Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In Brown I, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly found that Defendants had a prescriptive easement to cross Plaintiff's land that included residential and recreational uses but improperly limited the width of the easement to twenty feet for the purposes of trailing cattle. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to clarify the scope of recreational and residential uses authorized by the easement and to modify its order regarding the easement's width. After the case was remanded, Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court once more remanded the matter to the district court to modify its order to better define the character and frequency of the recreational and residential use, holding that the district court erred by failing to delineate the scope of Defendants' residential and recreational prescriptive easements across Plaintiff's real property. View "Brown & Brown of Mont., Inc. v. Raty" on Justia Law

Bank and Lumber Company had business and financial relationships with Sawmill. A few years into its operation, Sawmill began experiencing serious financial difficulties. Sawmill defaulted on approximately $1.4 million in loan obligations to Bank and owed Lumber Company approximately $900,000. Proceedings were initiated in bankruptcy court and district court. While the cases were pending, Sawmill was destroyed by fire. Bank recovered approximately $980,000 from Sawmill's insurance proceeds. In a subsequent case between Bank and Lumber Company, the jury determined that neither Bank nor Lumber Company was entitled to recover damages from the other. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence a particular letter written by the Bank president. View "H.E. Simpson Lumber Co. v. Three Rivers Bank of Mont." on Justia Law

Dean and Nancy Ziehl contended that they owned a prescriptive easement over a portion of dock located on the Swan River that extended onto Gayle Pederson's property. The Ziehls argued that the easement allowed them to maintain and use the entire dock. The district court concluded that the Ziehls did not hold a prescriptive easement and ordered that the intruding portion of dock be removed and costs be awarded to Pederson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by determining that the Ziehls failed to use the dock adversely for the required statutory period in order to obtain the prescriptive easement. View "Pedersen v. Ziehl" on Justia Law

Carol Miller, the owner of two adjacent parcels of real property, conveyed one of the parcels to the Biggerstaffs in 2005. In the conveyance, Miller purported to reserve an easement over the Biggerstaffs' parcel for the benefit of her retained parcel. In 2006, Miller conveyed her retained pracel to Yorlum Properties. Later, a dispute arose among Yorlum, the Biggerstaffs, and Lincoln County concerning the validity of the reserved easement. In 2011, Yorlum filed the instant action seeking to quiet title to its property and access rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Yorlum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the easement over the Biggerstaffs' parcel was valid; (2) The Biggerstaffs and Lincoln County failed to establish any basis that Miller lacked title to convey to Yorlum; and (3) Yorlum's complaint was not barred by equitable principles. View "Yorlum Props., Ltd. v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Terry Willis purchased a tract of property with funds that were apparently the proceeds from illegal drug sales. After Willis failed to make a payment, David Ferterrer contributed approximately half of the late payment. Willis was later sentenced to life imprisonment for drug-related crimes, which left him unable to pay for the property as the contract for deed contemplated. The parties agreed that Ferterrer would be responsible for completing the payments to purchase the property. Ferterrer also removed funds from Willis's checking account to prevent federal authorities from seizing those funds. Armed with a notarized agreement allegedly from Willis to sell the property to Ferterrer (the Deed), Ferterrer obtained a loan to purchase the property. Willis subsequently filed an action challenging Ferterrer's ownership of the property, also alleging that Ferterrer had converted the funds from Willis's bank account. The district court affirmed the validity of the Deed and concluded that Fertterer had not converted any funds belonging to Willis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of fact; and (2) the district court properly determined that Willis failed to prove that Fertterer had converted funds from Willis's bank account. View "Willis v. Fertterer" on Justia Law

In 1997, Plaintiff purchased a historical building that was the largest apartment house between St. Paul and Spokane when it was built in 1916. In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against various defendants, including the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO). ARCO purchased a copper mining company (ACM) in 1977, including all of ACM's liabilities. These liabilities included claims for property damage caused by mining-related surface subsidence. Plaintiffs alleged that mining-related subsidence had caused the current damage to the building. A jury found in favor of ARCO. Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law, as ARCO produced sufficient evidence to cast doubt in a juror's mind as to whether mining-related subsidence actually caused the damage alleged by Plaintiffs; and (2) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, as substantial credible evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Barile v. Butte High Sch." on Justia Law

Tom Harpole, a former owner of real property in Powell County, sued First American Title Insurance Company and Powell County Title Company claiming they negligently misrepresented the status of the access road into his former property and thus foiled a potential sale of the property. The Third Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the title companies. Harpole appealed. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Harpole v. Powell Co. Title" on Justia Law

The State appealed a jury verdict that awarded damages to L. Fred Weaver, Joan Weaver and Vicki Weaver. The Weavers had sued the State over negligent fire containment procedures on their real property. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Weavers' negligence claim; (2) whether the trial court did not allow the State to assert a "public duty doctrine" defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find the state negligent without expert testimony to establish the standard of care; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to change venue. Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weaver v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Appellant Laura Lee Neva sued Appellee Jim Bates, arguing he violated Montana's Human Rights Act by halting necessary repairs to a commercial building she rented from him because she rebuffed his sexual advances. In her complaint to the Human Rights Commission, Appellant alleged violation of the Public Accommodations Provision but made no mention of the Real-Estate Transaction Provision. The Commission nevertheless found that Appellee violated the Real-Estate Transaction Provision by sexually harassing Appellant while she was leasing the space from him. The District Court reversed that decision, holding that the Commission’s action violated Appellee's right to due process. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that Appellee was not afforded due process when Appellant brought claims under section 49-2-304 of the Act, but that the Commission did not find he violated section 49-2-305. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that the essential difference between a 49-2-304 claim and a 49-2-305 claim was the setting of the discrimination: a place of public accommodation as opposed to a real-estate transaction. "The setting here was fully litigated, as was the discrimination- Bates' sexual harassment of Neva." The Court concluded Appellee understood the issues as was afforded full opportunity to justify his conduct. Therefore, his due process rights were not violated. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

Timothy Watts sold real property to the Marions, who financed the purchase with one loan from PrimeLending and a second loan from Watts. Watts signed a subordination agreement agreeing to subordinate his loan to the PrimeLending loan. The Marions subsequently signed a deed of trust to PrimeLending and a trust indenture in favor of Watts. The Marions defaulted on the loan originating with PrimeLending, which assigned its interest in the loan to HSBC Bank. After a trustee's sale, HSBC purchased the property. The Marions also defaulted on the loan from Watts. Claiming to be unaware of the previous HSBC trustee's sale, Watts held his own trustee sale and was purchaser of record. After discovering HSBC claimed ownership of the property, Watts filed a complaint against HSBC and other parties claiming an interest in the property, seeking to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Watts' motion for summary judgment against HSBC, finding that the Marion debt to PrimeLending was no longer in the first priority lien position because the debt had been assigned to HSBC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that HSBC's deed of trust in the property was clearly entitled to priority over Watts' subordinated trust indenture. View "Watts v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law