Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Nebraska Supreme Court
132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy
Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC (Active Spine) and its owners, Sara and Nicholas Muchowicz, were sued by 132 Ventures, LLC (Ventures) for breach of contract and personal guarantee after failing to pay rent and common area maintenance (CAM) charges under a lease agreement. Ventures had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and sought damages for unpaid rent and CAM charges from June 2020 to February 2021. Active Spine argued that the lease was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and that they were under a COVID-19-related rent abatement.The district court initially ordered restitution of the premises to Ventures and denied Active Spine's request for a temporary injunction. A separate bench trial found Active Spine and the Muchowiczes liable for breach of contract. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order but reversed the breach of contract judgment, remanding for a jury trial.At the jury trial, Ventures presented evidence of unpaid rent and CAM charges, while Active Spine argued that Ventures failed to provide notice of budgeted direct expenses, a condition precedent to their obligation to pay CAM charges. The jury found in favor of Ventures, awarding $593,723.82 in damages. Active Spine and the Muchowiczes moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing errors in the jury's damage calculations and the lack of notice of budgeted direct expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits as business records and not summaries under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1006. The court also held that Active Spine and the Muchowiczes failed to preserve their arguments for appeal regarding the costs of new tenancy, COVID-19 abatement, and the amended lease. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for new trial or JNOV, concluding that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. View "132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy" on Justia Law
PSK v. Legacy Outdoor Advertising
PSK, LLC purchased a commercial property at a trustee's sale, which included a billboard. A dispute arose over the ownership of the billboard, leading PSK to file a quiet title action against Legacy Outdoor Advertising, LLC, claiming ownership of the billboard. Legacy counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the billboard was its removable personal property.The district court found in favor of Legacy, determining that the billboard was not a fixture but removable personal property. The court noted that the Arents, the previous owners, had sold the billboard to USA Outdoor in 2010 and had entered into a lease agreement allowing USA Outdoor to remove the billboard upon lease termination. The court found that PSK had notice of the separate ownership of the billboard before purchasing the property, as evidenced by a sign on the billboard and testimony from the previous owners and a realtor.PSK appealed, arguing that the billboard was included in its purchase of the real estate and that it had no notice of Legacy's claim. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that PSK failed to prove its ownership of the billboard and that the billboard was indeed Legacy's removable personal property. The court emphasized the importance of the Arents' intention to sell the billboard as personal property and the lease agreement's provision allowing for its removal. The court also found that PSK had constructive notice of the separate ownership due to the sign on the billboard and other circumstances that should have prompted further inquiry. View "PSK v. Legacy Outdoor Advertising" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Nebraska Supreme Court, Real Estate & Property Law
Isham v. Jack
Dylan R. Isham and Billy C. Jack entered into an agreement to exchange Isham’s manufactured home for Jack’s travel trailer, with an option for Jack to purchase a garage attached to the manufactured home for $3,000 by May 11, 2020. Jack declined the option via a message on June 3, 2019, which Isham read but did not respond to. In February 2021, Isham contacted Jack to either receive payment for the garage or remove it, leading to a dispute as Jack had integrated the garage into his home.The District Court for Butler County found in favor of Jack, concluding that Isham had abandoned his rights to the garage by failing to act on them for over 20 months. The court noted that Isham’s lack of communication and actions indicated abandonment, and it would be inequitable to enforce Isham’s right to remove the garage after such a delay. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that Isham had waived his right under the contract and that the district court’s finding of abandonment was not clearly erroneous.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Jack did not meet the burden of proving abandonment, as mere nonuse and the passage of time are insufficient to establish abandonment without clear and convincing evidence of intent. The court found that Isham’s actions, such as exploring options to move the garage, did not demonstrate an intent to abandon. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to reverse the district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings to determine the value of the garage, given its integration into Jack’s home. View "Isham v. Jack" on Justia Law
State v. Anderson
