Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
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The case involves the Parrot Ditch Company (PDC) and its four water rights in the Jefferson River. PDC delivers water to its shareholders through the Parrot Ditch, which runs parallel to the Jefferson River in Basin 41G. The ditch was constructed in 1895, and PDC was organized in 1916 to manage and distribute water through the ditch. PDC issued shares that correspond to water entitlements, and the company stopped issuing shares in 1981. Two of the water rights were litigated in 1926 in the Carney case, which established shareholders' interests in PDC and referenced priority dates and volumes for two water rights.The Montana Water Court issued a Temporary Preliminary Decree in 1989, which included abstracts for PDC's four water rights. PDC objected to the place of use for one of the rights in 1990 and later requested amendments to the flow rate and irrigated acreage. The Water Court adopted various recommendations over the years, ultimately increasing the place of use to 6,710.78 acres. In 2018, the Water Court issued a Preliminary Decree, and PDC objected, seeking a larger service area and other corrections. Objectors (AMD) also raised objections to various elements of PDC's water rights.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Water Court's decisions. The Court held that PDC failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a larger service area beyond 6,710.78 acres. The Court also found that the Carney decision did not adjudicate water rights and that AMD provided sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie status of PDC's claims regarding the Townsend and Methodist rights. Finally, the Court upheld the Water Court's modification of the Nolte flow rate to 100 cfs, based on the lack of notice to affected water users when PDC requested the amendment in 1997. View "Parrot Ditch v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

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In 2018, Robert Spoklie purchased land neighboring the property of the Paul Phillip Bardos and Mary L. Bardos Revocable Trust (Bardos) near Kalispell, Montana. Spoklie divided his land into smaller parcels for residential development and entered into an Easement Agreement with Bardos, granting mutual easements for access. Spoklie's easement allowed him to use a 60-foot-wide path through Bardos's property for ingress, egress, and utility installation. Spoklie used this easement to transport construction equipment, sometimes parking it temporarily within the easement boundaries, which Bardos contested.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denied Bardos's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of Spoklie. The court found that Spoklie's activities, including temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment within the easement, were within the scope of the easement agreement. Bardos appealed, arguing that material facts were in dispute and that Spoklie's actions constituted trespass and nuisance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the easement's language allowed for temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment as reasonably necessary for ingress and egress. The court also found that Spoklie's actions did not constitute trespass or nuisance since they were within the scope of the easement. Additionally, the court noted that the issue of Spoklie's proposed mailbox structure was not ripe for adjudication as no substantial steps had been taken toward its construction. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the District Court correctly applied the law. View "Bardos Revocable Trust v. Spoklie" on Justia Law

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David Polkow rented a residential home from Frank Kahl under a written lease agreement that transitioned to a month-to-month basis after its initial term. In 2022, they signed a new three-year lease. Frank later transferred his interest in the property to the Frank J. Kahl Revocable Trust, with his son David Kahl managing the property as trustee after Frank's death. In January 2023, David Kahl filed an eviction action against Polkow, seeking possession of the property, damages for delinquent rent, and attorney fees.The Yellowstone County Justice Court awarded Kahl possession of the property and attorney fees but denied the request for delinquent rent. Kahl then sought additional damages for property damage, which led to a hearing where he claimed $128,644.07 in damages. The Justice Court awarded Kahl $58,753.73 in damages, plus interest and attorney fees, despite Polkow's objection that the amount exceeded the court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Polkow appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision, interpreting that the court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court for landlord-tenant disputes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to award damages exceeding the $15,000 limit imposed by § 3-10-301, MCA. The court clarified that the concurrent jurisdiction statutes did not override this limit. The case was remanded for the Justice Court to vacate the damages award and dismiss the claim for compensatory damages without prejudice, allowing Kahl to refile in District Court. The award of attorney fees and costs was affirmed. View "Kahl v. Polkow" on Justia Law

