Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A developer, Schooldev East, LLC, proposed to build a charter school in the Town of Wake Forest and applied for major subdivision and site plan permits. The proposed site was a 35-acre parcel within a larger tract of land. The developer's plans included constructing a multi-use path to provide pedestrian and bicycle access to nearby areas. The Town's planning board and board of commissioners (BOC) held hearings and ultimately denied the applications, citing non-compliance with the Town's Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) requirements for pedestrian and bicycle connectivity to surrounding residential areas.The Superior Court of Wake County affirmed the BOC's decision, concluding that the developer failed to demonstrate compliance with the UDO and that the Town's requirements were not preempted by state law. The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, also affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, agreeing that the developer did not meet its burden of production to show entitlement to the permits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that the UDO provision in question was unclear regarding whether it required connectivity to all surrounding residential areas. The Court held that any ambiguity in land use ordinances should be resolved in favor of the free use of property. The Court concluded that the developer had presented competent, material, and substantial evidence of compliance with the UDO by proposing a multi-use path that provided access to a public park and a future residential subdivision. As no evidence was presented in opposition, the BOC had no basis to deny the applications. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions for the Town to approve the developer's applications. View "Schooldev East, LLC v. Town of Wake Forest" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of compensation following an eminent domain action by the Department of Transportation (DOT) against Bloomsbury Estates, LLC (the Developer) and Bloomsbury Estates Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association). The DOT took a portion of the property, which included development rights held by the Developer under a condominium declaration. The Developer and the Association disagreed on how to apportion the compensation for the taking.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Developer, distributing the majority of the compensation to the Developer based on the valuation of development rights. The Association argued that unresolved issues in separate litigation regarding the validity of the development rights should affect the distribution. The trial court, however, concluded that the validity of the development rights had been settled in a separate action and was not subject to relitigation in the eminent domain proceeding.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the unresolved issues in the separate litigation were material to the distribution of the compensation and that a jury should determine the credibility of the appraisers' valuations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that all issues related to the title and interests in the property had been resolved in the N.C.G.S. § 136-108 hearing, and the trial court properly used the appraisals to determine the distribution of the compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirming the trial court's distribution of the compensation. View "Department of Transportation v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC" on Justia Law

Alison Arter purchased land from Stephen and Sharon Burt in Orange County, which included a home and a horse farm. The Burts retained ownership of an adjacent property. In 2020, a developer sought to subdivide the Burts' property to build homes, planning a road along the property line next to Arter's land. Arter argued that a thirty-foot buffer was required between the road and her property based on the zoning ordinances. The Orange County Planning & Inspections Department disagreed, stating no buffer was needed as both properties were zoned "R-1" residential.Arter appealed to the Orange County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the department's decision. She then sought judicial review in Superior Court, which also affirmed the decision. Arter appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a divided panel ruled. The majority held that the zoning ordinances required buffers only between different zoning districts, not within the same district, thus affirming the lower court's decision. The dissent argued that the accompanying table suggested buffers were required based on land use, necessitating further fact-finding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The Court held that the text of the zoning ordinance, which required buffers based on zoning districts, controlled over any conflicting information in the accompanying table. Since both properties were zoned "R-1," no buffer was required. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the zoning ordinances were unambiguous and did not mandate a buffer between the properties. View "Arter v. Orange County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a tract of land in North Carolina. The defendants, Wade and Teresa Cornett, have lived on the property since 1983 and purchased it in 1995. The deed showed a thirty-foot access easement along the western edges of the property, which the Cornetts had used for access to a road. Over the years, the Cornetts made various improvements in the easement, under the belief that they owned the property in the easement. In 2019, the plaintiffs, Joanne and William Hinman, purchased the land from the Churches, who had inherited it from Bennie Church, the Cornetts' former neighbor. The Hinmans commissioned a survey, which confirmed the existence of the easement on their land. They demanded the Cornetts remove the improvements built inside the easement and asserted that the Cornetts could not use the portion of the paved driveway falling outside the easement boundary. The Cornetts refused, and the Hinmans brought suit for trespass and to quiet title.The trial court granted summary judgment for the Hinmans on all claims. The Cornetts appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals opined that the Cornetts’ evidence showed open, continuous, exclusive, actual, and notorious use of the disputed land for over twenty years. The dissenting judge disagreed, arguing that the Cornetts’ use was permissive and tolled the running of the twenty-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the Cornetts’ evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the hostility of their possession of the land. The court found that the Cornetts’ mistaken belief of ownership and their permanent improvements on the property constituted evidence rebutting the presumption of permissive use. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hinman v. Cornett" on Justia Law