The case involves the prosecution of Kay E. Anderson for multiple misdemeanor violations of a city property maintenance code at a residential apartment complex in Omaha, Nebraska, known as Yale Park. Anderson was responsible for managing and maintaining the complex, which consisted of 13 buildings with approximately 100 residential units. In September 2018, city inspectors, acting on numerous tenant complaints about unsafe living conditions, obtained an inspection warrant and discovered approximately 2,500 code violations. Anderson was subsequently charged with 99 counts of violating the Omaha Municipal Code (OMC).In the county court, Anderson filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the inspection, arguing that the warrant was invalid because inspectors had not complied with the statutory requirement to seek consent before obtaining the warrant. The county court initially granted the motion, but the district court reversed, finding Anderson lacked standing to challenge the warrant for units leased to others. Anderson's renewed motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on four counts after a bench trial.On appeal, Anderson argued that the evidence should have been suppressed due to the invalid warrant and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the failure to seek consent before obtaining the inspection warrant did not render the warrant constitutionally invalid. The court held that the omitted information about not seeking consent was not material to the probable cause finding. Additionally, the court found that the violation of the statutory requirement did not affect Anderson's substantial rights and did not require suppression of the evidence.The court also found sufficient evidence to support Anderson's convictions. The violation notices were properly served, Anderson was responsible for maintenance, and he knowingly failed to comply with the correction orders for at least 90 days. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Anderson's convictions and sentences. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law
Nieveen v. TAX 106
Sandra K. Nieveen owned property in Lincoln, Nebraska, which was free of encumbrances. After failing to pay property taxes, TAX 106 purchased a tax certificate for the delinquent taxes. TAX 106 later transferred its interest to Vintage Management, LLC, which obtained a tax deed for the property. Nieveen alleged that the property was worth significantly more than the tax debt and claimed that the issuance of the tax deed violated her constitutional rights.The District Court for Lancaster County dismissed Nieveen’s constitutional claims for failure to state a claim and later granted summary judgment in favor of the county on her remaining claim. The court found that Nieveen was not entitled to an extended redemption period due to a mental disorder. Nieveen appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County, which recognized a plausible takings claim when a property was sold for more than the tax debt. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that Nieveen had alleged a plausible takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC, as the issuance of the tax deed deprived her of property value exceeding her tax debt. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against other defendants and declined to reconsider the Excessive Fines Clause claim, as just compensation under the Takings Clause would provide complete relief.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC. View "Nieveen v. TAX 106" on Justia Law
Continental Resources v. Fair
Kevin L. Fair and his wife owned property in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, but failed to pay property taxes. The county treasurer sold a tax certificate to Continental Resources for the unpaid taxes. After three years, Continental notified the Fairs that they needed to redeem the property by paying the total amount due, which they did not. Consequently, Continental requested and received a tax deed from the county treasurer, transferring title to the property free of any encumbrances.The District Court for Scotts Bluff County granted summary judgment in favor of Continental Resources, rejecting Fair’s constitutional claims, including those under the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Fair argued that the issuance of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The district court found no merit in Fair’s claims and ruled in favor of Continental. Fair appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Continental on Fair’s takings claim. The court found that Fair had a protected property interest in the value of his property exceeding the tax debt and that Continental’s acquisition of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The court determined that Continental, as a state actor, could be liable for the taking.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects but reversed the summary judgment in favor of Continental on the takings claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Continental Resources v. Fair" on Justia Law
Dzingle v. Krcilek
The case involves a boundary dispute between two siblings, Susan Dzingle and Thomas Krcilek, over their adjoining tracts of real property in Valley County, Nebraska. Dzingle owns the northwest quarter, and Krcilek owns the northeast quarter of Section 17. The dispute arose when Krcilek discovered a government survey marker indicating that the true boundary line was approximately 20 feet west of an existing fence that had been in place since at least 1946. Dzingle believed the fence was the true boundary and filed a complaint to establish it as such.The district court for Valley County dismissed Dzingle’s claims based on mutual recognition and acquiescence and the common grantor rule, finding that the parties had not owned their properties for the requisite 10-year period and that the common grantor rule did not apply to quarter sections. The court also rejected Dzingle’s request to reform the deeds based on mutual or unilateral mistake, as there was no evidence of inequitable or fraudulent conduct by Krcilek. The court accepted the survey marker as the true boundary and granted Krcilek’s counterclaims to eject Dzingle from his property and order her to construct a new fence along the survey’s boundary line.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the common grantor rule applies only to conveyances described by lot numbers, not by quarter sections. The court also agreed that the doctrine of mutual recognition and acquiescence was inapplicable because the parties had not owned their properties for 10 years and their mother, the previous owner, could not have acquiesced to the boundary. The court found no error in the district court’s acceptance of the survey marker as the true boundary and rejected Dzingle’s claim for reformation of the deeds. View "Dzingle v. Krcilek" on Justia Law
