Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Ranco Sand and Stone Corporation, the owner of two parcels of contiguous property in an area zoned for residential use, applied to rezone one parcel to heavy industrial use. The Town of Smithtown’s Planning Board, acting as the lead agency under State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), adopted a resolution issuing a positive declaration that rezoning the parcel may have a significant effect on the environment and required Ranco to prepare a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS). Ranco commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the Town and the members of the Town Board, seeking to annul the positive declaration and requesting mandamus relief directing the Town to process the rezoning application without a DEIS. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the matter not ripe for judicial review. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the SEQRA positive declaration was the initial step in the decision-making process and did not give rise to a justiciable controversy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Town’s SEQRA positive determination was not ripe for judicial review. View "Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v. Vecchio" on Justia Law

James Pyne, who died during these proceedings, was the founder and sole stockholder of Remet Corporation. Pyne sold Remet’s stock and facilities, along with real property he had been leasing to Remet, to Burmah Castro Holding, Inc. The sales agreement contained an indemnification provision obligating Pyne to indemnify, defendant, and holder the buyer harmless for certain environmental losses. Remet later received a letter from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) notifying Remet that it was a potentially responsible party for environmental contamination at the Erie Canal Site adjacent to Remet’s real property. Remet filed notices of claim against Pyne’s estate seeking indemnification for environmental liabilities under the sales agreement. Remet then brought this action against the Estate asserting claims for contractual and common-law indemnification. Supreme Court granted Remet summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that DEC’s letter did not require Remet to take action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the letter was sufficiently coercive and adversarial as to require action in connection with any environmental law pursuant to the sales agreement; and (2) Remet was entitled to contractual indemnification for past and future environmental losses arising out of DEC’s investigation and remediation of the Erie Canal Site. View "Remet Corp. v. Estate of Pyne" on Justia Law

The Village of Kings Point adopted a proposal to build a facility in Kings Point Park. Plaintiffs filed an action against the Village, its Mayor and its Board of Trustees seeking to enjoin the Village’s proposed project and its current use of a portion of the Park for storage as unlawful uses of parkland in violation of the public trust doctrine. The State then filed an action against the Village seeking relief with respect to the Village’s proposed project. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the State and Plaintiffs, permanently enjoining Defendants from proceeding with the project and from obstructing existing access to the Park and directing the Village to remove the materials being stored in the Park. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the causes of action challenging the proposed project were not barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the continuing wrong doctrine applied to toll the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the ongoing use of parkland alleged to violate the public trust doctrine. View "Capruso v. Village of Kings Point" on Justia Law

The Board of Managers of the French Oaks Condominium, a residential complex located in the Town of Amherst, commenced a Real Property Tax Law article 7 proceeding against the Town challenging the Town’s tax assessment of the development as excessive. A referee concluded that the Board established that its property was overassessed and directed the Town to amend its tax roll and remit any tax overpayments to the Board. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board did not rebut the presumption that the initial tax assessment was valid. View "Bd. of Managers of French Oaks Condo. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

Petitioner purchased an apartment building on Staten Island. Petitioner’s parents lived in the building, and Petitioner stayed in their apartment on occasion to attend to their medical needs. Petitioner leased the other two apartments in the building to tenants. For the tax years in question, Petitioner filed nonresident income tax returns in New York. The Department of Taxation and Finance later issued a notice of deficiency, determining that Petitioner owed additional New York income taxes because he maintained a “permanent place of abode” at the Staten Island property during the relevant years. The Tax Appeals Tribunal sustained the deficiency, concluding that in order to qualify as a statutory resident under the Tax Law, a taxpayer need not actually dwell in the permanent place of abode but need only maintain it. Petitioner challenged the Tribunal’s determination, contending that the standard to be applied when determining whether a person “maintains a permanent place of abode” in New York should turn on whether he maintained living arrangements for himself to reside at the dwelling. The Court of Appeals agreed with Petitioner, holding that in order for an individual to qualify as a statutory resident, there must be some basis to conclude that the dwelling was utilized as the taxpayer’s residence. View "Gaied v. N.Y. State Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

Appellant was a land owner seeking to develop property located in the Town of Brookhaven as a site for a Lowe's Home Improvement Center. The Town sought to rezone property that included Appellant's parcel from "J Business 2" (J-2) to commercial recreation (CR) zoning. The proposed Lowe's Center would not have complied with the CR zone classification. Before a hearing on the classification issue, Appellant's predecessor in interest submitted a site plan application to the Town for the Lowe's Center to be built on the parcel. The Town subsequently adopted a resolution rezoning the parcel to CR. Appellant sought a declaration that the site plan application was subject to review under the previous J-2 zoning classification because the Town had unduly delayed the review of the application. On remand, Supreme Court concluded that special facts warranted the application of the previous J-2 zoning classification to Appellant's application. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to meet the threshold requirement that it was entitled to the requested land use permit under the law as it existed when it filed its application, and the special facts exception did not apply to this case. View "Rocky Point Drive-In, L.P. v Town of Brookhaven" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a lifelong resident of a housing complex operated under the Limited-Profit Housing Companies Act and the Private Housing Finance Law. After Petitioner's parents vacated the apartment, Petitioner filed a successive application to succeed to the tenancy. The housing complex rejected the application. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) denied Petitioner's appeal, basing its denial on the fact that Petitioner's mother had failed to file an annual income affidavit listing Petitioner as a co-occupant for one of the two years prior to her vacatur. Supreme Court annulled DHCR's denial of Petitioner's appeal and granted his succession petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the evidence of Petitioner's primary residency was overwhelming, and because the was no relationship between the mother's failure to file the income affidavit and Petitioner's income or occupancy, DHCR's determination was arbitrary and capricious. View "Murphy v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner of an apartment building, complained when Armory Plaza, the owner of the lot next to Plaintiff's building, began excavating the lot to make way for a new building. The excavation purportedly caused cracks in the walls and foundations of Plaintiff's building. After Plaintiff's insurer (Defendant) rejected Plaintiff's claims under its policy, Plaintiff brought suit. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, holding that the alleged conduct of Armory and its contractors was not "vandalism" within the meaning of the policy. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) for purposes of construing a property insurance policy covering acts of vandalism, malicious damage may be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the covered property; and (2) the state of mind required to find malicious damage is a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct in question may be called willful or wanton. View "Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner commenced a N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 7 proceeding challenging the valuation by the City of Syracuse's Board of Assessment Review of five houses near Syracuse University used as rental housing for college students. Petitioner claimed that the property valuations, which took place over a four-year period, did not account for the adverse effect the presence of lead paint would have on market value. Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the properties were overvalued or that the assessments were incorrect. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to proffer substantial evidence demonstrating that the presence of lead paint resulted in devaluation in the market value of the five properties for the years at issue. View "Roth v. City of Syracuse" on Justia Law

This mortgage foreclosure action arose from a failed redevelopment of a hotel complex. The complex consisted of several interconnected properties, including the hotel property, a tower building, and another building. The lender for the redevelopment and numerous mechanic's lienors dispute the priority of their respective claims to the proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the tower building. At issue before the Court of Appeals was N.Y. Lien Law 22, which subordinates a building loan mortgage made pursuant to an unfiled building loan contract to subsequently filed mechanic's liens. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the loan agreement made with the lender was a building loan contract, but the lender's mortgage was not entitled to first priority because the lender never filed the loan agreement; and (2) the lender was entitled to priority with respect to the loan proceeds used to refinance the existing mortgage, as the subordination penalty did not apply in this circumstance. View "Altshuler Shaham Provident Funds, Ltd. v. GML Tower, LLC" on Justia Law