Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1988, Faith Lutheran Church of Great Falls, Inc., which held certain property in its own name, affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA) denomination. In 2010, seventy-one percent of members voted to terminate Faith Lutheran’s affiliation with ELCA. Thereafter, the majority continued as Faith Lutheran, and approximately half of the minority formed the group that would become New Hope Lutheran Ministry. New Hope subsequently filed an action seeking a declaration that the minority was the rightful owner of all church property, including property held by the Foundation for the Endowment of Faith Lutheran Church, Inc. The district court determined that New Hope was entitled to all Faith Lutheran property and all property held by the Foundation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that New Hope was entitled to property held by Faith Lutheran because the ninety percent super-majority necessary for Faith Lutheran to retain the property under its constitution was not obtained; but (2) erred in holding that New Hope was entitled to the Foundation’s property because New Hope failed to prove that an express trust existed over the Foundation’s property in favor of the church members. View "New Hope Lutheran Ministry v. Faith Lutheran Church of Great Falls, Inc." on Justia Law

Bilt Rite Construction and Landscaping, LLC (Bilt Rite) opened a credit account with Larson Lumber Company (Larson) in 2003. Bilt Rite did not make the required payments, and as of 2006, when Bilt Rite had ceased operations, it owed approximately $14,000. That same year, Bilt Rite transferred real property it had purchased to Anita Bartz, who had loaned Rankin or Bilt Rite $45,000. In 2007, Casey Rankin, a partner in Bilt Rite, signed a contract agreeing to pay Larson Bilt Rite’s debt. In 2009 and 2010, Larson Lumber Company (Larson) filed suit against Bilt Rite, Rankin, and Bartz, among others. The district court entered judgment in favor of Larson, holding (1) Rankin and Bilt Rite breached a written contract with Larson; and (2) the transfer of the real property from Bilt Rite to Bartz was fraudulent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying summary judgment to Defendants; (2) did not err by holding that Rankin and Bilt Rite were jointly and severally liable to Larson; (3) erred by holding that the Bartz loan was made to Rankin personally; and (4) erred by holding that the transfer of the real property to Bartz was a fraudulent transfer. View "Larson Lumber Co. v. Bilt Rite Constr. & Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

To secure a loan, Plaintiff executed a promissory note naming ABN AMRO Mortgage Group (ABN) as the note holder. ABN later merged with CitiMortgage, Inc., which became the holder of Plaintiff’s note. CitiMortgage notified Plaintiff that her balloon payment was due and that she could either make the payment or exercise her “reset option.” Plaintiff did not notify CitiMortgage of her intent to exercise the reset option and did not make the payment. The property was foreclosed. CitiMortgage purchased the property and conveyed it to Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Plaintiff filed a complaint against FNMA and CitiMortgage (Defendants). Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that no evidence of the transfer of the note from ABN to CitiMortgage had been produced during discovery. Defendants subsequently produced a copy of the certificate of merger between ABN and CitiMortgage. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the untimely disclosure was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose sanctions against Defendants for discovery violations; and (2) the clause requiring Plaintiff to give written notice of her intent to exercise the reset option was not an unenforceable contract of adhesion or a violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act. View "Doherty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

Ruby Valley National Bank (RVNB) obtained and recorded a deed of trust (DOT) on certain real property subsequent to a previously recorded DOT. Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Co. (Wells Fargo) claimed to be the beneficiary of the first DOT. RVNB filed for judicial foreclosure of its interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for RVNB, holding that RVNB’s DOT was entitled to priority over the earlier DOT held by Wells Fargo because Wells Fargo had not proven the elements necessary for judicial foreclosure and was unable to do so because its trial witness and exhibit list had been stricken. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Wells Fargo was not required to file a counterclaim for foreclosure to protect its interest in the property; and (2) because the undisputed facts established that Wells Fargo was the current beneficiary of the first DOT, the undisputed facts established that Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that its indenture held priority over RVNB’s indenture. View "Ruby Valley Nat'l Bank v. Wells Fargo Del. Trust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

Then-owners of real property entered into a “Waiver of Right to Protest” the creation of special improvement districts (SIDs) for the purpose of making road and intersection improvements to Cottonwood Road between Huffine Lane and West Babcock Street. The waiver stated that the parties to the waiver would participate in alternate financing methods for completion of the road improvements if the SIDs were not utilized. No SIDs were implemented, and Covenant Investments, Inc. (Covenant) undertook and paid for all improvements to the intersection of Huffine and Cottonwood. First Security Bank (FSB), a successor to the original covenantor, subsequently constructed a building at the intersection. After FSB refused to reimburse Covenant for the costs of the street improvements, Covenant sued FSB seeking enforcement of the waiver agreement. The district court dismissed Covenant’s complaint, concluding that the waiver did not contain the essential elements of a contract and therefore did not bind FSB. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding (1) the waiver’s alternative financing provision was void for lack of certainty, (2) by acting unilaterally Covenant waived its right to belatedly demand enforcement of the waiver provision, and (3) Covenant’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. First Sec. Bank" on Justia Law

