Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Minnesota Supreme Court
Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC
This case arose out of the foreclosure of Respondent’s townhome. Respondent’s townhome association served Respondent’s adult son with notice of the foreclosure under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a), the substitute-service rule. Respondent brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale was legally void. The district court determined that service was ineffective under Rule 4.03(a) because Respondent’s son was not “residing” in Respondent’s townhome when the association attempted to serve Respondent. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Respondent’s son had not lived at Respondent’s home for an extended period when the substitute service occurred, the service was ineffective under Rule 4.03(a). View "Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law
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Minnesota Supreme Court, Real Estate & Property Law
First Baptist Church of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul
Two churches (the Churches) located in the City of Saint Paul were subject to a right-of-way assessment (ROW assessment) that the City assessed to nearly every owner of real property within the city limits to pay for public right-of-way maintenance services. The Churches appealed their 2011 ROW assessment, arguing that the charge was a tax and was not imposed uniformly upon the same class of property and that the assessed amount improperly exceeded the special benefit to the Churches’ properties. The district court upheld the assessments after applying a reasonableness test, concluding that the ROW was not a tax imposed under the City’s taxing power but was a fee imposed under the City’s police power and, therefore, was not subject to constitutional restrictions on taxation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ROW assessment was imposed as an exercise of the City’s taxing power rather than its police power; and (2) summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the extent of special benefits to the Churches’ properties attributable to the right-of-way services. View "First Baptist Church of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul" on Justia Law
County of Aitkin v. Blandin Paper Co.
Blandin Paper Company (Blandin) owned 4,680 parcels of timberland located in Aitkin, Itasca, St. Louis, and Koochiching Counties (the Counties). Blandin challenged tax assessments of market value for the timberland properties. Before trial, the Counties filed a motion to exclude evidence Blandin offered regarding the unit-rule method for determining the market value of the property at issue. The tax court denied the motion, determining that the unit-rule method is admissible in property tax proceedings. At trial, the court adopted Blandin’s appraisal values based on the unit-rule method and reduced the assessor's aggregate market value of the properties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the unit-rule method to determine the fair market value of real property may be admissible in a property tax proceeding; (2) the record in this case does not establish that the appraisal evidence offered by Blandin satisfied the requirements set forth in this opinion for admitting such evidence; and (3) the case must be remanded for both parties to have the opportunity to present evidence in favor of their respective positions. View "County of Aitkin v. Blandin Paper Co." on Justia Law
McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights
The City of Vadnais Heights imposed an assessment on real property owned by McCullough and Songs, Inc. McCullough appealed the City’s decision. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that McCullough was precluded from appealing because it had failed to file a written objection to the proposed assessment. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a party opposed to a proposed amendment must object in writing before or at the assessment hearing to preserve its right to appeal the assessment to the district court. McCullough appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, vacated the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded, holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the order denying summary judgment to the City. View "McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights" on Justia Law
Archway Marketing Servs. v. County of Hennepin
At issue in this case was Hennepin County’s assessment of the market value of two bulk-distribution warehouses for two assessment dates in 2009 and 2010. The tax court adopted market valuations that were far lower than the recent sale price of each subject property. The County appealed, arguing that the tax court provided inadequate reasons for rejecting the County’s sales comparison analysis and for rejecting a large portion of the County’s income capitalization analysis. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the tax court’s decision rejecting the County’s sales comparison analysis and vacated the tax court’s order, holding that the tax court (1) did not err in rejecting portions of the County’s income capitalization analysis, but (2) failed adequately to explain its reasons for rejecting the County’s sales comparison analysis. Remanded. View "Archway Marketing Servs. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law
Zweber v. Credit River Township
Appellant filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Scott County and Credit River Township, claiming that the County took his property without just compensation by placing conditions on the approval of his plat application. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because Appellant’s exclusive avenue for review of the County’s decision was to seek a writ of certiorari from the court of appeals. The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the County’s plat approval subject to conditions was a quasi-judicial action, which was reviewable only by certiorari appeal within sixty days. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s section 1983 action. View "Zweber v. Credit River Township" on Justia Law
Sprinkler Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc.
Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant for copyright infringement and obtained a money judgment in California. The judgment against Defendant was filed and docketed in a Minnesota district court. Plaintiff subsequently served a garnishment summons on Defendant and sought to attach Defendant’s domain name and the content of its related website. The district court concluded that neither the domain name nor its associated website constituted property subject to garnishment under Minn. Stat. 571.73(3). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an Internet domain name constitutes intangible personal property subject to attachment by garnishment under section 571.73(3)(3). View "Sprinkler Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc." on Justia Law
Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc.
Appellant entered into a mortgage with Aegis Lending Corporation. The mortgage was later assigned to Pacifica L. Ninteen, and the servicing rights were eventually transferred to Vantium Capital, Inc. (“Acqura”). After foreclosure proceedings were commenced against Appellant, Appellant filed suit against Acqura, alleging numerous state law claims. Specifically, Appellant claimed that Acqura’s violated its Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae by failing to follow guidelines applicable under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Minn. Stat. 58.18(1) did not provide a private cause of action for Appellant to pursue damages for Acqura’s alleged violation of its agreement with Fannie Mae and that Appellant therefore lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 58.18(1) provides for a private right of action and therefore gave Appellant standing to pursue her claim. View "Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc." on Justia Law
City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
In 1986, the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Band) entered into several agreements establishing a joint venture to operate gaming activities in Duluth. The agreements required that the Band seek approval before creating any additional Indian Country. In 1994, the Band and the City created a series of new agreements and amendments to the 1986 agreements. In 2010, the Band acquired a plot of land. The Band sought to have the plot placed in trust but did not seek the City’s approval to do so, as required by the 1986 agreements. The City commenced this action in state district court seeking a court order requiring the Band to withdraw its trust application. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Band had only consented to suit in federal court in the 1994 agreements. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the district court’s judgment for the Band, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Band breached the 1986 agreements because it required interpretation of the 1994 agreements, which was a matter vested in the federal courts. View "City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law
County of Dakota v. Cameron
Through the exercise of its eminent-domain power, the County of Dakota acquired a commercial property owned by Appellant. Following an administrative hearing, three condemnation commissioners awarded Appellant $655,000 in damages. Appellant appealed, arguing that under Minnesota's minimum-compensation statute, he was entitled to an award of damages that would allow him "to purchase a comparable property in the community." The trial court concluded Appellant was entitled to $997,056 in damages after finding that certain property, which was located within the same city as the condemned property, qualified as a comparable property in the community under the statute. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was what qualified as a "comparable property" located in the same "community" as the condemned property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase "comparable property" in the minimum-compensation statute refers to an existing property that has enough like characteristics or qualities to another property that the value of one can be used to determine the value of the other; and (2) the district court did not err when it determined that the disputed property qualified as a "comparable property in the community" of the condemned property. View "County of Dakota v. Cameron " on Justia Law