Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Scott Bardsley owned a parcel of residential property where he resided with Dora Cichantek (together, Plaintiffs). Earnest Anderson and Lizann Pluger (together, Defendants) resided on the adjacent property. When relations between Scott and Lizann soured, Lizann sought an order of protection against Scott. The district court granted Lizann’s petition for a permanent order of protection against Scott. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Defendants alleging that Plaintiffs’ property enjoyed an express easement over the property on which Defendants resided with regard to “Pluger Way.” The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants and amended its order of protection by prohibiting Dora from using Pluger Way. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s amended order of protection and affirmed the district court in all other respects, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing before expanding the order of protection to include Dora; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint, granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and awarding Defendants attorney’s fees. View "Bardsley v. Pluger" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant purchased 4,900 acres of property in Teton County known as Boadle Ranch. Thereafter, Defendant prohibited public use of the two main roads transecting the ranch. Public Lands/Water Access Association (PLWA), a Montana non-profit membership organization dedicated to promoting access to public-owned lands, successfully sought in the courts to regain access to these roads for public use. Defendant, however, had not yet removed the gates barricading entrance to the property. Here Defendant appealed the district court’s grant of supplementary declaratory relief to PLWA. PLWA cross-appealed the portion of the judgment denying its motion for reasonable attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in awarding money damages as supplemental declaratory relief under Mont. Code Ann. 27-8-313; (2) did not fail to consider ownership of Defendant’s railroad car and its suitability as a bridge in fashioning relief, in accordance with PLWA IV; and (3) erred by not awarding PLWA reasonable attorney fees and costs. View "Public Land/Water Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Meadow Brook owned land that it developed into lots with covenants, conditions, and restrictions. Meadow Brook then decided to develop an undeveloped tract as an independent subdivision. The existing homeowners, however, argued that the covenants granted them exclusive use of three roads that future homeowners would need to use to access the subdivision. A court concluded that the covenants did not reserve an easement over the three roads for use by future lot owners. First American Title Insurance Company and First American Title Company of Montana (collectively, First American), which had issued Meadow Brook a title insurance policy, subsequently denied Meadow Brook’s claim for coverage and refused to further defend against the homeowners’ counterclaims. Meadow Brook settled with the homeowners in the easement litigation and then sued First American for, inter alia, breach of contract and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to Meadow Brook as to the breach of contract claim, concluding First American had insured under the policy that the three roads would be open to public access. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Meadow Brook’s motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. View "Meadow Brook, LLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Greg LeMond had an oral contract to purchase a five-acre lot (Lot 11) at the Yellowstone Mountain Club from the lot's owner, Yellowstone Development. Yellowstone Development allegedly breached its contract with LeMond by combining twenty-three acres of additional property with Lot 11 to create what became the Overlook Lots, comprising a total of twenty-eight acres. LeMond sued, claiming that Yellowstone Development breached its contract to convey Lot 11 and was under an equitable duty to convey the entirety of Overlook Lots to LeMond. In its final determination, the district court quieted title to the Overlook Lots in favor of LeMond. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court did not provide adequate insight into the equitable considerations involved in granting LeMond title to the Overlook Lots, as Yellowstone Development was obligated to transfer Lot 11 to LeMond and was unjustly enriched by failing to do so, but LeMond was entitled to enforce a constructive trust worth only the equitable value of the parties’ bargain. View "LeMond v. Yellowstone Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Abraham and Betty Jean Morrow filed a request for a modification of their home loan, serviced by Bank of America, through the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. Bank of America denied the modification and scheduled a trustee’s sale of the property. The Morrows subsequently filed a complaint against Bank of America based on the bank’s alleged breach of an oral contract for modification of their loan. The district court granted summary judgment to Bank of America, concluding (1) the Morrows’ claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) were barred by the Statute of Frauds; and (2) the Morrows could not succeed on their claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Bank of America owed no duty to the Morrows. The Supreme Court reversed as to the negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of MCPA claims, holding that Bank of America owed a duty to the Morrows, genuine issues of material fact existed as to some claims, and the Statute of Frauds did not preclude the remainder of the Morrows’ claims. View "Morrow v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between property owners in a subdivision developed by Christopher and Jeffrey Houden. In 2007, twenty-three lot owners (“Defendants”) voted to record an amendment (“second amendment”) to the original covenants for the subdivision that prohibited division of the Houdens’ lot. The Houdens filed a complaint against Defendants seeking injunctive relief to declare the second amendment invalid. During the ensuing litigation, the lot owners passed another amendment (“third amendment”) purporting to revoke the second amendment. In 2010, the Houdens and all Defendants except Wayne Todd entered into a settlement agreement which set forth restated covenants expressly prohibiting amendment to prevent subdivision of the Houdens’ lot. The district court subsequently entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Houdens and against Todd, declaring the second and third amendments null and void and ordering that the Houdens were entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the original covenants. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in the Houdens’ favor, as the restated covenants mooted the underlying merits of the case; and (2) affirmed the district court’s determination that the Houdens’ were entitled to attorney’s fees. View "Houden v. Todd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned rural property, including a tract referred to as Section 27, that Defendants, who owned adjacent property, used to cross with their cattle and to conduct other ranching operations. Plaintiff filed an action seeking to exclude Defendants from crossing Section 27 and claiming damages for trespass. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the road across Section 27 was a public road or, alternatively, for a declaration that they had a prescriptive easement to use the road. After a trial, the district court concluded that Defendants established a prescriptive right to cross Section 27 for their ranching and other uses of their adjacent land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Defendants established a prescriptive easement across Plaintiffs’ property and properly determined the scope of the easement based upon the evidence in the record. View "Lyndes v. Green" on Justia Law

