Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Caliber Builders, Inc., sought to develop a parcel of land commonly referred to as "Golden Orchards." A small portion of the parcel is in Washington Township, but the bulk of it is in the Borough of Hillsdale, where it is included in the residential (R-2) zone. Intending of constructing an age-restricted housing development, which was a conditional use in the R-2 zone, Caliber submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Hillsdale Planning Board. Plaintiff Northgate Condominium Association, Inc., manages and operates a previously-existing condominium community built on an adjacent parcel of land in Washington Township. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lot designations contained in the notice of public hearings on an application for a conditional use approval sufficiently complied with the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law to confer jurisdiction on the Planning Board, and whether the project design of the internal roadway complied with requirements of the Residential Site Improvement Standards. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the developer's notice of public hearings, although using lot numbers that were not included on the official tax map, did not misidentify the lot to be developed, complied with the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law, and conferred jurisdiction on the Planning Board. "Plaintiff fail[ed] to point to anything in the record supporting its claim that the project design of the internal roadway did not comply with density requirements under the Residential Site Improvement Standards." View "Northgate Condominium Association, Inc. v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mazdabrook Commons Homeowner's Association, Inc. manages a common-interest community in which individual owners agree to certain common rules and restrictions for the benefit of the entire group. The Rules and Regulations of the community bar signs except as provided in a "Declaration." Defendant Wasim Khan lived in a planned townhouse community managed by Mazdabrook Commons. In 2005, Defendant ran for Parsippany Town Council and posted two signs in support of his candidacy at his private residence: one inside the window of his townhouse and another inside the door. Mazdabrook notified Defendant that the signs violated the association's rules and ordered their removal. Mazdabrook's regulations banned all residential signs except "For Sale" signs. Upon review, the Supreme Court "balance[ed] the minimal interference with Mazdabrook's private property interest against [Defendant's] free speech right to post political signs on his own property" and found that the sign policy in question violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution.

Defendant Frank A. Louis, Esq. represented Plaintiff Julia Gere in connection with Plaintiff's divorce from Peter Ricker. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement, Plaintiff had a six month window, which ended in October 2000, to decide how she wished to proceed with respect to the parties' ancillary real estate investments. Plaintiff's understanding was that she would retain a one-half interest in those assets unless she affirmatively advised Ricker within six months that she did not wish to do so. One of those assets was Navesink Partners, which owned both the real estate and business operations of a marina. Based on Louis's interpretation of Plaintiff’s wishes after a discussion with her friend, Louis sent a letter dated October 11, 2000, to Ricker's attorney stating, "this will confirm that except for the Marina, Mrs. Ricker wishes to maintain one-half interest in all other properties." Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Ricker maintained that Plaintiff had waived any interest in Navesink Partners, and Plaintiff contended that she did not waive her interest, that she wanted to continue her ownership interest in the marina's real estate, and that she was entitled to fair value for her interest in the marina's business operations. Plaintiff ultimately sued Louis for malpractice over the purported waiver of her interests in the marina property. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether "Puder v. Buechel" (183 N.J. 428 (2005)) barred Plaintiff's malpractice action against her former attorney and whether that claim was time-barred. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision that Plaintiff indeed was time barred, and that she voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement regarding the marina property which she testified was "fair and reasonable." Upon review, the Supreme Court found Plaintiff's case was materially distinguishable from "Puder," and that her legal malpractice claim was not barred.

Defendants Maryse and Emilio Guillaume failed to make their mortgage payment in April 2008, and made no payments since. In May 2008, the mortgage servicer "ASC" delivered a Notice of Intention to Foreclose informing them that the lender intended to file a foreclosure action and that they should seek the advice of an attorney. The notice of intention identified ASC, with a telephone number, as the entity to contact if they wished to dispute the calculation of the payment due or that a default had occurred. The name and address of the lender, Plaintiff U.S. Bank, did not appear anywhere on the notice. One month later, the Bank filed a foreclosure action. The complaint warned that judgment could be entered if Defendants failed to file an answer to the complaint within thirty-five days and that exercising their rights to dispute the debt did not excuse them from this requirement. For several months thereafter, the Guillaumes corresponded with ASC about the possibility of a loan modification to reduce their payment and to restore the loan to active status. However, the Guillaumes did not file an answer in the foreclosure action. The court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. The Guillaumes attempted to vacate the default judgment against them, arguing that the failure to provide the lender's name on the May 2008 notice of intent to foreclose was in violation of the Fair Foreclosure Act. The trial court denied the motion to vacate. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the trial court ordered the Bank to reissue a notice of intention and because the Guillaumes' other arguments did not warrant relief, the Court affirmed the denial of their motion to vacate the default judgment.