Dirt Road Development v. Hirschman
The case revolves around a dispute between Dirt Road Development LLC (DRD) and Robert and Kathryn Hirschman over the construction and operation of a new feedlot in Howard County, Nebraska. The Hirschmans own several properties in the county where they operate feedlot facilities. They planned to construct and operate a new feedlot on a property that is separated from their existing feedlots by a quarter section of land owned by a third party. DRD, which owns a property near the proposed new feedlot, filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent the Hirschmans from constructing and operating the new feedlot without obtaining a conditional use permit from the Howard County Board of Commissioners.The District Court for Howard County heard the case initially. The court had to determine whether, under Howard County’s zoning regulations, the Hirschmans' new feedlot was “adjacent” to their existing livestock operations. If so, the regulations required the Hirschmans to obtain a conditional use permit before constructing and operating the new feedlot. The district court concluded that the new feedlot was adjacent to the Hirschmans’ other feedlots and that therefore, the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit to build and operate the new feedlot. The court granted DRD’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Hirschmans’ motion.The Hirschmans appealed the decision to the Nebraska Supreme Court. They argued that the district court erred in holding that under the Howard County zoning regulations, their new feedlot was adjacent to their other feedlots and constituted a single commercial livestock operation rather than a separate feedlot. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the term "adjacent" as used within the zoning regulations is unambiguous and that the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit for their new feedlot. View "Dirt Road Development v. Hirschman" on Justia Law
MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis
The case revolves around a residential eviction dispute between a landlord, MIMG LXXIV Colonial, LLC (Colonial), and a tenant, TajReAna Ellis. Colonial initiated eviction proceedings against Ellis for failing to pay rent, providing a seven-day notice as required by Nebraska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). Ellis, however, argued that the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) imposed a 30-day notice requirement, superseding the state law. The county court rejected Ellis' argument and ruled in favor of Colonial. Ellis appealed to the district court, which reversed the county court's decision, agreeing with Ellis that the CARES Act required a 30-day notice.The case was then brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court. However, by this time, Ellis' lease had expired, and she had vacated the property. The court found that the case was moot as the relief sought by Colonial, a judgment for restitution of the premises, would have no practical effect since Ellis no longer resided in the property. Colonial argued that the case was not moot due to its interest in knowing whether it violated the law and the financial interest related to the district court's taxing of costs. The court rejected these arguments, stating that claims for costs are generally insufficient to avoid mootness.The court also considered whether to reach the merits of the case under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. However, it declined to do so, noting that the primary question in the case was a matter of federal statutory interpretation, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has final authority. The court also declined to apply the collateral consequences exception, which is typically used in criminal cases. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis" on Justia Law
Johnson v. Vosberg
The case involves a dispute between a landlord, Daniel Johnson, and his tenant, Tina Vosberg. Johnson filed a complaint under Nebraska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) seeking restitution of the premises, unpaid rent, and statutory damages for willful holdover. The primary disagreement was over the duration of the lease agreement. Johnson presented a 90-day lease, while Vosberg claimed she had signed a 1-year lease. The county court held an expedited trial on the claim for possession and ruled in favor of Johnson. Vosberg appealed this decision.Vosberg's appeal was heard by the District Court for Douglas County, which affirmed the county court's decision. Vosberg then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the alleged 1-year lease period passed, Vosberg vacated the premises, and she stopped paying monthly rent pursuant to the supersedeas bond.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case. However, it ruled that the appeal was moot because the term of the alleged 1-year lease had expired, Vosberg had vacated the premises, and she was no longer paying the monthly rent under the terms of the supersedeas bond. The court also rejected Vosberg's argument that she suffered collateral consequences from the writ because a judgment of eviction on her record made it harder for her to find landlords willing to rent to her. The court dismissed Vosberg's appeal as moot. View "Johnson v. Vosberg" on Justia Law