Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

623 Partners, LLC obtained a judgment against R. Larry Hunter and Larry Hunter Development Co. (collectively Larry). In its effort to satisfy the judgment, 623 Partners alleged that properly originally owned by Hunter Development was fraudulently transferred to Larry Todd Hunter, Larry’s son. The district court concluded that the properly was fraudulently transferred in order to avoid subjecting the property to 623 Partners’ writ of attachment and that Todd was liable to 623 Partners for the proceeds he received from the sale of a parcel of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed. On remand, Todd argued that he was entitled to an offset from the judgment amount based on the value of the improvements that he made to the property and that the property was exempt from execution or forced sale because he had claimed it as his homestead. The district court rejected Todd’s assertions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Todd was not entitled to an offset and correctly concluded that Todd did not qualify for a homestead exemption. View "623 Partners, LLC v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Two zoning actions were at issue in this proceeding - the “Text Amendment” and the “Map Amendment.” Citizens for a Better Flathead and Sharon DeMeester (collectively, Citizens) initiated this action challenging the Board of County Commissioners of Flathead County’s adoption of both the Text Amendment and the Map Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Citizens. The Commissioners appealed. Uncertain over the scope of relief granted by the district court’s order, Citizens cross-appealed from any partial denial of the relief it sought. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err by holding that the Map Amendment was invalid for failing to comply with statutory requirements; (2) the Text Amendment was not invalid for failure to comply with public participation requirements; and (3) the district court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to Citizens. View "Citizens For A Better Flathead v. Flathead County Commissioners" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was the existence and use of an easement along Turk Road, a private road that ran through multiple properties. All parties in this case owned property accessed via Turk Road, which passed through portions of Defendants’ properties. This appeal concerned the right of Marc and Gloria Flora (Plaintiffs) to use Turk Road over two properties owned by four defendants (Defendants). Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that they had legal access along Turk Road as it passed through Defendants’ properties pursuant to an express easement. The Floras then moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from interfering with the Floras’ access along Turk Road. The district court granted the Floras a preliminary injunction because the Floras laid out a prima facie case for a prescriptive easement. The court then limited the easement to light-duty passenger vehicles. The Floras appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) granting the Floras’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the basis of a prescriptive easement theory rather than on an express public easement theory; and (2) limiting the Floras’ prescriptive easement to the use of passenger vehicles. View "Flora v. Clearman" on Justia Law

This case arose from Appellant’s objection to three water right claims owned by Granite County. Appellant objected to the County’s water right claims in proceedings before the Water Court, arguing that the 1906 decree in the case of Montana Water, Electric and Mining Co. v. Schuh required the County to release storage water to benefit downstream users. The Water Court rejected Appellant’s argument and granted summary judgment to Granite County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Water Court did not err in its interpretation of the Schuh decree; and (2) the Water Court properly considered and applied the principles of claim preclusion relied upon by Appellant to limit Granite County’s arguments concerning application of the Schuh decree. View "Granite County Commissioners v. McDonald" on Justia Law

This in rem forfeiture proceeding brought under Mont. Code Ann. 44-12-201 (2013), et seq. arose from Mike Chilinski’s alleged use of real property to manufacture dangerous drugs. The proceeding was unconnected to a state drug prosecution. The statute mandated that the proceeding be heard only before a judge, precluding the use of a jury. At the forfeiture proceeding, Chilinski argued that the forfeiture statute violated his right to a jury trial. The district court conducted the hearing without a jury, reasoning that the proceeding was an equitable action and thus outside the scope of the right to a jury trial. The district court then forfeited Chilinski’s property to the State. Chilinski appealed the district court’s denial of his right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mont. Code Ann. 44-12-203(3) (2013) violates Mont. Const. art II, 26 by depriving individuals of the right to a trial by jury; and (2) therefore, the district court erred when it denied Chilinski the right to a jury trial in these civil in rem forfeiture proceedings. View "State v. Items of Property" on Justia Law

Appellants owned property adjacent to Whitefish Lake, which the City of Whitefish has annexed. In 2005, Appellants petitioned the City for annexation of the property, and their petition was granted. In 2010, Appellants petitioned to have their property de-annexed. The City Council denied the petition. Appellants commenced a declaratory action in the district court challenging the decision. The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of lack of service and on the ground that the statute of limitations for Appellants’ claims would bar any re-filed action. In 2014, Appellants filed another petition for de-annexation of their property. The City Council denied Appellants’ second petition for de-annexation, and Appellants filed a second declaratory action challenging the denial of their second petition. The district court entered summary judgment for the City, concluding that Appellants’ action was barred by claim preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment on the basis of claim preclusion. View "Schweitzer v. City of Whitefish" on Justia Law

The Water Use Act permits certain groundwater appropriations to be exempt from the permitting process. An exception to one exemption is when a “combined appropriation” from the same source by two or more wells or springs exceeds a certain amount per year. At issue in this case was the definition of the term “combined appropriation.” After an adverse ruling from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) hearing examiner, a group of senior water users (the Coalition) challenged the validity of Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), which states that the term “combined appropriation” means “groundwater developments that are physically manifold into the same system.” The district court invalidated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), reinstated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(7), which provided that “[g]roundwater developments need not be physically connected nor have a common distribution system to be considered a ‘combined appropriation’” and directed the DNRC to formulate a new administrative rule consistent with the court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, with the exception of the requirement that the DNRC initiate rulemaking, holding (1) the district court did not err by invalidating the newer administrative rule and reinstating the older rule; and (2) it was the DNRC’s decision whether to initiate rulemaking to change the reinstated rule. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Well Drillers Ass’n" on Justia Law

Chris Wagner sued MSE Technology Applications, Inc. and related MSE entities (collectively, the MSE entities) and Butte Local Development Corporation (BLDC), alleging that they had improperly interfered with his attempt to purchase certain property to establish a commercial nursery. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to add Shea Relators as a defendant. The district court dismissed Wagner’s claims at trial pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 50. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law to the MSE entities and BLDC; but (2) erred in granting Shea Realtors summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Wagner v. MSE Technology Applications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Macks and the Andersons owned adjacent properties. When the Macks discovered that a dam existed on the Mack Ditch, which crossed the Andersons’ property to the Mack property, that diverted water to a pond on the Anderson’s property, the Macks filed a complaint against the Andersons alleging violations of Mont. Code Ann. 70-17-112 and seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. The district judge issued a TRO restraining the Andersons from interfering with the Macks’ access to the ditch. The parties entered into a stipulation that the TRO should remain in effect until further court order. The district court later found that the Macks were entitled to the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court made proper findings and clearly reserved final adjudication on the merits in the order and did not abuse its discretion in the preliminary injunction determination. View "Mack v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The City of Missoula filed a complaint to condemn, pursuant to Montana’s law of eminent domain, the water system that provided potable water to the residents of the City. The water system was owned and operated by Mountain Water Company. After a bench trial, the district court issued a preliminary order of condemnation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that its contemplated use of the water system as a municipally owned water system was “more necessary that the current use as a privately owned for-profit enterprise,” as required by Montana’s eminent domain statutes. View "City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co." on Justia Law