Plaintiff American Dream at Marlboro, L.L.C., is the successor in interest to Beacon Road Associates, L.L.C., an entity that served as the residential developer of a series of lots. In 1994 and 1995, Plaintiff’s predecessor sought the approval of the Marlboro Township Planning Board for "Beacon Woods I." In 1995, the Planning Board granted preliminary major subdivision approval specifically conditioned on the inclusion of a restriction in the deed for a "flag lot" that would preclude its further subdivision. In 1999, Defendant Patricia Cleary entered into a contract with Plaintiff to purchase one of the properties in the originally-approved development. Defendant's lot backed onto the flag lot. The Planning Board approved Plaintiff's application for a new subdivision. The resolution made no reference to the deed restriction. Plaintiff closed on the purchase of the additional land and vacated the easement that had provided that parcel with separate access to a nearby road. In 2002, when Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell the new subdivision to another developer, Plaintiff realized that it failed to reserve the easement that it needed to cross Defendant's property. When negotiations to secure Defendant's consent to the easement failed, Plaintiff redesigned the roadway so as to obviate the need the easement. In 2006, Plaintiff returned to the Planning Board and requested that it act on its 2003 application for an amendment to the subdivision approval, but the Board rejected it, noting that prior approvals had expired. In April 2003, Plaintiff filed suit for a declaration that its 2003 application had been approved by default. Defendant as intervenor, filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the flag lot was prohibited from being subdivided because of the earlier-imposed deed restriction, along with an order directing Plaintiff to record the deed restriction. The trial court concluded that the Planning Board could not approve the amended application because it lacked jurisdiction to eliminate the deed restriction. The court therefore entered an order declaring that all of the prior approvals for the subdivision were void, and it permitted Plaintiff to amend its complaint to eliminate the deed restriction based on changed circumstances. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification, and after review concluded the trial court misapplied the governing standards for considering the application to eliminate the restriction based on changed circumstances.

Plaintiff Blanca Gonzalez, and Monserate Diaz purchased a home as tenants in common. Diaz borrowed the downpayment from Cityscape Mortgage Corporation (Cityscape) and executed a note. Plaintiff did not sign the note. Plaintiff and Diaz secured that loan by mortgaging their home to Cityscape. Over time, Plaintiff fell behind on the payments and U.S. Bank obtained a foreclosure judgment. The trial court ordered that the home be sold to satisfy the judgment. Before the sheriffâs sale, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with Defendant Wilshire Credit Corporation (Wilshire), U.S. Bankâs servicing agent. Plaintiff was represented by a Legal Services attorney who helped negotiate the agreement. Plaintiff missed four payments to Wilshire. A scheduled sheriffâs sale was cancelled when the parties entered into a second agreement. Plaintiff was contacted and dealt with directly; neither Wilshire nor U.S. Bank notified the Legal Services attorney. Although Plaintiff had not missed a single payment required by the second agreement, instead of dismissing the foreclosure action as promised, Wilshire sent a letter to Plaintiff noting that the second agreement was about to expire and that a new agreement needed to be negotiated to avoid foreclosure. Plaintiff contacted the Legal Services attorney. When the attorney questioned Wilshire, it could not explain how it had come to the arrears amount set in the second agreement, or why Plaintiff was not deemed current on the loan. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Wilshire and U.S. Bank engaged in deceptive and unconscionable practices in violation of the CFA. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wilshire and U.S. Bank, finding that the CFA did not apply to post-judgment settlement agreements entered into to stave off a foreclosure sale. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated plaintiffâs CFA claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the post-foreclosure-judgment agreements in this case constituted stand-alone extensions of credit. In fashioning and collecting on such a loan, a lender or its servicing agent cannot use unconscionable practices in violation of the CFA.

In 2002, Defendants decided to purchase, renovate, and resell a home located in Medford Lakes. According to their plan, Defendants Christopher Masso and John Torrence would finance the purchase; Defendant James Githens would perform the renovations; and Defendant real estate agent Jennifer Lynch would serve as the listing agent. Plaintiff Debra Lombardi viewed the home and made an offer. The sales contract, which was signed by Masso and Torrence, indicated that the house was being sold to Lombardi âas isâ and that any guarantees, unless set in writing, would be void. However, handwritten into the contract was a notation to âsee construction addendum attached.â That addendum reflected at least seventy repairs and renovations. At the closing, the house was nowhere near completion. Masso agreed to place money in escrow to ensure completion of the renovations. The escrow was to be held until which time the renovations would be completed. Against her realtorâs advice, Lombardi went ahead with the closing. Thereafter, the house remained unfinished and Plaintiff filed suit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants, finding that Lombardi accepted the property âas is,â Defendants did not breach the contract, Defendants could not be held liable under the Consumer Fraud Act, and they made no misrepresentations. Later the trial judge would write a letter to the parties, including the dismissed defendants, informing them that he was going to reconsider his order granting summary judgment and was scheduling a new hearing on the issue. The judge ultimately vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Appellate Division granted defendantsâ motion for leave to appeal, remanded to the trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ultimately reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the Appellate Division correctly determined that the trial courtâs original summary judgment order dismissing several of the defendants was issued in error, the trial judge was well within his discretion in revisiting and vacating the summary judgment order.

