Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case involving six water right claims on Big Warm Creek the Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court's final order, holding that the Water Court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Water Court (1) did not err by finding no ambiguity in the language of the deeds conveying portions of the Phillips Ranch, and the appurtenant water rights, from David Drum to Lloyd Knudsen, Wayne Norman, and Springdale Colony, Inc.; (2) did not err by declining to resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent; (3) did not err by apportioning the water pro-rata based on the parties’ historical use; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by denying Little Big Warm Ranch’s post-judgment motion for relief from the court’s final order. View "Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Elk Grove Development Company (Elk Grove) and the Elk Grove Homeowners Association (HOA) and entry of an injunction enjoining the Four Corners County Water and Sewer District from using the Elk Grove Subdivision's water "sourced from any of the wells located within the Subdivision and from the Water Right for use upon property outside the Subdivision, holding that the district court erred in determining that the Subdivision Covenant was a reasonable restraint upon the alienation of a water right.On appeal, the Water District argued that the Covenant was an unreasonable restraint on alienation because it usurped the State's jurisdiction over its water and violated the state water law requirement that waters be put to beneficial use. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred to the extent that it held the Covenant was a reasonable restraint on the alienation of the Subdivision's water and Water Right and so enjoined the Water District. View "Elk Grove Development Co. v. Four Corners County Water & Sewer District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds the summary judgment granted by the district court ruling that the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment precluded the claim brought by Mountain Water Company for a general property tax refund on taxes that accrued during the pendency of a condemnation action initiated by the City of Missoula, holding that Mountain Water contractually waived its right to property tax proration and reimbursement from or against the City under Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-315.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that the doctrine of unjust enrichment precluded relief on Mountain Water's claim for property tax proration and relief under Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-315; (2) the district court erred in concluding that, but for application of equitable unjust enrichment, section 70-30-315 would entitle Mountain Water to a general property tax refund under Mont. Code Ann. 15-1-402(1)-(2), (6)(b)(i) and -406(1)-(3); (3) Mountain Water contractually waived its right to property tax proportion and reimbursement from the City under section 70-30-315; and (4) the district court correctly concluded that Mountain Water's subsequent assertion of a general property tax refund claim did not breach the parties' 2017 condemnation action settlement agreement. View "Mountain Water v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Missoula County and declaring that the right-of-way next to Plaintiff's property extends from Rio Vista Drive to the Bitterroot River, as depicted in the subdivision plat, and provides legal access for the public to the river from Rio Vista Drive, holding that the district court did not err.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in determining that the public right-of-way from Rio Vista Drive extends to the banks of the Bitterroot River. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined, when taken together, the subdivision plat donating a right-of-way from Rio Vista Drive to the banks of the river and the Missoula County Board of Commissioners' acceptance of that right-of-way constitute an instrument of conveyance or deed of a right-of-way to Missoula County to hold the conveyance in trust for the public. View "Callsen v. Missoula County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding the declaratory ruling of the Flathead Conservation District asserting jurisdiction over David and Jacqueline Stalowy's dredging project, holding that the district court did not err.The Stalowys applied for permits with the District to conduct dredging activities on their Flathead County property. For the District to have jurisdiction under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 (Act), Title 75, chapter 7, Mont. Code Ann., the proposed dredging work must result in a "change in the state" of a "natural, perennial-flowing stream." At issue was whether North Bear Creek and other waterbodies on the Stalowys' property met the definition of a “stream." The District issued a declaratory ruling asserting jurisdiction over the Stalowys' property and projects. