Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Flathead Properties, L.L.C. (Appellant) owned a tract of land along Flathead Lake that became an island during certain months due to rising water levels. In 2011, Appellant received a permit from the Flathead County Planning and Zoning Office to build a bridge connecting the island to the peninsula. The Community Association for North Shore Conservation (C.A.N.S.C.) challenged the permit, arguing it violated the Montana Lakeshore Protection Act. The District Court voided the permit and ordered the bridge's removal, a decision upheld by the Montana Supreme Court.Following the Supreme Court's decision, Appellant filed a claim for inverse condemnation against Flathead County, arguing that the court-ordered removal of the bridge constituted a taking of its vested property interest, requiring compensation. The County filed a motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that since the permit was void ab initio, Appellant never had a vested property interest. The District Court granted the motion, agreeing with the County's reasoning.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Court held that Appellant's complaint contained sufficient facts to support a claim for inverse condemnation or, alternatively, a regulatory takings claim. The Court noted that Appellant had a constitutionally protected property interest in the bridge once it was built and that the County's actions in issuing and then voiding the permit could be seen as a taking requiring just compensation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Flathead Properties L.L.C. v. Flathead Cty" on Justia Law

Appellees Gordon Tait and Michelle Janz plan to build a residence at the base of their property adjacent to Whitefish Lake. The proposed access to their home is a narrow dirt road that crosses both Appellees’ and Appellants’ lots, part of an express easement allowing all lot owners to use the road. Appellants challenged this use, arguing the easement was intended only for summer access to the lake, not for regular travel to a residence, and that their properties would be unduly burdened by the construction.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, ruled in favor of Appellees, determining the easement’s language was specific and did not prohibit year-round use of the road. The court granted summary judgment to Appellees, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court examined the easement’s language and found it unambiguous regarding year-round use. The easement explicitly permitted motor vehicle traffic across a ten-foot right of way without seasonal limitations. The court noted that while the easement limited shared maintenance costs to summer use, it did not restrict the road’s use to summer months only. The court also found no basis to prohibit the use of the road for constructing a residence, as the easement did not limit the type of access provided.The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the easement allowed year-round use and did not restrict the road’s use to accessing only non-residential structures. Concerns about potential overburdening of the easement due to construction were deemed speculative and not ripe for adjudication. View "Archer v. Tait" on Justia Law

Donald Fleming filed a lawsuit against Caribou Creek Log Homes, Inc. and North Idaho Insulation, LLC, alleging that spray foam insulation installed by North Idaho Insulation caused significant structural damage to his residence in Montana. Fleming's claims included negligence, violations of residential construction defect statutes, the Montana Consumer Protection Act, and breach of warranties. North Idaho Insulation then filed a third-party complaint against Southwest Distributing Co. (Southwest), alleging that Southwest manufactured and sold the defective spray foam insulation and seeking indemnification and contribution.The Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court denied Southwest's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1). Southwest then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control, arguing that the District Court erred in its jurisdictional ruling.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the District Court erred in concluding it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest. The Supreme Court found that Southwest did not transact business in Montana related to the claims and that the claims did not arise from Southwest's activities in Montana. Additionally, the Court held that the stream-of-commerce theory did not apply, as Southwest did not purposefully direct its activities toward Montana. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of supervisory control, reversed the District Court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Southwest v. 19th Judicial Dist." on Justia Law

