Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Nevada Supreme Court
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Appellant obtained a home loan from Countywide Home Loans. The promissory note was secured by a deed of trust naming Countrywide as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as beneficiary of the deed of trust. MERS assigned its interest in the deed of trust to HSBC Bank. Bank of America later acquired Countrywide and its assets, including Appellant's promissory note. After Appellant defaulted on the loan, Appellant participated in Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP). BAC Home Loans Servicing, as a representative of Bank of America, appeared at the mediation. After the mediation, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review, which the district court denied. Appellant appealed, arguing that Bank of America lacked authority to negotiate a loan modification at the mediation because the note and deed of trust were assigned to two separate entities. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for judicial review and refusal to impose sanctions, holding that because Bank of America was not the deed of trust beneficiary at the time of the FMP mediation, Bank of America failed to satisfy Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086(4)'s attendance and participation requirement. Remanded. View " Bergenfield v. Bank of Am." on Justia Law

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This dispute arose out of a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding that Respondent bank initiated against a home owned by Appellants. Respondent purchased the home at the trustee's sale. When Appellants did not vacate, Respondent filed an unlawful detainer action. Appellants responded by filing a complaint seeking to quiet title to the property, alleging that Respondent did not own the promissory note or deed of trust and had foreclosed without proper notice under Nev. Rev. Sat. 107.080, invalidating the trustee's sale. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss Appellants' complaint, which the federal district court granted. Appellants appealed, arguing that the district court should not have ruled on the motion dismiss because the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine required the federal court to abstain in favor of the earlier-filed unlawful detainer action. The federal court agreed that if both the quiet title action and the unlawful detainer action were characterized as in rem or quasi in rem, then the court was required to vacate the district court's dismissal of the quiet title action. The Nevada Supreme Court accepted certification to answer the characterization of the parties' actions and held that quiet title and unlawful detainer proceedings are in rem or quasi in rem in nature. View "Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law

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This dispute arose out of a written option contract under which Respondent had the right to purchase real property from Appellants for $8 million. The property was subject to a deed of trust securing approximately $1.3 million in debt. At issue was whether the Respondent or Appellants were required to pay off the $1.3 million debt. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the option contract required Appellants to deliver clear title, meaning Appellants were required to remove the $1.3 encumbrance for a net $6.7 option price. Appellants appealed, arguing that the option contract contemplated that Respondent take title subject to preexisting encumbrances, so that Appellants received the full $8 million option price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly interpreted the option contract and that the contract placed responsibility for the $1.3 million debt on Appellants' side of the ledger. View " Galardi v. Naples Polaris, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2008, Regents Bank issued two loans to Appellant. After Appellant failed to repay either loan, Regents filed a complaint in district court for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The district court stayed the proceedings and compelled arbitration as provided in the loan documents. The arbitrator ultimately ruled in Regents' favor. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and later entered an amended judgment and order of sale. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) Regents employed undue means in procuring the award, and (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in refusing to void one of the loans. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award, holding (1) Appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the award was procured through intentionally misleading conduct; and (2) the arbitrator's refusal to void one of the loans was not a manifest disregard of the law. View "Sylver v. Regents Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Homeowner attended a first Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) mediation with Citimortgage, after which Defendant was denied a loan modification. The district court subsequently ordered a second mediation. PennyMac Corp. later obtained beneficial interest in the deed of trust and promissory note and attended the second mediation. The mediator determined that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust, and other documents to the mediation and that PennyMac's representative lacked authority to negotiate. Homeowner filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan modification. The district court imposed sanctions against PennyMac but declined to impose a loan modification or monetary sanctions beyond the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Homeowner had standing to challenge the district court's order on appeal; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in denying an FMP certificate and in determining sanctions. View " Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp." on Justia Law

