Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a farmer, owned Dunaway Farm and Rehfeld Farm, both of which were located within the jurisdiction of the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District. Beginning in 2010, Appellant used the well on Rehfeld Farm to irrigate Dunaway Farm, which was previously not irrigated. In 2013, the District ordered Appellant to cease and desist irrigating Dunaway Farm because the District’s rules prohibited use of ground water for new irrigated acres within the District’s management area without a variance. Appellant appealed using the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and also filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of several of the District’s rules related to irrigation. The district court affirmed the District’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) on the APA appeal, there were no errors in the district court’s judicial review of the District’s order; and (2) because the District’s rules are constitutional, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment. View "Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Natural Res. Dist." on Justia Law

U.S. Bank was a senior lien holder on certain property, and First Nebraska Educators Credit Union’s interest was junior to U.S. Bank’s. After a foreclosure sale, First Nebraska filed suit, alleging that because it did not receive notice of the sale, it was not able to bid on the property, and its second lien interest was extinguished with the sale of the property. The district court granted U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that First Nebraska was not entitled to notice. At issue on appeal was whether U.S. Bank was required to mail a notice of sale to First Nebraska under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1008. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that U.S. Bank was not required to serve notice of foreclosure sale upon First Nebraska. View "First Neb. Educators Credit Union v. U.S. Bancorp" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank was a senior lien holder on certain property, and First Nebraska Educators Credit Union’s interest was junior to U.S. Bank’s. After a foreclosure sale, First Nebraska filed suit, alleging that because it did not receive notice of the sale, it was not able to bid on the property, and its second lien interest was extinguished with the sale of the property. The district court granted U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that First Nebraska was not entitled to notice. At issue on appeal was whether U.S. Bank was required to mail a notice of sale to First Nebraska under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1008. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that U.S. Bank was not required to serve notice of foreclosure sale upon First Nebraska. View "First Neb. Educators Credit Union v. U.S. Bancorp" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint for injunctive relief and to quiet title attempting to stop the construction of a home on a lot directly adjacent to their property and asking that title to the lot be quieted in them based on a theory of adverse possession. The district court quieted title to the disputed land in Landowners’ favor, concluding that Landowners had established all of the elements of adverse possession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their possession of the subject property was sufficiently notorious to support their claim of adverse possession. View "Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Cheyenne County conducted its annual tax sale. Rather than using a traditional “round robin” format at the sale, the county treasurer used the “bid down” format provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1807. Adair Asset Management, LLC purchased a tax sale certificate on certain real estate, now owned by Terry’s Legacy, LLC, after offering to pay the taxes due for a one percent undivided interest in the property. After paying delinquent taxes on the property, Adair filed a complaint and obtained a decree judicially foreclosing the lien provided by the tax sale certificate. The complaint alleged that there was a potential claim against the property by First State Bank. The subsequent decree, in effect, ordered a sale of a 100-percent interest in the property. Terry’s Legacy appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to determine that it retained a ninety-nine-percent interest in the property. The Supreme Court modified the decree of foreclosure to apply only to Adair’s undivided one percent interest in the property and, as so modified, affirmed, holding that Adair’s lien to be foreclosed is limited to one percent of the property. Remanded. View "Adair Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Terry’s Legacy, LLC" on Justia Law

After Emil Alberts died, Lois Alberts, his surviving spouse, authorized her attorney to file a petition on her behalf to elect to take one-half of Emil’s augmented estate pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2313. Emil’s two nephews (Appellants), as coperaonal representatives of Emil’s estate and as beneficiaries of Emil’s trust, objected to the petition’s validity and to the calculation of Lois’ elective share within it. The county court found that Lois’ petition for elective share was validly filed and that certain trust property should be included in the augmented estate for purposes of calculating Lois’ elective share. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the county court did not err in finding that the petition for elective share was validly filed; but (2) the county court erred in failing to rule that the value of the trust property at issue should be excluded from the augmented estate under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2314(c)(2). Remanded. View "In re Estate of Alberts" on Justia Law

Various members of the Doty family gave three deeds of trust (DOT) conveying specific tracts of real estate to West Gate Bank, Inc. as security for certain loans. The DOTs also secured future advances given by the Bank. One advance was documented by Promissory Note 257. The Dotys defaulted on Note 257, and therefore, the Bank exercised its power of sale under one DOT and applied the funds generated by the sale to Note 257. The Dotys later brought a declaratory judgment action asking the district court to declare that the Bank was barred by Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1013 from recovering any amount still owed under Note 257. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Dotys, concluding that the Bank was barred by the three-month statute of limitations in section 76-1013 from taking action to collect amounts due on Note 257. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that section 76-1013 precludes the Bank from bringing a personal deficiency action against the Dotys for the balance owed under Note 275; but (2) erred in determining that the three-month statute of limitations set forth in section 76-1013 applies to successive foreclosures on remaining collateral. Remanded. View "Doty v. West Gate Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

This case involved a parcel of real estate previously owned by Four H Land Company Limited Partnership (Four H). Four H twice applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a sand and gravel pit on the property. James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney objected to the applications. To resolve their dispute, the Tierneys, Four H, and Western Engineering Company (Western), the operator of the sand and gravel pit, entered into an agreement in 1998 in which the Tierneys agreed to waive their right to appeal the issuance of the CUP, and Four H and Western accepted various conditions regarding operation of the sand and gravel pit. In 2009, the Tierneys brought an action for specific performance, alleging that Four H and Western had not fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. The district court dismissed the Tierneys’ complaint for specific performance, concluding that Four H and Western had not met the requirements of the 1998 CUP and the agreement but that specific performance was not an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that specific performance was an appropriate remedy for Four H’s and Western’s breach, and the district court should have ordered it. Remanded. View "Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were five parcels of real estate located within the Sanitary and Improvement District No. 424 of Douglas County (SID). In 2011, the SID became the titleholder of the properties. Through assignment, Tristar Management, LLC became the holder of five 2009 tax certificates on the properties. Tristar subsequently obtained the tax deeds for the properties pursuant to the “tax deed” method under Neb. Rev. 77-1837. The SID filed a complaint against Tristar seeking to quiet title in the properties. The district court granted summary judgment for Tristar, concluding that the special assessment liens levied by the SID survived Tristar’s acquisition of title to the parcels. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the treasurer tax deeds issued to Tristar pursuant to section 77-1837 and in compliance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1801 et seq. passed title to Tristar free and clear of the special assessment liens of the SID. View "Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 424 v. Tristar Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law