Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in New Hampshire Supreme Court
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The case involves improvements made by Robin and Phyllis Gelinas to their condominium unit, which expanded into the limited common area. Plaintiffs Anthony and Rosemarie Moda and Anthony and Olga Alba sued the defendants, Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condominium Association and the Gelinases, seeking a declaratory judgment, costs and attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed, a decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s conclusion that provisions of the Fernwood declaration of condominium waived the requirements of RSA 356-B:19, I concerning the assignment and reassignment of limited common area.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The court found that the Fernwood declaration did not expressly provide a waiver from the requirement of RSA 356-B:19, I. The court concluded that the Gelinases' expansion into the limited common area required compliance with RSA 356-B:19, I, which necessitates the consent of all adversely affected unit owners. The court also disagreed with the trial court's finding that all unit owners were adversely affected as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Moda v. Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Monadnock Rod and Gun Club, reoriented its outdoor shooting range from an east-west to a south-north direction without obtaining site plan approval from the Town of Peterborough. This reorientation encroached on a neighboring property. Subsequently, the Town amended its zoning ordinance to require shooting ranges to be enclosed, indoor facilities. The primary issues are whether the Club’s shooting range was a lawful nonconforming use when the Town amended its zoning ordinance and whether state law prohibits the enforcement of the amended ordinance.The Superior Court found that the Club had trespassed onto the neighboring property and awarded damages to the property owners. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Town for zoning ordinance violations related to the south-north range. The Club applied for site plan review for an expanded east-west range, but the Town’s code enforcement officer determined that neither the east-west nor the south-north ranges were grandfathered as nonconforming uses. The Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) affirmed this decision and denied the Club’s application for a special exception. The planning board subsequently denied the Club’s site plan application. The Superior Court affirmed these decisions and denied the Club’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Club’s south-north range was not a lawful nonconforming use because it was constructed without site plan approval. Therefore, it could not qualify as a lawful nonconforming use when the zoning ordinance was amended. The court also upheld the ZBA’s denial of the special exception application, concluding that the ZBA correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant a special exception for an illegal nonconforming use. Additionally, the court found that the Town’s zoning ordinance was not preempted by state law and that the Club’s constitutional arguments were not preserved for review. View "Monadnock Rod and Gun Club v. Town of Peterborough" on Justia Law

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Caroline Adams suffered a spinal cord injury while sledding on property owned by Moose Hill Orchards, LLC, which operates under the name Mack’s Apples. Adams and her husband, Christopher Estrella, filed a lawsuit against Moose Hill for negligence and loss of consortium. The incident occurred in January 2022 when the plaintiffs visited Moose Hill, which allows the public to use a hill on its property for sledding at no charge. Moose Hill also operates a seasonal stand selling hot beverages and other goods to sledders. Adams was injured during sledding and is now paralyzed from the waist down.The Superior Court granted Moose Hill's motion to dismiss the case, citing recreational use immunity under RSA 508:14, I. The plaintiffs argued that the immunity should not apply because they were on the property for a purpose related to Moose Hill's business, which customarily charges for its goods. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Moose Hill qualifies for immunity under RSA 508:14, I, because it allows the public to use its land for recreational purposes without charge. The court distinguished this case from Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, where the ski resort charged for access to its recreational facilities. The court found that Moose Hill's sale of hot beverages was incidental to the free recreational use of the sledding hill and did not negate the "without charge" requirement of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Adams v. Moose Hill Orchards, LLC" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Robert and Susan Keller, co-trustees of the MIKA Trust, challenged the reassignment of a parking space by defendants Clement and Martha Dwyer from one condominium unit they owned to another unit they also owned. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief, alleging violations of the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B. The dispute arose after the Dwyers transferred Parking Space 2 from Unit 11 to Unit 20, which they owned, and subsequently sold Unit 11 without an assigned parking space to the plaintiffs.The Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Harbour Hill Condominium Association and the Dwyers. The court found that the assignment and reassignment of the parking spaces were authorized and properly effected. The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that although Harbour Hill’s declaration of condominium was deficient under RSA 356-B:16, I(e) for not designating the unit to which Parking Space 2 was assigned, this deficiency was cured by the condominium instruments, including the floor plan and form warranty deed. These documents, when read together, satisfied the requirements of the Condominium Act.The court also determined that the reassignment of Parking Space 2 complied with RSA 356-B:19, which governs the reassignment of limited common areas. The reassignment was authorized by the condominium declaration and had the consent of all affected unit owners, as required by the Act. The amendment to the declaration, reflecting the reassignment, was approved by a two-thirds majority of unit owners and recorded accordingly. Therefore, the court concluded that the reassignment was valid and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Keller v. Dwyer" on Justia Law

