Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Homeowners obtained loans from Bank for the construction of a new home and entered into an agreement with Contractor to complete the new home construction. When Homeowners defaulted on payments owed to Contractor and on both loans, the house was sold at foreclosure, and Homeowners filed for bankruptcy. Contractor filed a fourth amended complaint against Homeowners, who were later dismissed as parties, and Bank. Following a trial the court granted summary judgment for Bank on Contractor’s claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court reversed. After remand, Contractor filed a fifth amended complaint, which differed from the fourth amended complaint in several respects. The district court determined that the election of remedies doctrine and judicial estoppel required a dismissal of Contractor’s claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Contractor’s claims were consistently premised on the existence of a contract, and therefore, no election was required; and (2) Contractor’s claims were based on different facts and obligations, and therefore, both could be pursued. View "deNourie & Yost Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

Guardian Tax Partners Inc. purchased, at a treasurer’s tax sale, a one percent interest in certain Douglas County real estate owned by Skrupa Investment Company. Guardian subsequently recorded a treasurer’s tax deed to the real estate interest. Thereafter, Guardian filed a complaint for partition against Skrupa Investment and Frank and Mary Skrupa. In their answer, Skrupa Investment and Frank alleged that Guardian’s tax deed was invalid due to Guardian’s failure to give the required statutory notice to the record owner. Skrupa Investment also filed a counterclaim to quiet title, claiming 100 percent interest in the property. On July 24, 2015, the district court entered an order finding that the tax deed was valid and determining that Guardian owned a one percent interest and Skrupa Investment owned a ninety-nine percent interest in the real estate. Upon Skrupa Investment’s motion, the district court certified the July 24 order as final and appealable. Skrupa Investment then appealed from the July 24 order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Skrupa Investment’s appeal was out of time because the July 24, 2015 order was a final, appealable order not subject to certification under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1315. View "Guardian Tax Partners, Inc. v. Skrupa Investment Co." on Justia Law

Randy and Helen Strode owned real property in the City of Ashland, Saunders County. Since the time of the purchase, the Strodes operated a business for the manufacture of agricultural fencing and the storage of salvage on the property. In 2003, the district court held that Randy’s use of the property to store salvage was in violation of the zoning ordinance but found that the manufacture of agricultural fencing was permitted. In 2013, the Strodes filed suit against the City and the County for inverse condemnation based on the zoning ordinance and the load limit regulation of a bridge used by the Strodes for transporting commercial goods. The district court concluded (1) Randy’s zoning takings claim was barred by claim preclusion because the matter was litigated in the 2003 case, (2) determined that Helen’s regulatory taking lain was barred by the statute of limitations because she was aware of the effect of the zoning ordinance after 2003; (3) found that the regulation of the bridge structure was not a regulatory taking, and (4) the City and County were entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding in favor of the City and the County. View "Strode v. City of Ashland" on Justia Law

Jeremy and Kimberly Klein, and Robert and Elaine Lynch, (collectively, appellees) purchased a trust deed at a trustee’s sale for certain real estate. Prior to the trustee’s sale, treasurer’s tax deeds for the same real estate had been issued to a third party. By operation of law, a treasurer’s tax deed passed title free and clear of all previous liens and encumbrances, and therefore, the treasurer’s tax deeds had divested the trust deed of title. The treasurer’s tax deeds were recorded prior to the trustee’s sale, but appellees failed to examine the record prior to the trustee’s sale. Appellees brought this action in equity against appellant Oakland/Red Oak Holdings, LLC (Oakland), which was the beneficiary of the trust deeds, seeking to set aside the sale and to be reimbursed the purchase price of $40,001. The district court determined that the trustee’s sale was void and ordered that Oakland return the purchase price to the appellees. Oakland appealed. The Supreme Court determined that the district court erred in its determination, reversed, and remanded. View "Klein v. Oakland/Red Oak Hold." on Justia Law