In 2000, Betty J. Brown took title to a property in Charlotte, North Carolina. She obtained a loan from First Horizon Home Loan Corporation in 2004, secured by a deed of trust. In 2010, a judgment was entered against Brown in South Carolina, which was domesticated and recorded in North Carolina in 2014. In 2016, Brown refinanced the First Horizon loan with Nationstar Mortgage LLC, which paid off the remainder of the First Horizon loan. The deed of trust for the Nationstar loan was recorded after the 2010 judgment. MidFirst Bank is Nationstar’s successor in interest for the 2016 loan. In 2019, enforcement proceedings began against Brown to collect the 2010 judgment. The property was seized and sold at an execution sale, with Brown's daughter, Michelle Anderson, placing the successful bid.The trial court granted summary judgment to MidFirst Bank, asserting that the Nationstar deed of trust still encumbered the property even after the execution sale. The court also held that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied, allowing Nationstar to assume the rights and priorities of the First Horizon deed of trust. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the Nationstar lien was extinguished by the execution sale and that the doctrine of equitable subrogation was not available to MidFirst Bank because it was not "excusably ignorant" of the publicly recorded judgment.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that it erred by applying the incorrect standard regarding equitable subrogation. The court held that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applies when money is expressly advanced to extinguish a prior encumbrance and is used for this purpose. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to be remanded to the trial court for reassessment under the correct legal standard. View "MidFirst Bank v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a landlord, in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, a tenant. The plaintiff had suffered serious burns in an explosion caused by a gas leak in the rental property. He claimed that the landlord had been negligent, violated the Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and breached the implied warranty of habitability.The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision. The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that he had notified the landlord of the issues with the flooring or the heating system, or that the landlord had any actual knowledge of these issues. Consequently, the landlord's duty under the RRAA had not yet arisen. Therefore, the landlord could not be held liable for negligence, violation of the RRAA, or breach of the implied warranty of habitability.The Court further clarified that the RRAA does not completely abrogate the common law principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) in relation to repairs and dangerous conditions on leased residential premises. The RRAA only imposes a duty on the landlord to make repairs after receiving notice or acquiring actual knowledge of the need for them. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on all of the plaintiff's claims, reinstated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the matter. View "Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Midland ordering Defendants to pay the Town a total of $97,400 in civil penalties but remanding the trial court's mandatory permanent injunction and abatement order and reversing the trial court's denial of Defendants' request for attorney's fees, holding that there was no error.In an earlier round of litigation, the court of appeals determined that Defendants were under a continuing responsibility to maintain the roads in a residential subdivision. The zoning administrator later sent Defendants a demand letter informing them that they owed civil penalties. When Defendants took no action, the Town filed suit, seeking a mandatory injunction and order of abatement requirement Defendants to repair the roads at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town. The court of appeals affirmed the civil penalties but reversed the permanent injunction and abatement order for failure to survive appellate scrutiny. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Town had standing to bring this suit; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that it was bound by the prior decision of another panel holding Defendants responsible for the subdivision's roads. View "Town of Midland v. Harrell" on Justia Law

In this case requiring a determination of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC's scope of authority under an easement it acquired to create Lake Norman, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the superior court, holding that the easement's plain language was clear and unambiguous and that Duke's actions were encompassed with the easement's broad grant of authority.In 1961, Duke purchased the easement at issue, which covered a tract of what is now known as Lake Norman. In 2017, after the lake level receded, Duke filed suit against Defendants alleging trespass and wrongful interference with the easement by building a retaining wall and backfilling the lakebed area subject to Duke's easement. The trial court ordered Defendants to remove the retaining wall and clear the backfilled area from the lakebed and then granted summary judgment for Duke on its remaining trespass claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Duke acted within its broad authority under the easement and that the trial court did not err. View "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and holding that eight of nine restrictive covenants governing Plaintiffs' lots within the parties' residential subdivision were extinguished by operation of North Carolina's Real Property Marketable Title Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 47B-1 to 47B-9, holding that the eight covenants were extinguished by operation of law.At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the Act's thirteenth enumerated exception did not apply to save all of the nine restrictive covenants in question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that all but one of the restrictive covenants, as applied to Plaintiffs' property, were to be extinguished under the Act; and (2) a plain reading of section 47B-3(13) exempts from extinguishment only those covenants that actually require that a property be used residentially within the confines of a general or uniform scheme of development. View "C Investments 2, LLC v. Auger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the trial court's order authorizing sale and remanded the case, holding that the condominium association Executive Office Park of Durham Association, Inc. (Executive Office) had the power of sale for foreclosure pursuant N.C. Gen. Stat. 47C-3-116 for nonpayment of an assessment that occurred after October 1, 1986.The condominium in this case was formed prior to the enactment of the North Carolina Condominium Act in 1985. In 2018, Executive Office filed a claim of lien against three units owned by Martin Rock, alleging that assessments and other charges from 2018 had remained unpaid for more than thirty days. Thereafter, the substitute trustee sainitiated a power of sale foreclosure. The superior court entered an order authorizing sale. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Executive Office lacked the power of sale for foreclosure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by failing to apply N.C. Gen. Stat. 47C-1-102(a) when addressing Rock's argument that Executive Office lacked the power of sale for foreclosure; and (2) because the condominium was created in North Carolina before October 1, 1986 and the assessments and non-payment occurred after that date, Executive Office possessed the power of sale permitted by section 47C-3-116(f). View "In re Foreclosure of a Lien by Executive Office Park of Durham Ass'n against Rock" on Justia Law