Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This was an action for partition of the real property in the estate of Ronald McKillip. At the time of his death, McKillip owned four tracts of land. McKillip's will left the property to his three daughters, "share and share alike." The probate court confirmed ownership of the real estate to the daughters in equal shares. One daughter brought an action to partition the real estate. A referee appointed by the county court determined that a partition in kind of the real estate was not possible and recommended a public sale. The court approved the report and concluded that the real estate could not be partitioned in kind "without great prejudice to the owners." The court ordered the referee to sell the real estate, and the personal representative appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the real estate should be partitioned in kind. Remanded with directions. View "In re Estate of McKillip" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a homeowners' association may enforce a covenant prohibiting "business activities of any kind whatsoever" against homeowners who have operated a daycare in their home for a period of twelve years. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order to the extent it found that the daycare business violated the "no business activities" covenant and to the extent it granted summary judgment on the defenses of estoppel, laches, and unclean hands; but (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners' association with respect to the affirmative defense of waiver raised by the homeowners because there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding this issue. View "Farmington Woods Homeowners Ass'n v. Wolf" on Justia Law

A broker doing business as McCully Ranch Company brought suit against its client Baccaro Ranch, LLC, as seller, claiming that Baccaro breached the real estate listing agreement and that McCully was entitled to a commission from Baccaro under contract theory or, in the alternative, under the theory of unjust enrichment. In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the listing agreement was enforceable and remanded the cause for further proceedings. After trial, the district court determined that McCully was not entitled to a real estate commission. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that McCully erred in its judgment, as MuCully produced a ready, willing, and able purchaser during the term of the listing agreement on terms acceptable to Baccaro and therefore was entitled to a commission. View "McCully, Inc. v. Baccaro Ranch Co." on Justia Law

Westin Hills West Three Townhome Owners Association (the Association) appealed an order of the district court, which entered summary judgment in favor of the owner of the property, Federal National Mortgage Association, doing business as Fannie Mae (FNMA). In this foreclosure of lien case, the Association claimed that the recording of its declaration of covenants before the deed of trust gave the assessment lien recorded after the deed of trust first priority. The district court rejected this claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in granting FNMA's motion for summary judgment, as the deed of trust was superior to any assessment lien mentioned in the declaration of the Association.

Mutual of Omaha Bank filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment against Patrick and April Kassebaum, who owed the Bank payments due under several promissory notes. In particular, the Bank sought to have the district court declare the rights of the parties with respect to an assignment of unliquidated proceeds or personal injury litigation executed by the Kassebaums. The Kassebaums filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the assignment was ineffective. The district court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. A jury entered a verdict in favor of the Bank in the amount of $126,376. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Kassebaums' assignment was valid and enforceable under Nebraska law.

For several years, Michael Feloney used his neighbor Robert Baye's driveway to turn his vehicle to enter his garage. Eventually Baye decided to build a retaining wall on his driveway, which prevented Feloney from using Baye's driveway. Feloney sued Baye, requesting the district court to impose a prescriptive easement on Baye's driveway for ingress and egress. The district court granted summary judgment for Baye, concluding (1) Feloney's use of the driveway was permissive under the "unenclosed land" rule, which provides an exception to the rule presuming adverseness when the use is over unenclosed land; and (2) thus Feloney could not prove the elements required for a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding (1) the presumption of permissiveness arises when the land is unenclosed wilderness and does not apply in urban settings such as in this case; (2) when the owner of a property has opened or maintained a right of way for his own use and the claimant's use appears to be in common with that use, the presumption arises that the use is permissive; and (3) Feloney's use of Baye's driveway was presumptively permissive under this rationale.

Volunteers of America, Dakotas (VOA) proposed to build an apartment-style building for veterans in Omaha. To construct the building as planned, VOA applied for variances from area and use restrictions under the Omaha Municipal Code (Code). VOA applied to the zoning board of appeals of Omaha (Board) for the variances. Appellants, Field Club Home Owners League and Thornburg Place Neighborhood Association, opposed the application. The Board granted the variances, concluding that the Code created an unnecessary hardship because it did not contemplate a project like VOA's. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) the record failed to show that VOA had standing to seek the variances; but (2) because Appellants raised standing for the first time on appeal to the Court, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Remanded.

The underlying cases here involved Randy and Helen Strodes' unsuccessful challenge to the valuation of certain property located in Saunders County. The court of appeals concluded that the Strodes' appeals were not timely filed and dismissed their appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issued hinged on whether the Strodes' motions for rehearing filed before the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) were timely filed and therefore tolled the time during which the Strodes could thereafter petition the court of appeals to judicially review the TERC's actions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motions were timely filed before the TERC, and therefore, the time to petition to the court of appeals was tolled, and the court had jurisdiction over the appeals. Remanded to the TERC with directions to consider the merits of the Strodes' motions for rehearing.

David and Wilai Burden provided childcare services in their home. The Southwind Homeowners Association filed suit against the Burdens, alleging that the childcare services as provided violated several restrictive covenants applicable to the premises and asking that the Burdens be enjoined from providing those services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the childcare services were in violation of several restrictive covenants, and granted an injunction. The Burdens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact remained, and as a matter of law, the Burdens' activities on the property violated the Association's covenants.

This case concerned a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned. At issue was whether the city could file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argued (1) the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings; and (2) it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, holding (1) it is appropriate for a district court to consider the question of a setoff upon a timely motion by the condemnor when the condemnor has a lien interest in the land acquired; and (2) the district court in this case erred in remanding the matter of the setoff to the county court, as the issue was properly presented to the district court through a timely motion by the city, and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the city's lien and whether and to what amount it should be deducted from the condemnation award.