Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was the surface owner of land in Sioux County. Plaintiff sued the owners of severed mineral interests in that land under Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes to reacquire their allegedly abandoned interests. Mineral interests are deemed abandoned unless the "record owner" has taken certain steps to publicly exercise his ownership rights during the twenty-three years preceding the surface owner's suit. This appeal involved one defendant (Defendant), who asserted that she was the "record owner" of the mineral interests through the will of Decedent. The register of deeds still listed Decedent as the owner of the disputed mineral interests. The district court vested title to the disputed mineral interests in Plaintiff, concluding that Defendant was not a "record owner" of the mineral interests because the term "record owner" under the dormant mineral statutes meant only the person listed in the register of deeds in the county where the property was located. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, for the reasons set forth in Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, the "record owner" of mineral interests includes an individual identified by probate records in the county where the interests are located. View "WTJ Skavdahl Land LLC v. Elliott " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the surface owner of various tracts of land. Plaintiff sued the owners of several mineral interests in those tracts under Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes to reacquire their allegedly abandoned interests. Mineral interests are deemed abandoned unless the "record owner" has taken certain steps to publicly exercise her ownership rights during the twenty-three years preceding the surface owner's suit. This appeal involved two Defendants. The district court vested title to the disputed mineral interests in Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the "record owner" of mineral interests includes an individual identified by probate records in the county where the interests are located and need not be determined only from the register of deeds in the county where the interests are located; and (2) an amended complaint that adds, rather than changes, a new party defendant does not relate back to the original complaint. View "Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler" on Justia Law

Defendants gave a promissory note to Bank and secured a loan with a trust deed on real property. Defendants defaulted on the note, and Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. The property was sold after a sheriff's sale. Bank subsequently filed a complaint to recover the deficiency. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that because Bank filed its complaint ninety-nine days after the sheriff's sale, the action was barred by the three-month statute of limitations in Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1013. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the special three-month statute of limitations on actions for deficiency set forth in the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act applies where a lender elects to judicially foreclose upon the real estate, but the special limitation applies only where the property has been sold by exercising the power of sale set forth in the trust deed; and (2) because the judicial foreclosure of the trust deed in this case did not result in the sale of property under a trust deed, it did not fall under the statutory language in section 76-1013, and the deficiency action was governed by the general statute of limitations for actions on written contracts. Remanded. View "First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Davey" on Justia Law

Lender made loans to Borrower that were secured by deeds of trust describing real estate owned by Borrower. As additional security for the loans to Borrower, Guarantor promised payment of the indebtedness on the promissory notes. Borrower subsequently defaulted, and Lender sought payment of the indebtedness from Guarantor. Guarantor moved to amend his answer to assert he was not liable to Lender because Lender was barred by section 76-1013 of the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act (Act) from pursuing a deficiency action against Borrower. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lender. At issue on appeal was whether a guaranty of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust is subject to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Guarantor's guaranty was not subject to the Act, and under the terms of the guaranty, Guarantor was liable for the total amount of Borrower's debt, less the trustee's sale price. View "Mut. of Omaha Bank v. Murante" on Justia Law

Lozier Corporation (Lozier) claimed that the Douglas County Board of Equalization (Board) overvalued three parcels of land it owned. Lozier mailed three appeals to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). Although Lozier mailed the appeals before the filing deadline, TERC did not receive the appeals until after the deadline had passed. TERC dismissed the appeals as untimely, concluding that the mailing did not meet the requirements under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5013(2). At issue on appeal was whether a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" for purposes of section 77-5013(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" within the meaning of section 77-5013(2); and (2) therefore, Lozier's mailing met the jurisdictional requirements under section 77-5013(2). View "Lozier Corp. v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were rental property owners in the City of La Vista. Appellant sought a declaration that the City's ordinance establishing a rental housing licensing and inspection program was unconstitutional. Appellants claimed that the ordinance's application to rental property residences only, and not to owner-occupied residences, was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification that violated Nebraska's constitutional prohibition against special legislation. The district court entered summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City's ordinance did not violate the prohibition against special legislation, as (1) the distinction between rental property residences and owner-occupied residences presented a real difference in circumstances; and (2) the City's regulation of rental properties was reasonably related to its legitimate goal of maintaining safe rental housing and livable neighborhoods. View "D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista" on Justia Law

United States Cold Storage (Cold Storage) and Sanitary and Improvement District No. 59 of Sarpy County (SID 59) filed complaints challenging separate annexation ordinances enacted by the City of La Vista. The ordinances at issue were ordinance 1142 and ordinance 1107, together which purported to annex SID 59 in its entirety, including an industrial area. The district court found in favor of La Vista on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in upholding the validity of both ordinance 1007 and ordinance 1142 adopted by La Vista for the annexation of SID 59. View "U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of La Vista" on Justia Law

Selma Development, LLC (Selma) obtained a loan from TierOne Bank (TierOne) that was guaranteed with six individual guaranty agreements. Selma later defaulted on the note. The property was sold at a trustee's sale, but the sale price was insufficient to cover the debt. TierOne brought an action seeking payment from the guarantors (Defendants). After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the fair market value of the property greatly exceeded the amount received from the trustee's sale. The court then granted TierOne's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against Selma for $306,230 and against Defendants for $586,229. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment remanded, holding (1) once the trial court determined that the fair market value of the property was greater than the amount received at the trustee's sale, it had to determine whether the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act applied to the guarantors, and accordingly, its order determining fair market value was not a final order; and (2) Defendants offered evidence which created a genuine issue of material fact regarding their defenses, precluding summary judgment. View "Selma Dev., LLC v. Great W. Bank" on Justia Law

This appeal, filed by brothers Gary and Dennis Baasch (Appellants), concerned disputed land located in Howard County. After a bench trial, the district court for Howard County denied Gary Baasch's counterclaim for quiet title. The court found that husband and wife Paul and Betty Lou Obermiller (Appellees) owned all the land they claimed to own, that the fence constructed by Appellants was on Appellees' land, and that Gary Baasch did not own any of the disputed land. The court also found that Appellants had trespassed, ordered them to remove the fence, and enjoined them from blocking access to the land owned by Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) Appellees were the rightful owners of the disputed land; (2) because Appellees owned the land, Appellants' intentional installation of a fence on the land constituted a continuous trespass; and (3) Appellees were entitled to an injunction. View "Obermiller v. Baasch" on Justia Law

The parties here were the surviving children of Decedent. Under Decedent's will, they were beneficiaries of a joint life estate interest in farmland. The will provided that no life tenant or remainderman could partition the property during the existence of any life tenancy. Through a codicil, Decedent later added a provision disinheriting any child who contested his will. After the probate court entered the final order in the probate proceeding, Appellees brought a partition action to divide the property. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Appellees were not bound by the will's restriction against a partition because they had not contested the will during the probate proceeding. Appellants then filed a declaratory judgment, claiming that Appellees had forfeited their inheritance by contesting the will through the partition action. The district court dismissed Appellants' action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that Appellants' partition action was not a will contest because it was filed after the estate was closed. View "Martin v. Ullsperger" on Justia Law