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David and Amy LeFevre own a residential property in Deering, New Hampshire, adjacent to a property owned by Tiffany and James Hogan. In 2002, a deed (the Spragg-McEwan deed) conveyed the LeFevre property and included a reservation for a 30-foot-wide easement for the benefit of the Hogan property. This easement was intended to provide access and utility purposes. The Hogans began using this easement, leading the LeFevres to file a lawsuit seeking to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the easement was invalid.The Superior Court initially granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the LeFevres. However, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Hogans, finding that the 2002 Spragg-McEwan deed validly created an easement over the LeFevre property. The court denied the LeFevres' motion for reconsideration and clarification, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Spragg-McEwan deed clearly intended to create an easement for the benefit of the Hogan property. The court rejected the "stranger to the deed" doctrine, which would have invalidated the easement because it was reserved for a third party not named in the deed. The court emphasized that modern principles of deed interpretation prioritize the intent of the parties over archaic formalistic requirements. The court also found that the deed was properly delivered and accepted, as evidenced by its recording and the clear intent expressed in a confirmatory deed. Thus, the easement was validly created, and the Hogans were entitled to use it. View "LeFevre v. Hogan" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, John Alexander Cucchi, owns a parcel of land south of Skatutakee Lake in Harrisville, New Hampshire. His property abuts the southern edge of Skatutakee Lake Road, which runs along the southern shore of the lake. A narrow strip of land, the disputed parcel, lies between the northern edge of the roadway and the lake. Both Cucchi and Pamela Worden, who owns adjacent land, claim ownership of this disputed parcel. Cucchi's claim traces back to a 1999 deed, while Worden's claim is based on a 2002 deed from the same original owner. In 2021, the Town of Harrisville conveyed most of its rights in the disputed parcel to Worden.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Worden and the Town of Harrisville, determining that Worden owned the disputed parcel and that Cucchi therefore lacked standing to challenge the Town’s release of its interest in the right-of-way to Worden. The court applied the presumption that landowners abutting public highways have fee ownership to the center of the road and concluded that the 1999 deed conveyed a fee interest only to the center of the traveled roadway.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case. The Supreme Court applied the whole-road presumption, which states that if a deed conveys to the side of a road, the effect is to convey the entire road if the grantor owns the land under the road and does not own the land on the other side. The court concluded that the 1999 deed did not reserve the fee underneath the right-of-way, and therefore, the whole-road presumption controls. The court determined that the 1999 deed conveyed the disputed parcel, and Cucchi now owns the underlying fee. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Cucchi v. Town of Harrisville" on Justia Law

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The case involves Mojalaki Holdings, LLC and GSSG New Hampshire, LLC (the plaintiffs) who appealed a decision by the City of Franklin Planning Board (the Board) that denied their site plan application to install a solar panel array on a piece of land owned by Mojalaki. The proposed solar panel array required the installation of new utility poles and the removal of mature trees to ensure sufficient sunlight. The land, which was mostly open space and was once a golf course, did not have any specific ordinance language addressing solar panel arrays. The Board, after multiple hearings and a site visit, denied the application based on concerns raised by neighbors about the project's potential impact on the scenery, property values, and previous negative experiences with other solar projects in the city.The Board's decision was upheld by the Superior Court, which agreed with the Board's first and third reasons for denial, namely that the installation of new utility poles would create an industrial look out of place in the neighborhood, and that cutting down mature trees contradicted the purpose provisions. However, the Superior Court did not uphold the Board's second basis, that the solar panel array endangered or adversely impacted the residents, due to lack of supporting facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Board could not rely solely on the purpose provisions to deny the application. The court found that the purpose provisions lacked sufficient specificity for site plan review and left the proposed project to be judged by the subjective views of the Board through ad hoc decision making. The court granted the plaintiffs a builder's remedy, allowing them to proceed with their development provided they comply with all other applicable regulations. View "Mojalaki Holdings v. City of Franklin" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Newfound Serenity, LLC, sought to develop a seasonal recreational vehicle park and applied for site plan approval from the Town of Hebron's Planning Board. The Planning Board denied the application, citing seven reasons. Newfound Serenity appealed this decision to both the Housing Appeals Board (HAB) and the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA). The HAB dismissed the appeal as untimely, while the ZBA overturned four of the Planning Board's reasons for denial, upheld one, and stated it lacked authority to address the remaining two. Newfound Serenity then filed a complaint in superior court, seeking review of both the Planning Board and ZBA decisions. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, based on the HAB's initial dismissal.The Superior Court agreed with the Town's argument that Newfound Serenity had effectively bifurcated its initial appeal, with the ZBA reviewing zoning ordinance-related reasons for denial and the HAB reviewing reasons outside the ZBA's jurisdiction. The Town argued that since the HAB dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal as untimely, and the plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal, the Planning Board’s decision on those issues became final. Therefore, even if the superior court were to reverse the ZBA’s decision, such a reversal would be moot because the Planning Board’s denial based on the two other reasons would remain effective. The Town also argued that because the plaintiff appealed the Planning Board decision in part to the HAB, the plaintiff waived its right to bring an action in superior court.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Superior Court's decision, concluding that the dismissal of the complaint was inconsistent with the statutes governing appeals from planning board decisions. The court found that the plaintiff's initial appeal to the HAB was not late, but premature, as the ZBA had not yet resolved the issues. The court held that the dismissal of a premature appeal by the HAB while the ZBA appeal was pending did not foreclose the plaintiff from pursuing its complaint in superior court. View "Newfound Serenity, LLC v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between the Commerce Park Condominium Association (Association) and Little Deer Valley, LLC (declarant), concerning the conversion of convertible land into a new structure, Building C, within the condominium. The declarant had recorded a declaration of condominium in 2005, reserving the right to create and build Building C on convertible land within five years. In 2010, shortly before the five-year deadline, the declarant recorded an amendment to the declaration and a new site plan, asserting that this action converted the convertible land. However, the Association contended that the amendment merely extended the declarant's right to convert for another five years, but did not actually convert the land.The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Association, holding that the Condominium Act required the declarant to physically construct Building C for conversion to occur. The court reasoned that since the declarant did not engage in any substantial construction of Building C before the extended deadline of May 9, 2015, its right to do so expired at that time. The court also concluded that the declarant's attempt to begin construction well after the May 9, 2015 deadline would be contrary to the Condominium Act's purpose to protect buyers and establish reasonable expectations among the parties.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that to convert convertible land, the Condominium Act required the declarant to file "appropriate instruments" within the five- to ten-year statutory deadline but did not require the declarant to physically construct Building C. The court also concluded that the declarant properly converted the convertible land when it filed the amended declaration and new site plan in 2010. Therefore, the declarant retained its statutory right to build Building C upon conversion. View "Commerce Park Condo. Ass'n v. Little Deer Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff, Candice K. Harvey, challenged the decision of the Superior Court affirming the Town of Barrington Planning Board's approval of a subdivision on a lot adjacent to her property. The lot was previously subdivided into two lots, one owned by the plaintiff and the other retained by the owners, David and Glenda Henderson. The Hendersons sought a variance to subdivide their lot into two residential lots and gain access via an easement over the plaintiff's lot. The plaintiff protested that the easement was initially meant for accessing only one lot, not two. The Superior Court affirmed the Planning Board's decision, validating the Zoning Board of Adjustment's authority to approve variances and amend subdivision plans under New Hampshire law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the decision of the Superior Court and remanded with instructions to vacate the Planning Board's approval of the subdivision application. The Court held that the easement, as specified in the plaintiff's deed and the 2006 plan, is to be used for a single lot and one buildable location only. Therefore, the Planning Board was precluded from approving the new plan absent legal access to the back lot consistent with RSA 674:41. The court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the Zoning Board of Adjustment or the Planning Board could modify the terms of the easement. The court also rejected arguments that the rule of reason should be applied to interpret the language of the easement, stating that the language was clear and unambiguous. View "Harvey v. Town of Barrington" on Justia Law