subject to the law’s licensing requirement, the subsequent legislative exemption was a clarification rather than a restoration or retroactive change. The court answered the certified question in the negative and did not reach the remaining questions. View "In re: Bowman" on Justia Law