Craig Baugh acquired a 20-acre tract of land in 1983 and another adjoining 20-acre tract in 1993, both located in a remote, forested area in Flathead County, Montana. In 2006, Baugh consolidated and subdivided the 40-acre aggregate into two new 20-acre tracts (Tract 1 and Tract 2) by certificate of survey (COS), which included a 20-foot wide access and utility easement on an existing road. Baugh sold Tract 2 to Florian Skyland in 2019, who later sold it to H2S2, LLC. H2S2 planned to develop a 32-unit short-term "glamping" business on Tract 2, which Baugh opposed, leading to a lawsuit.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, initially denied Baugh's request for a preliminary injunction but later granted summary judgment in his favor. The court concluded that H2S2's planned commercial use of the easement would exceed the intended scope of the easement, which was meant for single-family residential use. The court permanently enjoined H2S2's planned use and awarded Baugh prevailing party attorney fees, deeming H2S2's counterclaims for damages as frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's summary judgment that H2S2's proposed commercial use exceeded the authorized scope of the express easement. The court held that the easement's intended use was limited to single-family residential purposes, and H2S2's planned commercial use would significantly exceed this scope. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's award of attorney fees to Baugh, concluding that the central issue was a bona fide dispute on the merits of the permissible use and scope of the easement, and thus, H2S2's counterclaims were not frivolous. The case was remanded for entry of a corresponding final judgment. View "Baugh v. H2S2, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Parrot Ditch Company (PDC) and its four water rights in the Jefferson River. PDC delivers water to its shareholders through the Parrot Ditch, which runs parallel to the Jefferson River in Basin 41G. The ditch was constructed in 1895, and PDC was organized in 1916 to manage and distribute water through the ditch. PDC issued shares that correspond to water entitlements, and the company stopped issuing shares in 1981. Two of the water rights were litigated in 1926 in the Carney case, which established shareholders' interests in PDC and referenced priority dates and volumes for two water rights.The Montana Water Court issued a Temporary Preliminary Decree in 1989, which included abstracts for PDC's four water rights. PDC objected to the place of use for one of the rights in 1990 and later requested amendments to the flow rate and irrigated acreage. The Water Court adopted various recommendations over the years, ultimately increasing the place of use to 6,710.78 acres. In 2018, the Water Court issued a Preliminary Decree, and PDC objected, seeking a larger service area and other corrections. Objectors (AMD) also raised objections to various elements of PDC's water rights.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Water Court's decisions. The Court held that PDC failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a larger service area beyond 6,710.78 acres. The Court also found that the Carney decision did not adjudicate water rights and that AMD provided sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie status of PDC's claims regarding the Townsend and Methodist rights. Finally, the Court upheld the Water Court's modification of the Nolte flow rate to 100 cfs, based on the lack of notice to affected water users when PDC requested the amendment in 1997. View "Parrot Ditch v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robert Spoklie purchased land neighboring the property of the Paul Phillip Bardos and Mary L. Bardos Revocable Trust (Bardos) near Kalispell, Montana. Spoklie divided his land into smaller parcels for residential development and entered into an Easement Agreement with Bardos, granting mutual easements for access. Spoklie's easement allowed him to use a 60-foot-wide path through Bardos's property for ingress, egress, and utility installation. Spoklie used this easement to transport construction equipment, sometimes parking it temporarily within the easement boundaries, which Bardos contested.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denied Bardos's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of Spoklie. The court found that Spoklie's activities, including temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment within the easement, were within the scope of the easement agreement. Bardos appealed, arguing that material facts were in dispute and that Spoklie's actions constituted trespass and nuisance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the easement's language allowed for temporary parking and unloading of construction equipment as reasonably necessary for ingress and egress. The court also found that Spoklie's actions did not constitute trespass or nuisance since they were within the scope of the easement. Additionally, the court noted that the issue of Spoklie's proposed mailbox structure was not ripe for adjudication as no substantial steps had been taken toward its construction. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the District Court correctly applied the law. View "Bardos Revocable Trust v. Spoklie" on Justia Law

David Polkow rented a residential home from Frank Kahl under a written lease agreement that transitioned to a month-to-month basis after its initial term. In 2022, they signed a new three-year lease. Frank later transferred his interest in the property to the Frank J. Kahl Revocable Trust, with his son David Kahl managing the property as trustee after Frank's death. In January 2023, David Kahl filed an eviction action against Polkow, seeking possession of the property, damages for delinquent rent, and attorney fees.The Yellowstone County Justice Court awarded Kahl possession of the property and attorney fees but denied the request for delinquent rent. Kahl then sought additional damages for property damage, which led to a hearing where he claimed $128,644.07 in damages. The Justice Court awarded Kahl $58,753.73 in damages, plus interest and attorney fees, despite Polkow's objection that the amount exceeded the court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Polkow appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision, interpreting that the court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court for landlord-tenant disputes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to award damages exceeding the $15,000 limit imposed by § 3-10-301, MCA. The court clarified that the concurrent jurisdiction statutes did not override this limit. The case was remanded for the Justice Court to vacate the damages award and dismiss the claim for compensatory damages without prejudice, allowing Kahl to refile in District Court. The award of attorney fees and costs was affirmed. View "Kahl v. Polkow" on Justia Law