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Vernon K. Stensvad, the plaintiff, owns a small cattle herd and entered into a Grazing Lease Contract with Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. in July 2022. The contract stipulated that Stensvad would graze his cattle on Ayers Ranch's property for a fee, with higher winter rates to be determined. Stensvad paid the fees for July and August but later agreed orally to perform labor in exchange for reduced fees. Disputes arose over the quality of Stensvad's work and the amount owed. In October 2023, Ayers Ranch issued an agister’s lien for $78,662.50, seizing Stensvad’s herd. Stensvad sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of his cattle under the lien.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Prairie County granted Stensvad’s application for a preliminary injunction, ordering the cattle to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to consider all four factors required for a preliminary injunction under Montana law and that a preliminary injunction was not an appropriate remedy for challenging an agister’s lien.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by not addressing all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard. The Supreme Court clarified that under the revised standard, a party must satisfy all four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court adopted the "serious questions" test from the Ninth Circuit, allowing for flexibility in evaluating these factors. The case was remanded for the District Court to make supplemental findings consistent with this standard. The Supreme Court also held that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien and that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law. View "Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch" on Justia Law

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Dr. Stephen D. Behlmer sought declaratory relief to establish his right to access his property in the Scratchgravel Hills via a road that crosses various parcels owned by multiple property owners within the Treasure Canyon Estates subdivision. Behlmer's property is surrounded by land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and is accessible by traveling through Treasure Canyon Drive, which runs through the Landowners' properties. Behlmer has a lease from the United States to access his property via BLM land, effective until 2037.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissed Behlmer's petition for failure to join the United States as a required party, as the Landowners argued that the petition would prejudice federal interests. Behlmer amended his petition to clarify that he only sought a declaration of his rights relative to the portion of Treasure Canyon Drive traversing the Landowners' private property, not any BLM land. Despite this, the District Court granted the Landowners' motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the United States was not a required party under Rule 19 because its absence would not frustrate complete relief to the parties nor prejudice the United States' interests. The court determined that Behlmer's petition pertained only to the Landowners' interests and did not affect any adjacent property holders, including the United States. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Behlmer's petition for failure to join a required party. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Behlmer v. Crum" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, William and Ellen Solem, own property in Flathead County’s “Neighborhood 800.” In 2008, the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) conducted a mass appraisal of lakefront properties in this neighborhood, significantly increasing the valuation of the Solems' property from $229,500 in 2002 to $1,233,050 in 2008. The Solems challenged the appraisal, arguing that DOR’s methodology was improper and unlawful. They sought approximately $450 in alleged overpaid taxes and filed a class action on behalf of other property owners in the neighborhood.The Eleventh Judicial District Court certified the case as a class action and held a bench trial on liability issues. The court found in favor of the Solems, ruling that DOR’s appraisal methodology was unlawful and unconstitutional. The court criticized DOR for excluding 17 outlier sales from its model and for using only three variables in its appraisal process. The court awarded damages, costs, and fees to the plaintiffs. The Solems also cross-appealed the court’s denial of their motion to amend the class definition.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of DOR. The Supreme Court found that DOR’s mass appraisal methodology was consistent with accepted practices and that the Solems failed to meet the substantial burden of disproving the accuracy of DOR’s appraisal. The court also noted that the District Court improperly relied on the R squared value as the sole metric for accuracy. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s ruling and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not address the constitutionality of the payment-under-protest requirement, as it was unnecessary given the resolution of the primary issue. View "Solem v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The City of Shelby operates a municipal water system in Toole County, Montana, supplying water to several service areas. In 2017, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) approved changes allowing Shelby to temporarily service these areas. In 2019, Shelby applied to expand its service area and increase groundwater production. DNRC issued preliminary approvals for these applications in 2020, which the Town of Kevin objected to, leading to a hearing examiner's review.The hearing examiner denied Kevin's motion for summary judgment and later approved Shelby's applications, concluding that Shelby met the statutory criteria based on service agreements with communities in its service area. Kevin then petitioned the Montana Water Court for judicial review, arguing that DNRC misinterpreted the law and that Shelby's applications did not meet statutory requirements. The Water Court denied Kevin's petition, affirming DNRC's decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, focusing on whether DNRC erred in approving Shelby's permit and change of use applications. The court found that DNRC's interpretation of the law, which allowed service agreements to satisfy the statutory requirement for written consent, was reasonable. However, the court noted that the record lacked evidence of a service agreement with Galata, one of the proposed new service areas. Consequently, the court affirmed DNRC's decision in part but reversed it regarding the inclusion of Galata.The court remanded the case to DNRC to determine whether all required service agreements exist and to issue an order consistent with this opinion. The main holding was that DNRC's interpretation of the statutory criteria was correct, except for the missing service agreement with Galata. View "Town of Kevin v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

