Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved multiple litigations among three parties - Insurer, insured Mortgagee, and Homeowner - arising out of a defect in the title to Homeowner's home. Insurer brought suit in the land court on behalf of Mortgagee seeking to reform the deed to the property or to equitably subrogate Homeowner's interest in the property behind Mortgagee's mortgage. Homeowner initiated suit in the superior court against Mortgagee. Eventually, all claims in both actions became part of a federal court case, which settled. Thereafter, Mortgagee filed a complaint against Insurer in the U.S. district court seeking to recover from Insurer for the costs Mortgagee incurred in defending against Homeowner's claims. The judge determined Insurer had no obligation under its title insurance policy to pay Mortgagee's defense costs but certified two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that, under Massachusetts law (1) a title insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured in the entire lawsuit where one claim is within the scope of the title insurance coverage and other claims are not; and (2) a title insurer that initiates litigation similarly does not have a duty to defend the insured against all reasonably foreseeable counterclaims. View "GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This action arose from the Department of Environmental Protection's (Department) issuance of a waterways license under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 91 (chapter 91 license) to the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) to redevelop a section of land owned by the BRA on the seaward end of Long Wharf (project site). Plaintiffs, ten residents of Boston's North End neighborhood, appealed the issuance of the chapter 91 license, claiming the Department acted unconstitutionally and beyond its statutory authority when it issued the license without obtaining two-thirds vote of the Legislature as required by article 97 of the amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. After the a Department's office of appeals affirmed the issuance of the license, the superior court ordered declaratory relief and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Department to enforce article 97. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that article 97 did not apply to the project site, and therefore, a two-thirds vote of the Legislature was not required to approve the planned development. Remanded. View "Mahajan v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a dispute over property rights in a beach parcel. Two families, Plaintiffs and Defendants, owned the property upland from the beach. In 2004, Plaintiffs filed an action in the land court to quiet title, claiming they owned a fractional interest in the beach or, in the alternative, enjoyed a prescriptive easement to use it and land leading to it. Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs had no interest in the beach as it was presently located because their title interest dated to an 1841 deed that created the parcel, and the beach no longer existed as it did in 1841. The land court judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the title claim and determined that Plaintiffs had not met their burden of establishing a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the judgment declaring that Plaintiffs did not have title interest in the beach as it currently existed since their interest was to a beach now submerged in the Atlantic Ocean; and (2) vacated the portion of the judgment relating to the prescriptive easement claim, as the judge's findings of fact were insufficient to permit appellate review of the judgment. Remanded. View "White v. Hartigan" on Justia Law

An LLC filed an application for a comprehensive permit with the zoning board of appeals to build five three-story buildings with 150 rental apartments. The board denied the application. On appeal, the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) vacated the board's decision and directed the board to issue a comprehensive permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HAC did not err in calculating the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (2) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the fire safety concern outweighed the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (3) the HAC did not err in concluding that the town need not acquire a ladder fire truck if the project were built and that other claims of adverse fiscal impact arising from the project may not be considered in evaluating whether the denial of project approval is consistent with local needs; (4) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the development would not adequately protect wetlands; and (5) the HAC did not err in ordering the board to refund the fee it assessed the LLC to pay for the service's of the board's legal counsel. View "Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sunderland v. Sugarbush Meadow, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff bank (Bank) claimed to be the holder of a mortgage given by Defendant. Bank filed a complaint in equity in the land court under the Massachusetts Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to determine if Defendant was entitled to foreclosure protections under the Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). Defendant conceded she was not entitled to protection under the SCRA but moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Bank lacked standing to bring a servicemember proceeding because it was not the clear holder of her note or mortgage. The land court denied Defendant's motion, determining that Bank had standing based on its right to purchase Defendant's mortgage. The court then authorized Bank to make an entry and to sell the property covered by the mortgage. The Supreme Court vacated the land court's judgment, holding (1) because Defendant was not entitled to appear or be heard at the servicemember proceeding, the land court should not have accepted or entertained Defendant's filings; (2) only mortgagees or those acting on behalf of mortgagees having standing to bring servicemember proceedings; and (3) in the present case, the judge used the incorrect standard in making the determination that Bank had standing. Remanded. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt" on Justia Law