In 2010, Lewis and Clark County filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, asking the district court to declare that the entirety of Eagle Ridge Road was a sixty-foot public or county road or a sixty-foot public access easement from its intersection with Birdseye Road. After discussing the Supreme Court’s prior holding concerning Eagle Ridge Road in Schroeder v. Lewis & Clark County (Schroeder I), the district court determined that a portion of Eagle Ridge Road was not a public road and that no public prescriptive right existed over that portion of the road. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court may not revisit its ruling in Schroeder I; and (2) the district court did not misapply the law or misapprehend the evidence of prescriptive use when it determined that public prescriptive right exists over a portion of Eagle Ridge Road. View "Lewis Clark County v. Schroeder" on Justia Law

In 2011, IndyMac Bank foreclosed on a certain property. JAS, Inc. purchased the property and subsequently initiated a quiet title action. Defendants Countrywide Home Loans and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) defaulted. Bank of America (BOA), which had acquired Countrywide in 2008, was not named as a party defendant and did not appear in the proceeding. Final judgment was issued quieting title to the property in JAS’s name. Countrywide and MERS subsequently moved to have the entries of default entered against them set aside, and BOA filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding and sought to have the default entered against Countrywide set aside. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in granting BOA’s motions to intervene and to set aside the default judgment entered against Countywide, as BOA met the express requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and Countrywide had no present interest in the subject property at the time suit was filed; and (2) did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting MERS’s motion to set aside the default judgment entered against it, as MERS established good cause to set aside the default judgment. View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

In 1972, Phyllis and Clarence Hudson granted an easement to Burlington Northern, Inc. Plaintiffs were the successors in interest to the Hudsons, and Defendant was a successor to Burglinton Northern. The easement was a road or driveway that ran from a public road to Plum Creek’s property, crossing Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Plum Creek seeking to extinguish the scope of the easement, alleging, inter alia, extinguishment of the easement due to non-use and limitation on use of the easement. The district court granted summary judgment for Plum Creek. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in granting Plum creek’s motion for summary judgment, as an issue of material fact existed as to whether the easement had terminated; and (2) the district court erred in determining the scope of the easement. Remanded. View "Whary v. Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P." on Justia Law