Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute in this case centered on the ownership of subsurface mineral rights to coal-rich land located in Musselshell County. Plaintiffs filed this action against Musselshell County to quiet title to the property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County and awarded costs but not attorney fees. Plaintiffs appealed, and the County cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the pertinent statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ quiet title action; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the County its attorney fees. View "Bergum v. Musselshell County" on Justia Law

The Wayne S. Hansen Trust acquired tax deeds to three tracts of real property located in Powell County, which were previously owned by Douglas Johnson. The Trust filed three quiet title actions for the respective properties. John responded by filing his own quiet title actions on the properties, alleging that both the County and the Trust had failed to comply with several statutes. The district court granted summary judgment to Johnson and declared the tax deeds void. The Trust filed a request for relief from the judgment and a motion to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial. The district court partially granted the Trusts’ motions, concluding that the judgment failed to address the issues of taxes accrued or paid by either party during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court then issued an order addressing the calculation of the final redemption amount, ruling that no additional redemption amount was due or owing to the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the host of errors in the statutory procedure in this case required voiding of the deeds; and (2) the district court did not err in determining the final redemption amount due to the Trust as purchaser of the tax deed. View "Johnson v. Wayne S. Hansen Trust" on Justia Law

Fellows filed the underlying complaint challenging the Water Commissioner’s administration of water under the Perry v. Beattie decree. The district court dismissed Fellows’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that Fellows’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim. Fellows then requested the district court to certify a question to the Water Court. The district court granted the request. The Water Court entered a final order that tabulated the water rights necessary to address Fellows’s underlying complaint. By the time of its certification order, the water claims had been adjudicated in a temporary preliminary decree, and therefore, the Water Court ordered that the matter be closed and returned to the district court. The Perry Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the Water Court’s judgment. The Water Court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Water Court correctly followed the law of the case; (2) Fellows’s petition for certification was proper; and (3) the Water Court did not err in defining the scope of the controversy, in determining the purpose of the tabulation, and in tabulating the applicable rights involved in the controversy. Remanded. View "Fellows v. Saylor" on Justia Law

In 2001, Kurt Heigis executed and a notary notarized a quitclaim deed purportedly conveying certain real property to Frances Emmert. Heigis personally delivered the deed to Emmert at her home and told her not to record it until “something happened to him.” In 2014, Heigis was murdered. Emmert recorded the deed one month later. Barbara Sparks, Heigis’ daughter, acting as personal representative of his state, initiated an action against Emmert to quiet title to the property, arguing that the deed was inoperative because it was never delivered. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Emmert, concluding that the deed was legally delivered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an issue of material fact, whether the deed was legally delivered, existed, thus precluding summary judgment in favor of either party. View "Sparks v. Emmert" on Justia Law

JAS, Inc. purchased certain property at a trustee’s sale. JAS later filed a quiet title action, naming several defendants, including Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. (MERS), Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and OneWest Bank, FSB. Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), the successor to Countrywide, later intervened. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BOA, concluding that the trustee’s sale of the property was void ab initio for failure to strictly follow Montana’s foreclosure laws. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly voided the sale on the basis of failure of strict compliance with the Small Tract Financing Act of Montana; and (2) the issue of JAS’s recovery of the funds it paid to OneWest Bank at the trustee’s sale was not properly before the Court. View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

This was the third of three lawsuits arising from the development of condominiums at Lakeside Village on Hauser Lake in Lewis and Clark County. Cherrad, LLC (Cherrad) was the project’s developer and Mountain West Bank (Bank) was its lender. Craig Kinnaman was the general contractor on the project but died in 2007. In this third suit, the estate of Kinnaman (the Estate) brought eight claims against the Bank. The Bank moved for summary judgment on all the Estate’s claims on the grounds that the claims were barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule or the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) in granting the Bank’s motion to change venue; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims; (3) by taking judicial notice of the record in previous actions; and (4) by denying the Estate’s motion for relief from judgment under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). View "Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 1982, Teton Co-Operative Canal Company (Teton Canal) filed a statement of claim for existing water rights for the Eureka Reservoir. Teton Cooperative Reservoir Company (Teton Reservoir) objected to Teton Canal’s claims. The Water Master held a hearing in 2012 and, in 2015, adjudicated Teton Canal’s claims. Teton Reservoir appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Water Court’s order regarding Teton Canal’s water right claims to the Eureka Reservoir, holding that the Water Court erred in determining that off-stream water storage in the Eureka Reservoir was included as part of Teton Canal’s April 18, 1890 Notice of Appropriation. Remanded to the Water Court to assign a new priority date to Teton Canal’s rights to the Eureka Reservoir and for further proceedings. View "Teton Co-op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

When Mary Stewart failed to pay real property taxes on her property, the Flathead County Treasurer held a tax lien sale for the delinquent taxes. The County was listed as the purchaser of the tax lien. In 2013, RN & DB, LLC paid the delinquent taxes, penalties, interests, and costs for the property and applied for a tax deed. The County issued a tax deed to RN & DB, after which RN & DB filed an action to quiet title in the property. The district court granted RN & DB’s motion for summary judgment and entered a decree quieting title in favor of RN & DB. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in not applying the statutory homestead exemption to the tax lien sale on Stewart’s property; (2) Stewart’s claim that the district court should have considered the tax assessor’s failure to investigate Stewart’s complaints regarding irregular tax assessments on Stewart’s property was barred; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment without holding a hearing. View "RN & DB, LLC v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendants acquired real property by borrowing more than $2 million from Whitefish Credit Union (WCU) and signing a promissory note to WCU, secured by mortgages on the property. Defendants later defaulted on that note, owing a principal balance of $1,951,670. WCU filed this action for foreclosure and collection of the debt. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to WCU for $1,100,000. Thereafter, WCU filed a request for entry of a deficiency judgment against Defendants for the amount of $745,365. Defendants opposed the request, arguing that the fair market value of the property exceeded the loan balance. After a hearing, the district court found the property was worth $2,366,667 as of the date of the sheriff’s sale and that no deficiency was owed to WCU. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding in equity to determine the fair value of the property for purposes of entering a deficiency judgment; but (2) evidentiary errors clearly affected the outcome of the proceeding to the prejudice of WCU. Remanded for further proceedings on the evidentiary issues and the applicable standard. View "Whitefish Credit Union v. Prindiville" on Justia Law

Letica Land Company, LLC and Don McGee (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking a preliminary injunction to close Modesty Creek Road, which consisted of an upper branch and a lower branch and crossed Plaintiffs’ respective properties. Plaintiffs claimed that they were unaware of any claim of public right of access over either branch of Modesty Creek Road at the time they purchased their respective properties. The district court concluded that Modesty Creek Road’s lower branch was a statutorily created road, that a public prescriptive easement established Modesty Creek Road’s upper branch as a public road, and that the prescriptive easement had not been extinguished by reverse adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Modesty Creek Road’s lower branch was statutorily created; but (2) erred in concluding that the public prescriptive easement the court found on Modesty Creek Road’s upper branch was not extinguished by reverse adverse possession. View "Letica Land Co., LLC v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County" on Justia Law