Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Sunpin Energy Services, LLC and Ralph P. Lapinkas, Jr. sought to construct a large-scale ground-mounted solar energy system on a parcel of undeveloped, mostly forested land in Petersham, Massachusetts. Because the proposed site was outside the town’s designated solar electric overlay district, Sunpin applied for a special permit from the Zoning Board of Appeals. The project would require clearing trees from approximately 14.3 acres, and Sunpin secured an order of conditions from the town conservation commission under the Wetlands Protection Act. The permit application was denied after one of three board members voted against it, citing concerns about deforestation and referencing the town’s bylaw goals of maintaining the town’s beauty and proper land use.The plaintiffs challenged the board’s denial in the Land Court Department. The Land Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of the board, concluding that the board member properly applied the zoning bylaw criteria, including the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, and concerns about tree removal. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court vacated the judgment, holding that the board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, improperly favoring forest preservation over solar energy siting and relying on speculation about future development.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that, under the Dover Amendment’s solar provision (G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth paragraph), municipalities must provide reasonable opportunities for solar energy systems and may not deny a special permit unless it is necessary to protect public health, safety, or welfare. The Court found that the denial, based on general concerns about tree cutting, amounted to a blanket prohibition in a town that is ninety-seven percent forested, which was improper. The Court vacated the Land Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sunpin Energy Services, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Petersham" on Justia Law

A general contractor and a subcontractor entered into agreements for the construction and renovation of a facility. The subcontracts required disputes to be resolved by arbitration pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The subcontractor performed work and submitted invoices, but the general contractor, while timely rejecting the invoices and providing reasons, failed to include the good faith certification required by the Massachusetts prompt pay act. The contractor later paid the invoices after an arbitrator determined that the invoices were deemed approved due to the lack of timely certification. Subsequently, the contractor filed a counterclaim in arbitration seeking recoupment of those payments, arguing the invoices were not fair and reasonable.The subcontractor initially brought suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which was then compelled to arbitration per the contract. During arbitration, the arbitrator found that the contractor’s failure to timely certify its rejection of the invoices resulted in the invoices being deemed approved and ordered payment to the subcontractor. After payment, the arbitrator allowed the contractor’s counterclaim for recoupment. Following evidentiary proceedings, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the contractor, awarding partial recoupment. The subcontractor moved in the Superior Court to vacate this award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Relying on J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co., the Superior Court judge vacated the recoupment portion of the arbitration award, finding that the contractor had asserted defenses before paying the invoices, contrary to precedent.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the matter on direct appellate review. It held that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because the award was not prohibited by law nor did it violate public policy. The court determined that the prompt pay act did not expressly prohibit recoupment in these circumstances and that the arbitrator’s actions were within the broad scope granted by the parties’ agreement and the arbitration rules. The judgment vacating the arbitration award was reversed and the matter remanded for confirmation of the arbitration award. View "J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co." on Justia Law