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether a condominium complex is liable in tort for injury sustained by a pedestrian on its abutting sidewalk. "551 Observer Highway" is the site of a 104-unit condominium complex (the Building). Each unit is owned in fee simple by individual residents who have an undivided interest in the common elements. Every unit owner is a member of the Skyline at Hoboken Condominium Association, Inc. (Skyline), and only an owner may be a Skyline member. The Master Deed requires owners to pay an âAnnual Common Expenseâ assessment, which is used for, among other things, maintaining the common elements and paying insurance premiums. According to the Master Deed, âcommon elementsâ included â[a]ll curbs, sidewalks, stoops, hallways, stairwells, porches and patios.â On the morning of February 14, 2006, while walking on the sidewalk abutting the Building, Plaintiff Richard Luchejko slipped on a sheet of ice and was injured. Plaintiff sued Skyline, CM3 (its property manager), the City of Hoboken, and D&D (a snow-clearing services company) alleging negligence for an unsafe sidewalk. All Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Skyline, CM3, and Hoboken, but not to D&D. Plaintiff then settled his claim with D&D and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment to the remaining Defendants. Upon review of the appellate record, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division properly analyzed the facts of this case and concluded that no sidewalk liability attached for the injury to Plaintiff.

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether a condominium complex is liable in tort for injury sustained by a pedestrian on its abutting sidewalk. "551 Observer Highway" is the site of a 104-unit condominium complex (the Building). Each unit is owned in fee simple by individual residents who have an undivided interest in the common elements. Every unit owner is a member of the Skyline at Hoboken Condominium Association, Inc. (Skyline), and only an owner may be a Skyline member. The Master Deed requires owners to pay an âAnnual Common Expenseâ assessment, which is used for, among other things, maintaining the common elements and paying insurance premiums. According to the Master Deed, âcommon elementsâ included â[a]ll curbs, sidewalks, stoops, hallways, stairwells, porches and patios.â On the morning of February 14, 2006, while walking on the sidewalk abutting the Building, Plaintiff Richard Luchejko slipped on a sheet of ice and was injured. Plaintiff sued Skyline, CM3 (its property manager), the City of Hoboken, and D&D (a snow-clearing services company) alleging negligence for an unsafe sidewalk. All Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Skyline, CM3, and Hoboken, but not to D&D. Plaintiff then settled his claim with D&D and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment to the remaining Defendants. Upon review of the appellate record, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division properly analyzed the facts of this case and concluded that no sidewalk liability attached for the injury to Plaintiff.

Plaintiffs William and Vivian Allen contracted defendant V and A Brothers, Inc. (V&A) to landscape their property and build a retaining wall to enable the installation of a pool. At the time, V&A was wholly owned by two brothers, Defendants Vincent DiMeglio, who subsequently passed away, and Angelo DiMeglio. The corporation also had one full-time employee, Defendant Thomas Taylor. After V&A completed the work, Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint naming both corporate and individual defendants. The first count was directed solely to V&A and alleged that the corporation breached its contract with Plaintiffs by improperly constructing the retaining wall and using inferior backfill material. The second count was directed to the corporation and Vincent's estate, Angelo, and Taylor individually, alleging three "Home Improvement Practices" violations of the state Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Before trial, the trial court granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against them, holding that the CFA did not create a direct cause of action against the individuals. Plaintiffs' remaining claims were tried and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on all counts, awarding damages totaling $490,000. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order dismissing the claims against the individual defendants under the CFA. The panel remanded the matter to determine whether any of the individual defendants had personally participated in the regulatory violations that formed the basis for Plaintiffs' CFA complaint. The panel precluded relitigation of the overall quantum of damages found by the jury in the trial against the corporate defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that employees and officers of a corporation might be individually liable under the CFA for acts they undertake through the corporate entity. Furthermore, individual defendants are not collaterally estopped from relitigating the quantum of damages attributable to the CFA violations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.