Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

For the tax year 2011, the county assessor decided to assess property taxes on parcel of land owned by Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District (Central) but leased to private parties. Central protested the tax assessment, and the Board of Equalization recommended not taxing the land. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirmed, concluding that the parcels should not be taxed because Central had already made a payment in lieu of tax pursuant to Neb. Const. art. VIII, 11 for the relevant tax year. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed TERC’s finding that Central was not subject to property taxes for tax year 2011 because it had already made a payment in lieu of tax for that year; but (2) vacated the portion of TERC’s order that could be interpreted to mean that a lessee’s property tax obligation is included in Central’s payment in lieu of tax, as the issue of a lessee’s liability was not before TERC. View "Conroy v. Keith County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Through its power of eminent domain, the State of Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) took real property owned by Leo and Joanna Hike for a highway project. The parties were unable to agree on compensation, and the case proceeded to trial for a determination of damages. The principal issue disputed at trial was the fair market value of the Hikes’ property immediately prior to the taking, which depended on whether the property’s highest and best use at the time was residential or commercial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Hikes for $53,209, which suggested that the jury agreed with NDOR that the property must be valued as residential property. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict, holding (1) the district court did not commit prejudicial error with respect to the evidentiary issues raised by the Hikes; (2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) the prosecutor made an improper comment during closing argument, but the comment did not prevent a fair verdict. View "Hike v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, including Lyle Sukup and Kristen Sukup, seeking payment for a boundary fence he built between his property and the property in which Defendants had an interest. Specifically, Defendant alleged that he had an agreement with the Sukups to build the fence between his property and the Sukups’ property and that the Sukups agreed to share equally in the cost. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Plaintiff's cause of action arose under Nebraska's "fence law" and that the county courts had exclusive jurisdiction over fence contribution cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint was not simply an action for contribution but was also a common-law contract action that was subject to the district court’s jurisdiction. View "Kotrous v. Zerbe" on Justia Law

The City of Fremont paved on block of a street and assessed the paving costs against abutting property owners. The City relied on Nebraska’s “gap and extend” law, which permits a city to “pave any unpaved street…which intersects a paved street for a distance of not to exceed one block on either side of such paved street” to authorize the paving. Appellees, legal titleholders of property that abutted upon and was adjacent to the street, filed a petition on appeal, alleging that the levy of special assessments was invalid. The district court sustained Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City did not comport with the limitations and restrictions required by the gap and extend law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plan language of the statute authorized the paving. Remanded with direction to enter judgment in favor of the City. View "Johnson v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a quiet title action against owners of adjacent lots, seeking a declaration that express easements granted in favor of the adjacent lots were invalid. The defendants filed counterclaims asserting that the express easements were valid. Plaintiffs submitted to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") a claim for defense pursuant to a policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth insuring Plaintiffs’ property, but Commonwealth denied the claim. In the quiet title action, the district court extinguished the express easements and denied the counterclaims but concluded that the defendants possessed implied easements. While the quiet title action was pending, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Commonwealth, seeking a determination that Commonwealth breached its duty under the policy by refusing to provide a defense to the counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment because Commonwealth did not violate its contract with Plaintiffs by denying coverage or indemnification. View "Woodle v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Rodehorst Brothers, a partnership, applied for several building permits for its apartment building. A building inspector granted the first two permits but denied the third, concluding that Rodehorst had forfeited its right to continue its nonconforming use of a fourplex in an area zoned R-2 for one- and two-family use. On appeal, the city’s Board of Adjustment determined (1) Rodehorst had forfeited its right to continue its nonconforming use by not having more than two apartments occupied for more than one year, and (2) the Board lacked authority to grant a use variance to otherwise allow the use to continue. The district court affirmed, concluding that the Board did not err in its judgment and that the Board’s ruling was not an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the record showed that Rodehorst discontinued the noncomforming use for one year, it forfeited its right to continue the use; (2) the Board lacked authority to grant a use variance; and (3) there was no taking of Rodehorst’s property. View "Rodehorst Bros. v. City of Norfolk Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

SourceGas Distribution, LLC owned property located in an area that had been annexed by the City of Hastings. The City, on behalf of the board of public works, filed a petition in the county court under the general condemnation procedures found at Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-101 through 76-726, seeking to initiate condemnation proceedings against the property owned by SourceGas. In an effort to enjoin the county court proceedings, SourceGas Distribution filed a complaint in the district court for temporary and permanent injunction, primarily alleging that the City must utilize Nebraska’s Municipal Gas System Condemnation Act (the Act) rather than the procedures in chapter 76. The district court overruled the motion for temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 19-4626(2) exempted the City from being required to proceed under the Act and that the City could utilize chapter 76’s general condemnation procedures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that, pursuant to the exception set forth in section 19-4626(2), the Act does not apply in this case and, instead, the general condemnation procedures of chapter 76 apply. View "SourceGas Distrib., LLC v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

The owners (Owners) of certain property in the Village of Memphis filed with the county judge an inverse condemnation petition against the Village and sought compensation for an unlawful taking, alleging that the Village deprived them of their property by maintaining a well, a buried powerline, and water pipes on their property without an easement. An appraiser awarded damages to the Owners. The Village appealed. Thereafter, the parties entered into a settlement agreement as to compensation to be paid to the Owners. The Owners subsequently moved for attorney fees and expenses under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720, which mandates that a property owner be allowed attorney fees if a public entity initiates condemnation proceedings without negotiating in good faith with the owner. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the Village did not fail to engage in good faith negotiations with the Owners. The Supreme Court affirmed because the record demonstrated that the Village engaged in good faith negotiations to settle with the Owners after the Village appealed to the district court. View "Village of Memphis v. Frahm" on Justia Law

Mike and Becky Carey applied for a building permit for an interior renovation of an apartment building. A municipal building inspector denied the application because the construction documents were not prepared by a registered design professional. The city's appeals board denied the Careys' appeal. The district court overruled the appeals board and ordered that the Careys be issued a building permit without the requirement that they retain a licensed architect, concluding (1) the appeals board did not act within its jurisdiction, and (2) the renovation fell into one of the exemptions to the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeals board acted within its jurisdiction and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the proposed renovation failed to qualify for statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Act. View "Carey v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law