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Respondents were involved in the development and construction of Holcomb Condominiums (Condos). Appellant was the homeowners' association for Condos. Appellant filed, on behalf of itself and all condominium homeowners, a constructional defect complaint against Respondents, alleging a variety of defects and claims for negligence and breach of warranty. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint as time-barred by the two-year contractual limitations period found in nearly identical arbitration agreements attached to each of the homeowners' purchase contracts. The court also denied as futile Appellant's request to amend its complaint to add causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent concealment based on missing roof underlayment, finding that the claim would also be time-barred by the contractual limitations period. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) arbitration agreements containing a reduced limitations period that are attached to and incorporated into purchase contracts are unlawful; (2) the district court erred in finding Appellants' negligence-based claims and breach of warranty claims were time-barred; and (3) because the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable, the district court's denial of the motion to amend on this basis was improper. View "Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2009, Respondents hired a construction company (Company) to construct a shooting range. Respondents paid Company's bills as the construction continued through the summer and fall. By September, Company had billed $48,810. Respondents paid $46,000 by October but then refused to pay anything further. Soon thereafter, Company quit the project, which was largely finished. The range opened for business soon after. At the end of the year, Respondents installed soundproofing to the building. In March 2010, Company recorded its mechanics lien. In August, Company filed a complaint against Respondents seeking to recover $40,000 in damages and costs. The district court held the lien was not timely and was therefore frivolous and ordered the lien released, ruling that the "work of improvement" of constructing the shooting range concluded more than ninety days before Company filed the lien. At issue on appeal was whether the soundproofing constituted a "work of improvement." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the soundproofing was not within the scope of the "work of improvement" or finding that the lien was untimely and frivolous. View "I. Cox Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

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Respondents sought to permanently enjoin their neighbor, Appellant, from constructing a wind turbine on his residential property, asserting that the proposed turbine would constitute a nuisance. The district court agreed and granted the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the order granting a permanent injunction prohibiting the wind turbine's construction, holding (1) the aesthetics of a wind turbine alone are not grounds for finding a nuisance, but a nuisance in fact may be found when the aesthetics are combined with other factors, such as noise, shadow flicker, and diminution in property value; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that the proposed residential wind turbine would be a nuisance in fact. View "Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision" on Justia Law

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Appellant Corporation executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on property to Respondents. Appellant did not pay annual property taxes, and a delinquent-tax certificate was issued. Because Corporation also did not make the payments due on Respondents' note, Respondents recorded a notice of default and election to sell. After a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Respondents purchased the property and brought this action against Appellants for the deficiency. Because Respondents did not record the trustee's deed until after the two-year period to redeem the property from the delinquent-tax certificate ran out, the county treasurer held the property in trust until Respondents paid the back taxes and penalties due. Appellants argued that Respondents could not validly foreclose while the county treasurer held the property in trust on the delinquent-tax certificate and that, without a valid foreclosure, Respondents were precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment. The district court disagreed and awarded Respondents a deficiency judgment against Corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the foreclosure sale was proper, and thus, the deficiency judgment was also proper. View "Bldg. Energetix Corp. v. EHE, LP" on Justia Law

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The City brought an eminent domain action to acquire a forty-foot-wide strip of real property from Respondent. Respondent's predecessor-in-interest originally acquired title to this property through a federal land patent that reserved a thirty-three-foot-wide easement across the strip of property for "roadway and public utilities purposes." The City asserted that it sought to utilize its existing rights to the thirty-three-foot right-of-way under the federal land patent's easement and to attain, by condemnation, the remaining seven-foot portion of land. The district court granted Respondent partial summary judgment and awarded Respondent $394,490 in compensation, concluding that the City lacked any right to use the easement because the federal patent did not specifically name the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the federal land patent did not create a thirty-three-foot-wide easement, as the plain meaning of the patent's language created a valid public easement; (2) determining that the City's proposed use of the easement constituted a taking, as the use of this easement was within its scope and did not strip Respondent of a property interest; and (3) awarding Respondent just compensation and attorney fees. View "City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law