Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The underlying annexation suit was voluntarily dismissed in 2008 with certain terms and conditions imposed on plaintiff James Frisby. Plaintiff owns property in Harrison County. In 2007, he filed a Petition for Inclusion, seeking to have his property annexed by the City of Biloxi. Biloxi responded and asked the court to grant plaintiff's petition. Gulfport objected to the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the City of Biloxi. Harrison County filed an answer as an interested party and also objected. Plaintiff sought clarification of the terms set forth in the order of dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the case should have been dismissed as moot, because nothing remained to be decided on appeal. View "Frisby v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law

In a case consolidating the competing annexation petitions of Biloxi and D’Iberville, the chancellor ultimately awarded each city a reduced area from that requested, determining that it was unreasonable for either city to annex the entire area requested, and then determining that it was reasonable to award each city a smaller, reduced area. Both cities appeaedl this decision, and Biloxi raised jurisdictional issues for the first time on appeal. Because Biloxi raised personal jurisdiction on behalf of third parties, and because Biloxi failed to raise this issue at the trial-court level, the Supreme Court found that Biloxi not only lacked standing to raise this issue, it also waived it. Further, because the chancellor’s decision awarding each city a reduced area was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the annexations as modified by the chancellor. View "In The Matter of the Enlarging, Extending and Defining the Corporate Limits and Boundaries of the City of Biloxi" on Justia Law

Roundstone Development, LLC, sought to develop an affordable-housing subdivision in the City of Natchez. The land which it sought to develop had two different zoning classifications: O-L (Open-Land) and R-1 (Single-Family Residential). The City’s Planning Commission denied Roundstone's site plan, finding that the O-L area must be rezoned R-1 before the development could be approved. The Mayor and Board of Alderman then denied Roundstone's rezoning request. The Circuit Court of Adams County and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the City’s decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address: (1) whether the City erred in requiring that the O-L area be rezoned R-1 and (2) whether the City erred in failing to grant Roundstone's rezoning request. Upon review, the Court found that the City’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance to require rezoning from O-L to R-1 was not manifestly unreasonable and that it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the rezoning. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. View "Roundstone Development, LLC v. City of Natchez" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal stemmed from a lawsuit in which Mark Wolgin sued various entities alleging wrongdoing surrounding his 2006 purchase of a condominium on the Gulf Coast. In case #2010-CA-00653-SCT, Wolgin appealed the Chancery Court's decision to dismiss two credit reporting agencies (Trans Union LLC and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian")), finding that claims against them were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). In case #2010-CA-01177-SCT, the broker for the sale, The Power Broker, Inc. ("Power Broker"), appealed the Chancery Court's decision to order discovery on the scope of the mandatory arbitration clause in the "Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Real Estate" instead of fully granting its "Motion to Compel Arbitration." Regarding Wolgin's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the credit reporting agencies, as Wolgin's claims are preempted by the FCRA. As to Power Broker's appeal, the Court reversed the trial court judgment ordering discovery and remanded the case with instructions to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. View "Wolgin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

An underground culvert system failed and caused a large sinkhole behind the Carraway residence. The culvert system drains Eastover Lake, which is owned by the surrounding property owners (collectively, "the Lake Owner Defendants") and maintained by the Eastover Lake Association (ELA). T.L. Carraway Jr. filed suit against the Lake Owner Defendants and ELA. The Lake Owner Defendants and ELA filed third-party complaints for indemnity against the City of Jackson, alleging that the City's sewer-line repairs had caused the sinkhole. The chancellor found the Lake Owner Defendants, ELA, and the City jointly and severally liable for the repair. The Lake Owner Defendants, ELA, and the City appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, finding that the issues raised by the Lake Owner Defendants and ELA were without merit, except that the chancellor erred by ordering joint and several liability. The Court reversed and remanded for apportionment of liability in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 85-5-7 (Rev. 2011). The City correctly argued that, because the chancellor rejected the indemnity claims brought by the Lake Owner Defendants and ELA against the City, there was no basis for the chancellor's apportionment of liability to the City. Therefore, the Court reversed the chancellor's apportionment of liability to the City and rendered judgment in favor of the City. View "Borne v. Estate of T. L. Carraway, Jr." on Justia Law

This case involved a residence that the plaintiff homeowners allege contained "major structural defects." After discovering these defects and notifying the builder, the parties entered a "tolling agreement" to toll the applicable limitations period, so they could "engage in a review and analysis of the structural settlement issues to determine an agreed upon repair." After the builder refused to correct the defects, the plaintiffs filed suit averring breach of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA); breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; implied warranty of construction performed in a workmanlike manner; negligence; and fraud/misrepresentation/and/or omission of fact. In response, the defendant builder asserted the claims were time-barred and that the tolling agreement was void. This appeal arose from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the tolling agreement was void: "Parties should not be discouraged from honest efforts to settle and/or compromise disputes, and thereby avoid incurring the attendant expenses and uncertainty of litigation and further burdening the courts – all laudable and desired goals. . . .parties should be allowed to agree to extend statutes of limitations (or repose) if they believe this to be in their best interest; however, the limitation period should not be shortened, absent an act of the Legislature." View "Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

Town Creek Water Management District of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties ("Town Creek") appealed a decision of the Lee County Chancery Court that awarded compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest to the Webbs for Town Creek's wrongful taking of the their property. The case was before the trial court on remand from the Supreme Court's reversal of an earlier grant of summary judgment for Town Creek, with an instruction to conduct a trial on all issues. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by limiting the trial to damages alone, rather than holding a trial on all issues. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the Lee County Chancery Court for a trial on all issues. View "Town Creek Master Water Mgmt. Dist. of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties v. Webb" on Justia Law

Ernest and Bonnie Harland filed suit in the Chancery Court of Lafayette County seeking to have a "corrected" warranty deed set aside; to vacate three lots from the official plat of Long Meadow subdivision; or to validate the protective covenants included with their original deed. The chancellor set aside the "corrected" deed and validated the Harlands' original covenants. The Long Meadow Homeowners' Association appealed the chancellor's judgment, and the Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, found no error and affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. The Supreme Court granted Long Meadow’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Having reviewed the briefs and record in this appeal, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, and used the opportunity of this case to discuss precedent as it related to the Harlands' equitable-estoppel claim.