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A group of residents in the Whitehorse Estates Minor Subdivision filed a complaint against their neighbors, Joseph and Amanda Kleinhans, alleging that the Kleinhans violated the subdivision’s restrictive covenants by converting their garage into an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) and renting it out as an Airbnb. The covenants in question required properties to be used only for single-family dwellings and prohibited the operation of commercial businesses.The District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, Carbon County, granted summary judgment in favor of the Kleinhans. The court interpreted the single-family dwelling covenant as a structural restriction, not a use restriction, meaning it only limited the type and number of buildings but did not restrict the use of the property to single families. The court also found the commercial business covenant to be ambiguous and concluded it did not prohibit short-term rentals like Airbnb. Consequently, the court awarded the Kleinhans their Bill of Costs amounting to $4,594.35.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the term "commercial business" was not ambiguous and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes activities conducted for profit. Therefore, the Kleinhans' operation of an Airbnb constituted a commercial business, violating the subdivision’s covenants. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of the Bill of Costs to the Kleinhans and remanded the case to the District Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the neighbors. View "Myers v. Kleinhans" on Justia Law

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This case involves a property dispute in Lincoln County, Montana. Tiffany House sought to sell a property initially conveyed to her former husband, Conrad Coggeshall, by an LLC owned by David E. Orr. After their divorce, House was granted permission by the Superior Court of Arizona to transfer the property into her name. However, Coggeshall, while incarcerated, executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the property to Orr, who recorded it in Lincoln County. House then filed a quiet title action, alleging the transfer was fraudulent.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court reviewed the case. House served Orr with discovery requests, including admissions that Orr failed to respond to. Consequently, House filed a motion for summary judgment, which Orr did not contest. The District Court granted House’s motion, quieting title in her name and ordering Orr to execute a quitclaim deed. Orr filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay execution, which the District Court denied. Orr’s first appeal was dismissed, and he filed a second notice of appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. Orr argued that the requests for admission were improperly served, that he did deny them, and that the summary judgment violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court noted that these arguments were not raised in the lower court and thus were not preserved for appeal. The court emphasized the importance of procedural rules and fair notice of legal issues. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of House. View "House v Orr" on Justia Law

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The case involves Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC (MAID), which challenged two laws passed by the 2023 Montana Legislature aimed at addressing affordable housing. Senate Bill 323 (SB 323) mandates that duplex housing be allowed in cities with at least 5,000 residents where single-family residences are permitted. Senate Bill 528 (SB 528) requires municipalities to allow at least one accessory dwelling unit on lots with single-family dwellings. MAID, consisting of homeowners from various cities, argued that these laws would negatively impact their property values and quality of life, and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County granted MAID a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the implementation of the laws. The court found that MAID had standing and had demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, success on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court cited concerns about potential impacts on property values and neighborhood character, as well as constitutional issues related to public participation and equal protection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that MAID did not meet the burden of demonstrating all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held that MAID's evidence of potential harm was speculative and did not show a likelihood of irreparable injury. The court also noted that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor the injunction, given the legislative intent to address the housing crisis. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v. State" on Justia Law