Appellant, a farmer, owned Dunaway Farm and Rehfeld Farm, both of which were located within the jurisdiction of the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District. Beginning in 2010, Appellant used the well on Rehfeld Farm to irrigate Dunaway Farm, which was previously not irrigated. In 2013, the District ordered Appellant to cease and desist irrigating Dunaway Farm because the District’s rules prohibited use of ground water for new irrigated acres within the District’s management area without a variance. Appellant appealed using the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and also filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of several of the District’s rules related to irrigation. The district court affirmed the District’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) on the APA appeal, there were no errors in the district court’s judicial review of the District’s order; and (2) because the District’s rules are constitutional, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment. View "Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Natural Res. Dist." on Justia Law

U.S. Bank was a senior lien holder on certain property, and First Nebraska Educators Credit Union’s interest was junior to U.S. Bank’s. After a foreclosure sale, First Nebraska filed suit, alleging that because it did not receive notice of the sale, it was not able to bid on the property, and its second lien interest was extinguished with the sale of the property. The district court granted U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that First Nebraska was not entitled to notice. At issue on appeal was whether U.S. Bank was required to mail a notice of sale to First Nebraska under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1008. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that U.S. Bank was not required to serve notice of foreclosure sale upon First Nebraska. View "First Neb. Educators Credit Union v. U.S. Bancorp" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank was a senior lien holder on certain property, and First Nebraska Educators Credit Union’s interest was junior to U.S. Bank’s. After a foreclosure sale, First Nebraska filed suit, alleging that because it did not receive notice of the sale, it was not able to bid on the property, and its second lien interest was extinguished with the sale of the property. The district court granted U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that First Nebraska was not entitled to notice. At issue on appeal was whether U.S. Bank was required to mail a notice of sale to First Nebraska under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1008. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that U.S. Bank was not required to serve notice of foreclosure sale upon First Nebraska. View "First Neb. Educators Credit Union v. U.S. Bancorp" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint for injunctive relief and to quiet title attempting to stop the construction of a home on a lot directly adjacent to their property and asking that title to the lot be quieted in them based on a theory of adverse possession. The district court quieted title to the disputed land in Landowners’ favor, concluding that Landowners had established all of the elements of adverse possession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their possession of the subject property was sufficiently notorious to support their claim of adverse possession. View "Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Cheyenne County conducted its annual tax sale. Rather than using a traditional “round robin” format at the sale, the county treasurer used the “bid down” format provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1807. Adair Asset Management, LLC purchased a tax sale certificate on certain real estate, now owned by Terry’s Legacy, LLC, after offering to pay the taxes due for a one percent undivided interest in the property. After paying delinquent taxes on the property, Adair filed a complaint and obtained a decree judicially foreclosing the lien provided by the tax sale certificate. The complaint alleged that there was a potential claim against the property by First State Bank. The subsequent decree, in effect, ordered a sale of a 100-percent interest in the property. Terry’s Legacy appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to determine that it retained a ninety-nine-percent interest in the property. The Supreme Court modified the decree of foreclosure to apply only to Adair’s undivided one percent interest in the property and, as so modified, affirmed, holding that Adair’s lien to be foreclosed is limited to one percent of the property. Remanded. View "Adair Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Terry’s Legacy, LLC" on Justia Law

After Emil Alberts died, Lois Alberts, his surviving spouse, authorized her attorney to file a petition on her behalf to elect to take one-half of Emil’s augmented estate pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2313. Emil’s two nephews (Appellants), as coperaonal representatives of Emil’s estate and as beneficiaries of Emil’s trust, objected to the petition’s validity and to the calculation of Lois’ elective share within it. The county court found that Lois’ petition for elective share was validly filed and that certain trust property should be included in the augmented estate for purposes of calculating Lois’ elective share. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the county court did not err in finding that the petition for elective share was validly filed; but (2) the county court erred in failing to rule that the value of the trust property at issue should be excluded from the augmented estate under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2314(c)(2). Remanded. View "In re Estate of Alberts" on Justia Law