Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this dispute over a mortgage was whether statutes of limitations apply to actions for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant based on the applicable statute of limitations, holding that to the extent Plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory relief, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device through which parties may vindicate substantive legal rights, an action for declaratory judgment is barred by an applicable statute of limitations to the same extent that the same cause of action would be barred in a nondeclaratory proceeding. Remanded. View "Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

The county assessor determined that the fair market value of a tax parcel, which was improved by a department store operated by respondent Federated Retail Holdings, Inc., was $17,000,000 for the year 2006. The assessor included the value of a leasehold interest held by Federated in the parcel adjacent to the tax parcel in its value determination. Federated timely filed petitions challenging the assessor's market value determinations. The tax court held that Federated's ownership interest in the tax parcel included the leasehold interest in the adjacent property, but concluded that the value of the leasehold interest was not subject to the jurisdiction of the tax court and therefore did not include it. The county appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the value of Federated's leasehold interest in adjacent property because it constituted real property of the tax parcel under Minn. Stat. 272.03, 1 and affected the fair market value of the tax parcel. View "Federated Retail Holdings, Inc. v. County of Ramsey " on Justia Law

Following a trial, the Minnesota tax court affirmed an order of the Commissioner of Revenue calculating the value of the estate of Ruth Singer and assessing the estate the sum of $69,679 in taxes and interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court had jurisdiction; (2) Minn. Stat. 291.215, which provides that any elections made in valuing the federal gross estate shall be applicable in valuing the Minnesota gross estate, is constitutional, even if it is not uniform or its application results in a regressive tax; (2) the tax court did not err in affirming the Commissioner's assessment; (3) the federal estate tax law does not preempt Minnesota's estate tax law; and (4) the tax court properly determined that the value of Singer's home should be included in her gross estate. View "Singer v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Vernon Stisser, the personal representative of the estate of Pamela Stisser, petitioned the district court for an order directing certain payments and disbursements from Pamela's inter vivos trust (Trust). Among other claims, Vernon sought an order requiring trustee David Andreas (Trustee) to (1) pay all debts at the time of Pamela's death that were secured by Pamela's personal property and by Pamela's and Vernon's real estate; (2) compensate Vernon for his services as the personal representative of Pamela's probate estate; and (3) reimburse Pamela's estate for all probate estate administration expenses. The court granted Trustee's motion for partial summary judgment on Vernon's claim for payment of the secured debts. After a trial on Vernon's remaining claims, the court concluded the Trust did not require Trustee to compensate Vernon for his services as personal representative and required Trustee to pay only a limited amount of Vernon's claim administration expenses. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals incorrectly held that Trustee was required to pay debts secured by Pamela's personal property. View "In re Pamela Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust" on Justia Law

In 2008, Stearns County changed the tax classification of property co-owned by Respondent from residential nonhomestead to commercial. Respondent filed a petition under Minn. Stat. 278.01, claiming the property was misclassified, unequally assessed, and undervalued. The tax court dismissed the petition as untimely. Respondent did not appeal from the tax court's dismissal of its petition and instead filed a verified claim under Minn. Stat. 278.14 for a refund of taxes paid in 2009, claiming the property was misclassified for taxes payable in 2009. The County denied the refund claim. The tax court denied the County's motion to dismiss the section 278.14 appeal (Matter A11-1479). In the meantime, Respondent filed a timely petition under Minn. Stat. 278.01 with respect to property taxes assessed in 2009. The tax court ruled the property was properly classified as residential nonhomestead, its original classification (Matter A11-1480). The County petitioned for writ of certiorari in both matters. The Supreme Court dismissed the writs of certiorari, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction in each case. View "Beuning Family LP v. County of Stearns" on Justia Law

Relator 78th Street OwnerCo, LLC, the owner and landlord of a hotel, filed petitions contesting Hennepin County's assessments of its property for property taxes payable in 2008 and 2009, along with the taxes due in 2008 and 2009. The tax court dismissed both petitions for failure to comply with the statutory sixty-day rule, which states that failure to submit required documentation within sixty days results in automatic dismissal of the petition, because each petition did not include a copy of 78th Street's lease and a calculation of percentage rent paid, and the 2008 petition did not include a rent roll/tenant list. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) 78th Street's argument that the information it did not submit was not relevant to the calculation of property tax for its hotel property was unavailing because a taxpayer is not permitted to evaluate relevancy under the sixty-day rule, and neither the relevancy standard nor the unavailability exception excuses a taxpayer from providing required information that is available to the taxpayer; and (2) neither version of the sixty-day rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 78th Street.

This case involved two mechanic's liens foreclosed against a hotel property. An agent of the lien claimants personally served mechanic's liens statements on the property owner. Appellant, a community bank, challenged the validity of this service. Appellant argued that a lien claimant may not personally serve a mechanic's lien statement, and therefore, service was improper. As a result, Appellant contended that the mechanic's liens were invalid and could not be foreclosed. The district court determined that service was proper and entered judgment in favor of the lien claimants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a lien claimant may personally serve a mechanic's lien statement, and therefore, service of the mechanic's lien statements in this case was proper.

The Rochester International Joint Zoning Board enacted a zoning ordinance that increased the size of a runway safety zone and changed the restrictions within the safety zone to allow fewer types of uses of land within the zone. The safety zone extended over property owned by Leon and Judith DeCook. The DeCooks brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging that the Board's decision constituted a taking for which the DeCooks were entitled to compensation. The district court first concluded there was no taking, and upon remand, again concluded that the Board's actions did not constitute a taking. The DeCooks appealed another time, and the Supreme Court ultimately held the ordinance constituted a taking of the DeCooks' property. The DeCooks subsequently moved for an award of attorney fees incurred during the appeals. The Supreme Court granted the motion, as the Cooks prevailed and were entitled under Minn. Stat. 117.045 to an award of reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred on appeal.

The City of Red Wing enacted an ordinance requiring inspections of rental property before landlords could obtain operating licenses and allowing the City to conduct inspections by application for and judicial approval of an administrative warrant in the absence of landlord or tenant consent. Appellants in this case were nine landlords and two tenants who refused to consent to inspections of their properties and successfully challenged three separate applications for administrative warrants. At the same time Appellants opposed the City's application, they filed a separate declaratory judgment action seeking to have the rental inspection ordinance declared unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action for lack of standing, concluding that Appellants had not alleged an injury that was actual or imminent. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the rental inspection ordinance presented a justiciable controversy. Remanded.

Berry and Co. petitioned the tax court for relief from the County's property tax assessment of its property for 2007 and 2008. At trial, Berry and the County each offered expert appraiser testimony as to the estimated market value of the property. Both appraisers used the market sales comparison approach to value the subject property. The tax county determined that the highest and best use for the subject property was redevelopment and agreed with the County's expert on the valuation, which was higher than the original assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court's determination that the highest and best use of the subject property was redevelopment was not erroneous, and (2) the tax court's valuation of the subject property was supported in the record and was not clearly erroneous.