A group of registered voters in Massachusetts challenged the Attorney General’s certification of an initiative petition proposing to limit annual rent increases for residential properties. The petition would repeal the Statewide ban on rent control and instead institute a cap on rent increases, but it expressly exempted certain types of properties, including those in facilities operated solely for religious, educational, or nonprofit purposes. The Attorney General had certified that the petition did not contain excluded matters, issued the required summary, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth prepared the petition for circulation and potential inclusion on the November 2026 ballot after sufficient signatures.The plaintiffs filed a civil action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking a declaration that the petition was invalid under the Massachusetts Constitution, an order quashing the certification, and an injunction preventing the petition from appearing on the ballot. The parties agreed to reserve and report the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court. The central argument was that the petition impermissibly “relates to religion, religious practices or religious institutions,” which is prohibited by Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case de novo and concluded that, because the petition included an exemption for facilities operated solely for religious purposes, it “relates to religion” within the meaning of Article 48. The Court explained that the exemption makes religion a factor in the law’s application and would require governmental determinations about religious purpose, thereby conferring preferential treatment on religious institutions. The Court held that the petition is barred from the initiative process by Article 48 and directed that it may not be placed on the 2026 Statewide election ballot. The judgment was remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment and an injunction consistent with this holding. View "Cella v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A buyer entered into a contract to purchase a cranberry bog property that was assessed and taxed as agricultural land under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 61A. The contract acknowledged that the sale was contingent on the town’s waiver of its statutory right of first refusal. The buyer informed the seller that it intended to subdivide two lots for non-agricultural use and keep the rest agricultural. This intended use was incorporated into the notice of intent to sell, which was sent to the town as required. Later, the buyer changed its position and stated it intended to maintain the property for agricultural use, and together with the seller, attempted to withdraw the notice of intent. However, the town declined the withdrawal and exercised its option to purchase the property through its affordable housing trust.The Superior Court reviewed cross motions for summary judgment. The judge found that the notice of intent sufficiently triggered the town’s right of first refusal and that the town’s right ripened into an irrevocable option, precluding withdrawal of the notice. Judgment was entered against the buyer, who then appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court for review.The Supreme Judicial Court held that the notice of intent to sell, which stated an intention to subdivide two lots for non-agricultural use, was sufficient under chapter 61A to trigger the town’s right of first refusal. The Court ruled that the town’s option to purchase vested upon receipt of the notice and could not be withdrawn by the seller and buyer. Additionally, the town’s option applied to the entire parcel as described in the purchase and sale agreement, not just the subdivided lots. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Watermark LLC v. R H Benea Cranberry Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns the sale of a manufactured housing community in Bourne, Massachusetts, owned by the Charles W. Austin Trust. The trust entered into a purchase and sale agreement with Crown Communities, LLC for $3.8 million, subject to the statutory right of first refusal afforded to resident tenants under the Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, § 32R. After receiving notice of the pending sale, a group of residents formed an association and submitted a signed petition indicating support from more than fifty-one percent of resident tenants to exercise the right of first refusal and purchase the property. Despite gathering sufficient signatures, the association failed to secure a binding financing commitment within ninety days of executing its purchase and sale agreement with the trust.A civil action commenced in the Massachusetts Superior Court, with Crown asserting claims for declaratory relief regarding its rights to purchase the property. The association counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief and alleging unfair practices and tortious interference by Crown. After a jury-waived trial, the Superior Court judge found that the association did not validly exercise its right of first refusal, relying on the number of signed membership agreements rather than petition signatures, and concluded that the trust must sell to Crown. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment, finding error in the Superior Court’s methodology and holding that the signed petition constituted reasonable evidence of support. The Appeals Court also ruled that Crown was estopped from challenging the association’s failure to meet the financing deadline due to its filing of a lis pendens.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. The Court held that a petition signed by resident tenants is “reasonable evidence” under § 32R, but found that the association’s failure to obtain financing within the statutory ninety-day period terminated its right of first refusal. The Court reversed the amended judgment that had required the trust to sell to the association and affirmed the rulings in favor of Crown on the association’s counterclaims. View "Crown Communities, LLC v. Austin" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including abutting property owners and a nonprofit, challenged the sale of a 21-acre cranberry bog in Centerville, Massachusetts, known as the Jenkins Bog. The land had been classified for tax purposes as horticultural use under G. L. c. 61A, which provides municipalities a right of first refusal when such land is sold for non-agricultural purposes. Susan L. Jenkins, as trustee, notified the Barnstable town manager of her intent to sell the bog to a buyer intending residential use, but failed to provide notice to other required municipal bodies and the State forester. The sale proceeded, transferring title to Bog Partners LLC. The plaintiffs learned of the sale after the fact and contended that the statutory notice requirements had not been met, seeking to invalidate the transaction and compel compliance with the statute.The plaintiffs brought their claims in Barnstable Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment and mandamus relief. Both the Town of Barnstable and Bog Partners LLC moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing. Two Superior Court judges granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of lack of standing.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The Court held that the plaintiffs, as abutters and concerned citizens, did not have standing to seek declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A because the statutory notice and right of first refusal provisions in G. L. c. 61A are designed to protect municipal—not private—interests. The Court also held that mandamus relief was improper because the Town had fulfilled its statutory obligation by notifying the seller of the deficient notice; any further enforcement steps were discretionary. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court judgments in favor of the Town and Bog Partners LLC. View "Banevicius v. Barnstable" on Justia Law

Two former tenants sued the owner and manager of a residential apartment complex, alleging that they were charged unlawful rental application fees and excessive lock change fees, in violation of the Massachusetts security deposit statute and consumer protection laws. They sought to represent a statewide class of similarly situated tenants. After contentious discovery, the Superior Court sanctioned the defendants, precluding them from contesting certain liability facts. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the security deposit claims but denied summary judgment on the consumer protection claims. Before trial, the parties reached a proposed class action settlement that established a fund for class members, with unclaimed funds to be distributed partly to charities and partly returned to the defendants.The Superior Court, after scrutiny and required revisions, approved the settlement. The court capped the amount of unclaimed funds that could revert to the defendants and required that a portion go to designated charities. However, the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee, a nonparty potentially entitled to notice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3), was not notified prior to settlement approval. After final approval and claims processing, the committee received notice for the first time and objected to the final distribution of unclaimed funds, arguing that the lack of timely notice violated the rule and that final judgment should be set aside. The motion judge agreed there was a violation but declined to vacate the settlement, finding no prejudice.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the IOLTA Committee had standing to appeal the denial of its procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the disposition of residual funds, but lacked standing to challenge the overall fairness or structure of the settlement. Assuming a violation of the rule occurred, the Court found no prejudice because the committee ultimately received the opportunity to be heard before judgment entered. The judgment was affirmed. View "Ortins v. Lincoln Property Company" on Justia Law

