Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in New Hampshire Supreme Court
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Petitioner Winecellar Farm ("Winecellar") appealed a superior court order that found it was not entitled to: (1) a decree pro confesso awarding it specific performance to purchase the Bedard Farm ("Bedard"); (2) specific performance to purchase the farm under the part performance doctrine; and (3) continued haying in perpetuity under a lease agreement. Craig and Jennifer Rief purchased Winecellar, a working farm adjacent to the Bedard Farm. Bedard was owned by two siblings who until 2006, had lived there all their lives. The Riefs had enjoyed a close, friendly relationship with the Bedards until the Bedards died in 2006. The Riefs informed the Bedards on multiple occasions of their interest in buying the Bedard Farm when the Bedards were ready to sell. Until that time, the Riefs were content with farming the two properties together. In 2004, the Riefs and the Bedards signed a "memorandum of understanding" to harvest hay. In exchange, Winecellar/Riefs would maintain certain access ways and roadways to a shared driveway. In 2004, the Riefs wanted to lease the Bedard land to raise a small herd of buffalo to which the Bedards declined. In January 2006, the Bedards acquiesced to the Riefs' proposal to lease the land for buffalo. They drafted a "letter of understanding" for which the Riefs would lease the land, and later be given the opportunity to purchase the land should the Bedards sell. When the Bedards died, the land passed to their family. The Riefs filed a preliminary injunction in an attempt to preclude the Bedards' estate from evicting its buffalo and removing fencing equipment maintained on two leased pastures. Although the Bedard heirs filed responses in the case, their answer was untimely. The Riefs moved for a decree pro confesso for the right to purchase the Bedard land. The trial court denied the motion, but ordered a voluntary nonsuit as to the Bedard estate. On appeal, the Riefs argued that the sum of the various memoranda/letters of understanding constituted contracts for which specific performance was the only remedy. According to the Riefs, the monthly lease payments were in consideration for the right to purchase the land. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the record adequately supported the trial court's decisions to deny the Riefs specific performance for the Bedard Farm. Additionally, the Court found that the haying arrangement between the parties was not sufficient to constitute an "interest in land" consistent with "the ultimate intent that Winecellar Farm would own the Bedard Farm." As such, the Court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

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Petitioners Peter Gordon and the Peter Gordon Revocable Trust of 1999 own six oceanfront properties adjacent to and at the end of a road in the Town of Rye. Petitioners unsuccessfully appealed an order from the Town Board of Selectmen that a portion of the road had become public by prescription. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioners argued that the Boardâs conclusion was wrong. Central to the Board's conclusion was Petitioner's 1997 request to remove snow from the road. The Board reasoned that if the road was private, the Town would have had no duty to remove the snow. Upon consideration of matter, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented at the Board hearing was insufficient to declare the road a public road by prescription. The Court vacated the Board's decision, and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings.

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Bower Road in Henniker was originally designated a "public highway" in 1797. In 1895, the Town voted to discontinue the road. In 2002, Timothy Hanson purchased a parcel of land in Henniker which could only be accessed by the road. The neighbors disputed Mr. Hanson's use of the road, and he successfully brought suit to establish a right-of-way in the road. In 2009, Plaintiff Russell Forest Management acquired the Hanson property. Plaintiff applied to the Town Board of Selectmen for a building permit to construct a single-family home there. Following a hearing, the Board rejected Plaintiff's application, holding that the discontinued road could not be used as planned. The Board found that Plaintiff's property did not have the required frontage, rather, a simple right-of-way. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and the superior court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that over time, the discontinued "public highway" became a "private road" due to the nature of Mr. Hanson's original use to access his property. As a private road, Plaintiff argued the Board erred in finding that it did not meet the statutory requirements for frontage to the proposed single-family house. The Supreme Court found that the "road" indeed did not meet the Town's requirements of a private road nor as frontage to the property. Furthermore, the Court found that the "road" did not meet the criteria for being a qualified easement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's and the ZBA's decisions to deny Plaintiff its building permit.

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"Homes by George," run by Adelaide and Rick George, developed residential real estate known as "Esther's Estates" in Newton. Homes by George entered into a written contract with Defendant Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., in which Defendant agreed to perform certain work in connection with the development. Defendant was paid but did not complete the work. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and claimed that Defendant violated the State Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant counter-claimed that Plaintiff failed to pay amounts due in accordance with the contract. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings to allow a jury to first determine liability claims. A second trial was held on the contract claims. Plaintiffs won on all liability claims in the first trial, and received damages on its breach of contract and CPA claims at the second. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs challenged the amounts of damages they were awarded by the trial court. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its finding of violations under the CPA, and in its damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the grant of damages was appropriate in light of the terms of the contract, the state case law, and the evidence presented at trial. However, the Court questioned how the trial court arrived at the amount of damages. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on its damages award to Plaintiffs. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other aspects of its decision.

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Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company evicted Defendants James and Catherine Kevlik from their home. The Bank claimed it owned the property because it purchased it at a foreclosure auction in June, 2009. The Kevliks appeared at the eviction hearing and challenged the Bankâs claim that it had purchased the property. They said they attended the auction, and no one but the auctioneer showed up. The Kevliks tried to move the trial court to dismiss the case because the Bank couldnât prove it owned their property. The Bankâs attorney conceded that the documents he brought to prove the Bank owned the Kevliksâ home were not certified copies of official records. The Supreme Court concluded that the Bank could not prove it owned the property, and reversed the trial courtâs decision to grant judgment to the Bank.