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District had jurisdiction over the project. View "Stalowy v. Flathead Conservation District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court voiding a permit issued by the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) allowing the Montana Artesian Water Company (MAWC) to appropriate water, holding that while the DNRC issued its preliminary determination granting MAWC the water use permit based on incomplete data, because the statutory deadline had passed, the application was deemed correct and complete as a matter of law, and DNRC could not require the missing information.DNRC failed to identify defects in the application before the statutory deadline. The district court concluded that DNRC failed to comply with its own rules to determine whether the application was correct and complete and voided the permit without addressing other issues raised on judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) with or without the missing information, MAWC's application became correct and complete as a matter of law after the statutory deadline had passed; and (2) Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-302(5) forecloses an argument regarding compliance with application requirements the agency imposed by rule. View "Flathead Lakers v. Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and answered that, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute "minerals" for the purpose of a mineral reservation.Mary Ann and Lige Murray owned the surface estate of sizable property in Garfield County. The mineral estate was held by BEJ Minerals, LLC and RTWF LLC (collectively, BEJ). The Murrays found and excavated several valuable dinosaur fossils on their property. When BEJ claimed an ownership interest in the fossils the Murrays sought a declaratory judgment affirming that the fossils were owned solely by the Murrays. BEJ filed a counterclaim requesting a declaratory judgment that, under Montana law, the fossils were "minerals" and thus part of the mineral estate. The federal district court granted summary judgment to the Murrays. On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed. The Murrays then filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The Ninth Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court for resolution under Montana law. The Supreme Court "decline[d] to stretch the term 'mineral' so far outside its ordinary meaning as to include dinosaur fossils," concluding that, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute "minerals" for the purpose of a mineral reservation. View "Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting Defendant's motion to stay proceedings without holding a hearing on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the district court abused its discretion by staying proceedings and denying Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction without a hearing.Plaintiff filed suit against Title Insurer seeking damages for breach of contract and bad faith. In a separate suit, Plaintiff sued Defendant seeking a declaration that Moss Agate Road was either a county road, public highway, or that the public enjoys a prescriptive easement across Moss Agate. Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Defendant from interfering with Plaintiff's access to its property over Moss Agate. Defendant then filed a motion to stay proceedings. Without holding a hearing, the district court stayed proceedings in Plaintiff's case against Defendant pending the resolution of Plaintiff's case against Title Insurer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the bad faith case did not cover all the issues in the instant matter, the district court manifestly abused its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction without holding a hearing. View "Flying T Ranch, LLC v. Catlin Ranch, LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the findings of the Water Court in adjudicating two of Twin Creeks's water rights claims, holding that the Water court did not err in finding that Twin Creeks abandoned one claim by nonuse but misapprehended the effect of testimony regarding the second claim's historical use.Five Twin Creeks claims were at issue before the Water Court. After a hearing, the Water Court issued a closing order ordering changes to four of the claims and removing the issue remarks. At issue on appeal were the statements of claim 40B109102-00 (the 102 claim) and 40B109104-00 (the 104 claim). The Supreme Court held (1) the Water Court did not err in finding that the 102 claim was abandoned by nonuse because the intent to abandon occurred concurrently with the nonuse; and (2) the Water Court erred finding that Petrolia Irrigation District did not overcome the presumption that the 104 claim was correct as filed. View "Twin Creeks Farm & Ranch v. Petrolia Irrigation District" on Justia Law

In this action brought against BNSF Railway Company due to its alleged involvement with the asbestos contamination in Libby, Montana the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Montana Asbestos Claims Court granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the issues of preemption, strict liability, and non-party affirmative defenses, holding that BNSF was protected from strict liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts, 521, for some of its actions.After it was discovered that asbestos contaminated materials were shipped through the BNSF railyard and spilled into the soil in Libby for decades Plaintiffs sued BNSF. The Asbestos Court concluded that BNSF was strictly liable because its actions were abnormally dangerous and BNSF could not present evidence of non-party conduct to negate causation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court properly found that Plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by federal law; (2) while BNSF was subject to strict liability, it was protected from strict liability for its actions determined to be taken pursuant to its statutory public duty, and for those actions, it is subject only to claims for ordinary negligence; and (3) the court did not err in finding that BNSF could not use evidence of non-party conduct to refute causation. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Asbestos Claims Court" on Justia Law