Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

David and Wilai Burden provided childcare services in their home. The Southwind Homeowners Association filed suit against the Burdens, alleging that the childcare services as provided violated several restrictive covenants applicable to the premises and asking that the Burdens be enjoined from providing those services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the childcare services were in violation of several restrictive covenants, and granted an injunction. The Burdens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact remained, and as a matter of law, the Burdens' activities on the property violated the Association's covenants.

This case concerned a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned. At issue was whether the city could file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argued (1) the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings; and (2) it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, holding (1) it is appropriate for a district court to consider the question of a setoff upon a timely motion by the condemnor when the condemnor has a lien interest in the land acquired; and (2) the district court in this case erred in remanding the matter of the setoff to the county court, as the issue was properly presented to the district court through a timely motion by the city, and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the city's lien and whether and to what amount it should be deducted from the condemnation award.

The dispute in this case revolved around a limited partnership (Kellom Heights) formed to provide financing for the redevelopment of property. Appellees were Kellom Heights, a corporation, and limited partners in Kellom Heights. Appellants were the redevelopment corporation, the general partner, and a corporation that was a limited parter of the redevelopment corporation. Appellees became dissatisfied with the operation of Kellom Heights and filed this complaint asserting various causes of action. The district court found for Appellees on certain causes of action and entered a judgment in their favor in the amount of $918,228 plus costs and interest. The court also awarded attorney fees and denied Appellees' request for prejudgment interest. The Supreme in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred when it rejected Appellants' statute of limitations defenses as to certain claims; and (2) the court erred in ruling that additional supervisory fees were not permitted. The Court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment.

A public power and irrigation district (District) filed an action against a development and other sublessees (collectively, Development) to quiet title to land owned by District and leased by Development. Development filed motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that District's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be grante. The district court sustained the motions and overruled Development's motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting Development's motions to dismiss because (1) the allegations in District's complaint, taken as true, were plausible and thus were sufficient to suggest that District had presented a justiciable controversy, and (2) the motions to dismiss filed in this case provided no notice that Development was asserting the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel and res judicata. Remanded.

The County of Dixon did work on Landowners' property, including grading and removing fences and trees, as part of a road maintenance project. Landowners eventually brought an inverse condemnation proceeding. The district court awarded Landowners damages of $4,049 and attorney fees in the amount of $5,600. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the court of appeals' decision that affirmed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the controlling statutes; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded with directions to award reasonable attorney fees under both Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720 and 76-726(2).

John and Betty Vlasin leased the oil and gas rights to their land to Ranch Oil Company. Ranch Oil operated on one-half of the land in the lease and Byron Hummon operated on the other half. After the primary term of the lease expired and the wells stopped producing oil, the Vlasins entered into a new lease agreement with Hummon which encompassed the entirety of their land. Thereafter, Ranch Oil took action to revive one of its dormant wells, relying on a savings provision of the lease, which stated that the lease shall not terminate if the lessee commences operations for drilling a well within sixty days from such cessation. Plaintiffs, the Vlasins and Hummon, brought suit against Ranch Oil for declaratory judgment, trespass, and conversion. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs but awarded only nominal damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding (1) Ranch Oil's activities on the Vlasins land did not operate so as to extend Ranch Oil's interest in the lease, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to prove they were entitled to damages under trespass and conversion claims, and the Vlasins were entitled only to nominal damages.

These two consolidated appeals arose from actions taken by American National Bank (ANB) to execute on a judgment against Michael Medved, an Arizona resident with business interests in Nebraska. Medved's wife, Laura, unsuccessfully sought to intervene in an action ANB filed against Medved in the district court for Douglas County. The district court denied her motion and issued charging orders against Medved's transferable interest in three Nebraska limited liability companies. Laura also unsuccessfully sought to intervene in an action filed in the district court for Sarpy County. The Sarpy County action resulted in a garnishment of Medved's wages. Medved appealed and Laura cross-appealed, arguing that the Nebraska order violated their rights under Arizona community property law because the earnings and distributions from the limited liability companies were Medved and Laura's community property and were protected by Arizona law. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under either Arizona or Nebraska law, there was no error in the enforcement of the judgment.

American Central City (ACC) appealed from two separate decisions of the district court. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court and involved complaints regarding the condemnation of three properties located in Lincoln, Nebraska. In the first case, a civil suit for damages apart from the condemnation award, ACC claimed it had compensable property interests for which it was not paid when the Joint Antelope Valley Authority (JAVA) and the City of Lincoln took its land through condemnation. In the second case, an appeal from the condemnation award, ACC argued that it did not receive adequate compensation for its land. The district court granted JAVA's motion for summary judgment in the civil suit and granted JAVA's motion to dismiss in ACC's appeal from the condemnation award. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) in the appeal of the civil suit for damages, ACC did not present sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) in the appeal from the condemnation award, ACC did not offer sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.

James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney brought an action against Four H Land Company and other defendants to compel them to lower the elevation of a lakeside housing development adjoining the Tierneys' land. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Tierneys appealed. While their appeal was pending the Tierneys discovered that the district court judge who issued the order harbored a personal prejudice against the Tierneys' attorney. The Supreme Court concluded that the three-factor test set forth in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. is the best means of determining when the rulings of a judge who should have recused himself or herself will be vacated and adopted the test. Applying the Liljeberg test to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the district court judge's order on the summary judgment motions should be vacated.

Appellee Betty Vandenberg owned a parcel of land which she leased to individuals who farmed the land. The parcel contained a well, a pump, motor, gear box, and pipe, all of which were used to irrigate the land. The central issue of this case involves the irrigation pump, which hanged inside a cased well and was secured to the land with a cement cap and bolts. The County assessor determined that the pump was taxable as Appelleeâs personal property. She appealed to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) which reversed the assessor and called the pump a fixture on the land. The County appealed TERCâs decision. The Supreme Court found that the pump is a trade fixture, a fixture that is taxed as personal property. The Court reversed TERCâs determination and remanded the case for further proceedings on the assessment of tax.