This case centers on a dispute involving the planned construction of a new cottage by a hotel operator on Martha’s Vineyard. The hotel, situated in a residential area, is considered a preexisting nonconforming commercial use. In 2008, the hotel’s predecessor sought permission for expansion and entered into an agreement with a neighboring property owner, who agreed not to oppose the project or appeal permit decisions, in exchange for promises including the installation and maintenance of vegetative screening. After subsequent changes to the project—including the removal and replacement of screening and the relocation and resizing of the cottage—the neighbor, acting as trustee, objected to the most recent modifications in 2023, claiming inadequate screening and diminished privacy.Following the 2023 decision by the Edgartown zoning board of appeals approving the hotel’s modifications, the trustee filed suit challenging that decision and asserting additional claims against the hotel. The hotel counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging that the suit was frivolous and vexatious. The Superior Court denied the trustee’s special motion to dismiss the counterclaim under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the underlying lawsuit was a sham. The trustee appealed. The Appeals Court reversed, finding that it could not determine at that stage whether the trustee’s claims were meritless because the underlying suit was unresolved.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the anti-SLAPP statute requires the party opposing dismissal to prove that the petitioning activity (the lawsuit) was devoid of reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. The court determined that the hotel failed to meet this burden because the trustee’s challenge to the 2023 decision was not frivolous on its face. The order denying the special motion to dismiss was therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings, including an award of attorney’s fees to the trustee. View "Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner LLC" on Justia Law

An assisted living residence operated by the defendant charged new residents a one-time “community fee” upon admission. The agreement stated that this fee was intended to cover upfront staff administrative costs, the resident’s initial service coordination plan, move-in assistance, and to establish a reserve for building improvements. The plaintiff, acting as executor of a former resident’s estate and representing a class, alleged that this community fee violated the Massachusetts security deposit statute, which limits the types of upfront fees a landlord may charge tenants. The complaint further claimed that charging the fee was an unfair and deceptive practice under state consumer protection law.The Superior Court initially dismissed the case, finding that the security deposit statute did not apply to assisted living residences, which are governed by their own regulatory scheme. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts previously held in a related decision that the statute does apply to such residences when acting as landlords, but does not prohibit upfront fees for services unique to assisted living facilities. The court remanded the case for further factual development to determine whether the community fee corresponded to such services. After discovery and class certification, both parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court judge ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that the community fees were not used solely for allowable services because they were deposited into a general account used for various expenses, including non-allowable capital improvements.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed. The court held that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because uncontradicted evidence showed that the community fees corresponded to costs for assisted living-specific intake services that exceeded the amount of the fees collected. The court emphasized that the statute does not require the fees to be segregated or tracked dollar-for-dollar, and ordered judgment in favor of the defendant. View "Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

A dispute arose over public access to a portion of Estabrook Road in Concord, Massachusetts, which runs through land owned by various private parties, land trusts, and Harvard College. The road consists of a northern section, which was formally laid out by county authorities in 1763, and a southern section, for which no direct layout records exist but which connects to the northern section and an undisputed public way. The abutting landowners sought to bar public access, arguing that the southern section was never a public way and that a 1932 discontinuance order by county commissioners converted the road into a private way, extinguishing public rights. The town of Concord contended that both sections were public ways and that the 1932 order only ended the town’s maintenance obligation, not public access.The Land Court, after a bench trial, found that both the northern and southern disputed sections had been established as public ways, the latter based on circumstantial evidence such as historical use, maintenance, and references in town records. The court also concluded that the 1932 discontinuance under G. L. c. 82, § 32A, terminated only the town’s duty to maintain the road, not the public’s right to use it. The Appeals Court affirmed, modifying the judgment to clarify that both sections were public ways prior to 1932 and that public access was not terminated by the 1932 order.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that the Land Court did not err in finding, based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, that the disputed sections were public ways by 1763. The Court further held that the 1932 discontinuance under § 32A relieved the town of maintenance obligations but did not extinguish the public’s right of access to the road. The judgment as modified by the Appeals Court was affirmed. View "Town of Concord v. Rasmussen" on Justia Law