Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land that was subject to and had the benefit of several easements, including Way A, which was created so the easement holder could access his lot, which otherwise had no direct access from a public way. Defendant held title to three lots over which Way A extended and made improvements that protruded to some extent into Way A. Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting acts of encroachment upon its right to use the easement over Way A. The Land Court judge found that Defendant had no obligation to remove any of the encroachments. The Appeals Court reversed in part, concluding that because Plaintiff’s parcel was held under a Land Court certificate of registration, the dimensions of all easements appurtenant to it indicated on the Land Court plan were immutable, and therefore, Plaintiff had had right of access over the full width of Way A as shown on the plan. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Land Court judge, holding that the width of the easement may be reduced since Plaintiff did not dispute that he had been able to use the remaining unobstructed portion of the easement for the purpose of travel to and from his parcel. View "Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC" on Justia Law

In each of these three consolidated cases plaintiff banks brought summary process actions against defendants, former homeowners-mortgagors, after foreclosure. Each defendant raised several defenses and counterclaims in his or her answer to the complaint, including challenges to the bank's right to possession and title as derived through foreclosure sale. Each bank filed a motion to strike the affirmative defenses and to dismiss the counterclaims, arguing that the only defenses and counterclaims available in summary process are those related to landlord-tenant relationships between the parties and those challenging title based on a failure to strictly comply with the power of sale provided in the mortgage. The housing court judge (1) granted the defendants' motions as to landlord-tenant-related defenses and counterclaims, and (2) denied the defendants' motions as to the other defenses and counterclaims, including those challenging title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the housing court has jurisdiction to hear defenses and counterclaims challenging the title of a plaintiff in a post-foreclosure summary process action and has the authority to award damages in conjunction with such counterclaims. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a subcontractor, filed an action to enforce a mechanic's lien on certain land. More than a year later, Defendants, acting as principal debtor and the surety, executed and recorded a surety bond to dissolve the lien pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 254, 14. The bond named Plaintiff as an obligee. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to include Defendants as defendants in the underlying complaint and to add a claim to enforce the bond against them. At issue was whether Plaintiff's amendment of its original complaint constituted timely commencement of its action to enforce a bond pursuant to section 14. The lower court found that although Plaintiff had not filed the amended complaint within ninety days of receipt of notice of the bond, service of its motion to amend on Defendants within that ninety-day period satisfied the section 14 requirement that a claimant have "commenced" a civil action within that period in order to enforce the bond. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commencement requirement in section 14 was satisfied on the facts of this case because the amendment to the complaint related back to the date on which Plaintiff filed its original action against Corporation. View "Nes Rentals v. Me. Drilling & Blasting, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded. View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Karla Brown brought a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank and others seeking rescission of a note and first mortgage securing that note, alleging that she was the victim of a predatory lending scheme. The mortgage was originated by Deutsche Bank's predecessor in interest in connection with the purchase of Brown's home. Deutsche Bank requested that First American Title Insurance Company defend Deutsche Bank's mortgage interest pursuant to the terms of its title insurance policy. First American refused coverage, claiming the lawsuit did not trigger its duty to defend because Brown was claiming she was misinformed as to the terms of the note rather than challenging that she granted the mortgage. Deutsche Bank subsequently brought this action seeking a judgment declaring First American had a duty to defend it in Brown's lawsuit. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of First American. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Brown's complaint did not trigger First American's duty to defend because the complaint's claims were not specifically envisioned by the terms of the title insurance policy. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Law Firm and its attorneys (collectively, Law Firm) to accomplish Plaintiff's foreclosure on a mortgage to certain property. A year after the foreclosure sale, while Law Firm was representing Plaintiff in negotiations for the sale of the foreclosed property, another law firm retained by Plaintiff sent a notice of claim to Law Firm alleging that Law Firm breached its obligations to Plaintiff by failing to inform Plaintiff of outstanding liens on the foreclosed property. After Law Firm concluded its representation of Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed an action against Law Firm, alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation. Law Firm moved for a protective order to preserve, among other things, the confidentiality of allegedly privileged communications to Law Firm's in-house counsel regarding Law Firm's reply to the notice of claim. The judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge correctly allowed Law Firm to invoke the attorney-client privilege to preserve the confidentiality of the communications. View "RFF Family P'ship v. Burns & Levinson, LLP" on Justia Law

The Stefanidises divided a parcel into Lot A and Lot B. The Stefanidses converted the building on Lot A into three condominium units and applied for a variance to built a two-family house on Lot B. The variance was approved, but the Stefanidses failed to record the variance. Pursuant to a subsequently granted building permit, the Stefanidses began to clear and prepare the site. More than one year after the variance was granted, Plaintiff, who lived in one of the units on Lot A, requested that the building commission revoke the building permit on the ground that the Stefanidses failed to record the variance within one year. The commissioner denied the request, and the zoning board of appeals upheld the commissioner's denial. The land court affirmed, determining that the variance had not lapsed because the Stefanidses had taken substantial steps in reliance upon it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the variance had become effective and had not lapsed. View "Grady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Peabody" on Justia Law

Defendants owned two-family and three-family rental properties in the City of Worcester. Defendants leased dwelling units in these properties to groups of four unrelated adult college students. The City determined that, where such a dwelling unit is occupied by four or more unrelated adults not within the second degree of kindred to each other, the dwelling unit is a "lodging" for purposes of the Lodging House Act, and Defendants were therefore operating a lodging house without a license. The trial court found Defendants in contempt and imposed monetary fines. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dwelling units did not meet the definition of "lodgings" under the Act, and accordingly, the properties were not lodging houses under the Act. View "City of Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Landlord and Tenant entered into a twelve-year lease for commercial space. The lease required a separate guaranty agreement to be executed by Guarantor. Tenant stopped making rent payments a couple of years later, and thereafter, Landlord reentered and took possession of the premises, thereby terminating the lease. Landlord subsequently filed suit against Tenant and Guarantor for damages arising from the breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to Landlord as to liability and awarded damages in the amount of $1,092,653, for which Tenant and Guarantor were jointly liable. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment assessing damages and remanded. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the part of the judgment finding Tenant liable for breach of the lease and assessing damages for the period before termination of the lease in the amount of $37,276 plus prejudgment interest; and (2) vacated the part of the judgment assessing damages for the period following termination of the lease and awarding attorney's fees. View "275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased real property after a real estate broker gave him incorrect information about the zoning classification of the property. Plaintiff was thereafter unable to use the property as he intended. Plaintiff sued the broker and the real estate agency that employed her, alleging misrepresentation and violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 2. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) a broker has a duty to exercise reasonable care in making representations as to a property's zoning designation, and where the misrepresentations were based on information provided by the seller, as in this case, the question of whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to rely on such information is to be determined by the trier of fact; and (2) an exculpatory clause in the purchase and sale agreement did not preclude the buyer's reliance on prior written representations as to zoning classification. View "DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd." on Justia Law