Public Lands Access Association, Inc. (PLAA) sought a declaration that the public may use certain roads and bridges to access Ruby River. In 2008, the district court granted PLAA summary judgment on the issue of public access to the Ruby River from Lewis Lane. In 2012, the district court denied the public access to Ruby River at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge. PLAA appealed, and James Kennedy, who intervened as a defendant, cross-appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeal and cross-appeal. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred in deciding that the County had a secondary easement that was independent and separate from the public road right-of-way at the intersection of Seyler Lane and Ruby River; (2) in determining the width of the public right-of-way at the intersection of Seyler Lane and Ruby River, the trial court’s blanket exclusion of recreation use evidence was improper; (3) the scope of use of the public road right-of-way was not limited to the adverse usage; and (4) the district court did not effectuate an unconstitutional taking of Kennedy’s property when it ruled that the public may access Ruby River at Lewis Lane. View "Pub. Lands Access Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Madison County" on Justia Law

Borrowers obtained a home loan from Mann Mortgage and executed of deed of trust (DOT) naming the lender. Borrowers also signed a promissory note, which was endorsed to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) was identified in the DOT as the beneficiary of the note. Borrowers later defaulted on the note. MERS then assigned its interest in the DOT to Greenpoint, and Greenpoint assigned the servicing rights to Countrywide Home Loans. Following a series of cancelled foreclosure sales, Borrowers filed a complaint against MERS, Greenpoint, and Countrywide (collectively, Lenders), alleging that they lacked the authority to foreclose. The district court granted summary judgment for Lenders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lenders because (1) MERS did not qualify as a beneficiary of the DOT under Montana's Small Tract Financing Act; and (2) MERS' agency relationship with the lender was not sufficiently established to warrant summary judgment. View "Pilgeram v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc." on Justia Law

After Susan Cavanaugh defaulted on her loan, which was secured by a deed of trust on the home she shared with her husband, the bank that was the beneficiary of the deed of trust made two forestalled attempts at a trustee's sale. The bank then elected to proceed by judicial foreclosure. The district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure, finding that the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a statutory right of redemption. The Supreme court affirmed, holding (1) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a one-year right of redemption because their property was foreclosed by judicial procedure rather than by advertisement and sale; and (2) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a right of redemption because their property was a multi-family residence, as the Cavanaughs' home was a single family residence at the time the deed of trust was executed. View "Cavanaugh v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Burcalow Family, LLC purchased property that sat adjacent to The Corral Bar, Inc. property. Burcalow and The Corral signed a license agreement whereby The Corral agreed to pay Burcalow for the use of Burcalow's property for its drain field and well. After the license agreement expired, Burcalow filed suit against The Corral, alleging claims for trespass and a declaratory judgment. The Corral counterclaimed for, inter alia, prescriptive easement, detrimental reliance, and mistake. The district court (1) determined that The Corral possessed a prescriptive easement over and across Burcalow's property, and (2) rescinded the license agreement, ordering Burcalow to refund the fees The Corral had paid under the license agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) The Corral failed to demonstrate the elements required to establish a prescriptive easement; and (2) Burcalow's counsel did not make fraudulent representations entitling The Corral to rescind the parties' license agreement, and therefore, Burcalow did not have to return The Corral's payments made pursuant to the agreement. Remanded. View "Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

James and Rachel Earl filed an action against Pavex Corporation seeking declarations concerning two overlapping easements that burdened the Earls' land for the benefit of Pavex's land. One of the easements was 100 feet in width and the other thirty feet in width. The Earls asserted (1) the 100-foot-wide easement was unenforceable because it did not appear in the chain of title to the Earls' property, and (2) in the alternative, even if the 100-foot-wide easement was valid, they were not required to remove structures and cropland that encroached upon both easements. The district court concluded (1) the 100-foot-wide easement did not burden the Earls' property, and (2) the Earls may be required to remove the structures and cropland from the easements - if the Supreme Court found the 100-foot-wide easement to be valid - to the extent necessary to effectuate the purposes of the easements. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's conclusion that Pavex's 100-foot-wide easement was extinguished by failure to properly record it; and (2) affirmed the district court's ruling that encroachments must be removed from the two easements to the extent they constituted unreasonable interference with Pavex's easement rights. Remanded. View "Earl v. Pavex" on Justia Law