Vernon K. Stensvad, the plaintiff, owns a small cattle herd and entered into a Grazing Lease Contract with Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. in July 2022. The contract stipulated that Stensvad would graze his cattle on Ayers Ranch's property for a fee, with higher winter rates to be determined. Stensvad paid the fees for July and August but later agreed orally to perform labor in exchange for reduced fees. Disputes arose over the quality of Stensvad's work and the amount owed. In October 2023, Ayers Ranch issued an agister’s lien for $78,662.50, seizing Stensvad’s herd. Stensvad sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of his cattle under the lien.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Prairie County granted Stensvad’s application for a preliminary injunction, ordering the cattle to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to consider all four factors required for a preliminary injunction under Montana law and that a preliminary injunction was not an appropriate remedy for challenging an agister’s lien.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by not addressing all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard. The Supreme Court clarified that under the revised standard, a party must satisfy all four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court adopted the "serious questions" test from the Ninth Circuit, allowing for flexibility in evaluating these factors. The case was remanded for the District Court to make supplemental findings consistent with this standard. The Supreme Court also held that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien and that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law. View "Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch" on Justia Law

Dr. Stephen D. Behlmer sought declaratory relief to establish his right to access his property in the Scratchgravel Hills via a road that crosses various parcels owned by multiple property owners within the Treasure Canyon Estates subdivision. Behlmer's property is surrounded by land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and is accessible by traveling through Treasure Canyon Drive, which runs through the Landowners' properties. Behlmer has a lease from the United States to access his property via BLM land, effective until 2037.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissed Behlmer's petition for failure to join the United States as a required party, as the Landowners argued that the petition would prejudice federal interests. Behlmer amended his petition to clarify that he only sought a declaration of his rights relative to the portion of Treasure Canyon Drive traversing the Landowners' private property, not any BLM land. Despite this, the District Court granted the Landowners' motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the United States was not a required party under Rule 19 because its absence would not frustrate complete relief to the parties nor prejudice the United States' interests. The court determined that Behlmer's petition pertained only to the Landowners' interests and did not affect any adjacent property holders, including the United States. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Behlmer's petition for failure to join a required party. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Behlmer v. Crum" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, William and Ellen Solem, own property in Flathead County’s “Neighborhood 800.” In 2008, the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) conducted a mass appraisal of lakefront properties in this neighborhood, significantly increasing the valuation of the Solems' property from $229,500 in 2002 to $1,233,050 in 2008. The Solems challenged the appraisal, arguing that DOR’s methodology was improper and unlawful. They sought approximately $450 in alleged overpaid taxes and filed a class action on behalf of other property owners in the neighborhood.The Eleventh Judicial District Court certified the case as a class action and held a bench trial on liability issues. The court found in favor of the Solems, ruling that DOR’s appraisal methodology was unlawful and unconstitutional. The court criticized DOR for excluding 17 outlier sales from its model and for using only three variables in its appraisal process. The court awarded damages, costs, and fees to the plaintiffs. The Solems also cross-appealed the court’s denial of their motion to amend the class definition.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of DOR. The Supreme Court found that DOR’s mass appraisal methodology was consistent with accepted practices and that the Solems failed to meet the substantial burden of disproving the accuracy of DOR’s appraisal. The court also noted that the District Court improperly relied on the R squared value as the sole metric for accuracy. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s ruling and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not address the constitutionality of the payment-under-protest requirement, as it was unnecessary given the resolution of the primary issue. View "Solem v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law