Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Sneil, LLC sought to quiet title to certain property and to eject Tybe Learning Center, Inc. and Regions Bank from that property. The circuit court found in favor of Tybe and Regions, concluding that Sneil failed to provide adequate notice to Tybe and Regions of their right of redemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a purchaser is authorized to acquire a collector's deed for property purchased at tax sale one year after the sale; (2) accordingly, in order for the purchaser to send timely notice to the owner of that property of the right to redeem said property pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 140.405, the purchaser must send said notice ninety days prior to the one-year anniversary of the tax sale, and the notice must only inform the owner of the right to redeem the property; and (3) because Sneil did not meet these requirements, its notice was untimely pursuant to section 140.405.

This case concerned the tax sale of certain property to KSSO, LLC. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment awarding quiet title to the property to Catherine Ndegwa as trustee of the Mrema family revocable trust. KSSO, LLC asserted that the circuit court improperly entered summary judgment in favor of Ndegwa and the trust because there was a sufficient question of material fact as to whether KSSO provided Ndegwa with timely and sufficient notice of Plaintiffs' right to redeem the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the circuit court's order did not resolve a single, distinct judicial unit, and therefore, was neither a final nor appealable judgment in this case.

This was an appeal from the circuit court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to certain property in favor of Edward and Nancy Bosch. Harpagon MO, LLC asserted that the circuit court should have entered summary judgment in its favor because it complied with the requirements of Mo. Rev. Stat. 140.405 by providing the Bosches with timely and sufficient notice of their right to redemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a purchaser is authorized to acquire a deed to property purchased at a tax sale one year after the sale; (2) therefore, a purchaser must notify the owner of that property of the owner's right to redeem at least ninety days prior to one year after the tax sale; (3) if the purchaser does not provide timely or sufficient notice, but still acquires the deed by presenting the certificate of purchase to the collector, then the owner can file a petition to set aside the tax sale asserting the purchaser's failure to comply with section 140.405; and (4) the circuit court did not err in finding that the notices provided to the Bosches were not timely and thus awarding the Bosches quiet title to the property.

This case involved the question of how the amount of a deficiency owed by Fischer & Frichtel Inc, a commercial debtor, after a foreclosure sale of its property should be measured. The trial court submitted an instruction directing the jury to award the difference between the amount of the debt and the property's fair market value at the time of the foreclosure sale. The court then granted First Bank's motion for a new trial in light of its showing that Missouri case law instead requires the deficiency to be determined by the difference between the debt and the amount received at the foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court affirmed after discussing Missouri common law, which requires that the deficiency should be measured by the amount received at the foreclosure sale, but if the sale price is so inadequate as to raise an inference of fraud, then the foreclosure sale can be voided.

A developer attempted to plat a new subdivision within an existing subdivision, and sought the County's approval to use Bridle Parc Lane (BP Lane) as a public road. Several owners of lots in the subdivision brought an action against the County asserting that BP Lane could not have been dedicated to public use because the owners of private easements on which BP Lane was situated had never consented to the dedication. The circuit court entered a judgment declaring BP Lane to be a private road. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' action was not barred by the ten-year limitation period provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.010; and (2) BP Lane did not become a public road through statutory dedication, common law dedication and the establishment of a prescriptive easement.

Mahamad Ali Naji contracted with JAS Apartments to sell property that he owned together with his wife (Wife). Naji secured a preliminary title commitment from the title company, which included a preliminary title commitment stating that Wife must join in the real estate transaction. Wife refused to approve the transaction. JAS sought to enforce the contract in circuit court by legally extinguishing Wife's interest. Naji counterclaimed for breach of contract for JAS's refusal to close as scheduled. The circuit court denied relief to both parties. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for the circuit court to consider whether or not Naji breached the agreement. On remand, the circuit court found that JAS had breached the contract when it failed to close the transaction as scheduled. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded once again, holding (1) the circuit court did not make the appropriate determinations of law consistent with the decision of the court of appeals in the first remand; and (2) the language of the preliminary title commitment required Wife to join in the real estate transaction, and Naji's failure to do so constituted a breach of the real estate contract.

Laclede Gas Company maintained gas lines along Pitman Hill Road in St. Charles County. Pitman Hill Road and the gas lines were located within areas established as public roads on five recorded subdivision plats. Each of the subdivision plats first established public roads and then designated the roads as utility easements. The plats specifically stated that one of the purposes of the utility easements was for the installation and maintenance of gas lines. The County planned to widen Pitman Hill Road, which required Laclede to relocate its gas lines. Laclede declined to pay for the relocation, after which the County filed a declaratory judgment action to require Laclede to bear the cost of relocation. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was required to reimburse Laclede for displacing the gas lines from Laclede's utility easement because the easements were constitutionally cognizable property interests and, therefore, requiring Laclede to relocate its gas lines without compensation would amount to an unconstitutional taking of private property.

Tiffany Lewis and Ryan Gran, neither of whom had a real estate brokerage license, founded Kansas City Premier Apartments, a business devoted to assisting owners of rental property in locating prospective renters. After the Missouri Real Estate Commission informed Lewis that KCPA was conducting real estate activity without a Missouri real estate license in violation of Missouri law, KCPA filed a lawsuit requesting a declaratory judgment that Mo. Rev. Stat. 339 did not encompass its business activities, that it was exempted from licensure requirements, and that the Commission's interpretation of chapter 339 violated KCPA's rights under the United States and Missouri constitutions. The Commission filed a petition for a preliminary injunction, and the two cases were consolidated. The trial court issued an injunction against KCPA. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) KCPA failed to meet its burden that it qualified for an exemption; (2) the challenged provisions of chapter 339 did not violate KCPA's freedom of speech under either the Missouri or United States constitutions; (3) the exemptions listed in chapter 339 did not violate the equal protection clause of the Missouri Constitution; and (5) the challenged provisions of the law were not unconstitutionally vague.