Hollis Hills, LLC filed an application for a comprehensive permit with the zoning board of appeals of Lunenberg to build condominium units in townhouses. The board denied the application. The Massachusetts housing appeals committee (HAC) set aside the board's decision and directed the board to issue a comprehensive permit. The superior court affirmed the HAC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the HAC's finding that the existing subsidized housing in the region did not adequately address the regional need for housing; (2) substantial evidence supported the HAC's conclusion that the proposed project was not inconsistent with the town's master planning and would not undermine those plans; (3) the HAC did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the balance of interests under the circumstances favored the regional need for affordable housing rather than the local concern of a zoning noncomformity; and (4) the HAC did not err in not staying the proceedings until the Governor had appointed a fifth member to the HAC. View "Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lunenburg v. Housing Appeals Comm." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit in superior court claiming that she and her son entered into an oral that granted her a life estate in certain property. Petitioner sought to enforce the oral agreement or, in the alternative, recover of a theory of quantum meruit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The appeals court remanded for proceedings as to whether Petitioner should recover under a theory of quantum meruit. While the case was pending on remand, Petitioner filed a petition in the county court against the judge assigned to the matter, in both his individual and official capacities, and against the Commonwealth. Petitioner raised a number of claims concerning the judge's rulings and conduct, including an assertion that he had acted in an unlawful and biased manner. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claims of judicial bias and declaratory judgment claims should have been addressed through the ordinary trial and appellate process; (2) the judge was absolutely immune from Petitioner's request for monetary damages; and (3) Petitioner's allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to overcome the judge's absolute immunity. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal was whether an uncontroverted affidavit attesting to the statutory form "Affidavit of Sale under Power of Sale in Mortgage" was sufficient to show compliance with the power of sale for the purpose of establishing the right of possession by motion for summary judgment in a summary process action. A judge in the housing court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, and the defendant, Oliver Hendricks, appealed. Hendricks asserted error in the grant of summary judgment to Fannie Mae, where the statutory form failed to set forth "fully and particularly" the acts taken to exercise the power of sale in Hendricks's mortgage, as required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 15. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) because the statutory form that Fannie Mae offered in support of its motion for summary judgment was sufficient within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, 8, it made out a prima facie case of compliance with chapter 244, 14; and (2) because there was no genuine issue of material fact to be decided, Fannie Mae was entitled to summary judgment. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant committed a breach of a settlement agreement with the town by failing to remove mulch from property owned by Plaintiff. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, contending that the civil claim was intended to retaliate, deter, and punish Defendant solely for engaging in the constitutionally protected activity of petitioning the town. The motion was denied. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that Defendant failed to meet its required threshold showing that Plaintiff's claim of breach of the settlement agreement was based on Defendant's exercise of its right to petition. View "Marabello v. Boston Bank Corp." on Justia Law

In 1990 McCarthy bought land at a mortgage foreclosure sale conducted by defendant, Seamen's, the mortgage holder. The advertisement described the parcel as "at the end of the paved portion of Higgins Hollow Road, Truro." McCarthy obtained a mortgage from Seamen's and retained defendant, Snow, an attorney. Before closing, Snow and issued to Seamen's a certificate of title. McCarthy received a copy. The foreclosure deed and mortgage were recorded. McCarthy purchased the property under the belief that it was in a specific location; it is actually another parcel. Following a land court action concerning a boundary dispute with a neighbor, McCarthy sued those involved in her purchase. During discovery, defendants sought, from the land court action, time sheets, correspondence between or among McCarthy and her attorneys, land surveyors, title abstractors, and title examiners; and all documents concerning the parcels. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the defendants did not establish entitlement to discovery of communications protected by attorney-client privilege under a theory of at issue waiver, but may discover the other information that qualifies as "fact" work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), because they have shown substantial need for the material and cannot without undue hardship obtain it from another source. View "McCarthy v. Slade Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law